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WAMP Advanced Profile

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1. WAMP Advanced Profile

While all implementations MUST implement the subset of the Basic Profile necessary for the particular set of WAMP roles they provide, they MAY implement any subset of features from the Advanced Profile. Implementers SHOULD implement the maximum of features possible considering the aims of an implementation.

Note: Features listed here may be experimental or underspecced and yet unimplemented in any implementation. This part of the specification is very much a work in progress. An approximate status of each feature is given at the beginning of the feature section.

1.1. Feature Announcement

Support for advanced features must be announced by the peers which implement them. The following is a complete list of advanced features currently defined or proposed.

Advanced RPC Features

Feature	Status	Caller	Dealer	Callee
Progressive Call Results	stable	Х	Х	Х

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Feature	Status	Caller	Dealer	Callee
Progressive Call Invocations	alpha	Х	Х	Х
Call Timeout	alpha	Х	Х	Х
Call Canceling	alpha	Х	Х	Х
Caller Identification	stable	Х	Х	Х
Call Trustlevels	alpha		Х	Х
Registration Meta API	beta		Х	
Pattern-based Registration	stable		Х	Х
Shared Registration	beta		Х	Х
Sharded Registration	alpha		Х	Х
Registration Revocation	alpha		Х	Х
(Interface) Procedure Reflection	sketch		Х	

Table 1

Advanced PubSub Features

Feature	Status	Publisher	Broker	Subscriber
Subscriber Blackwhite Listing	stable	Х	Х	
Publisher Exclusion	stable	Х	Х	
Publisher Identification	stable	Х	Х	Х
Publication Trustlevels	alpha		Х	Х
Subscription Meta API	beta		Х	
Pattern-based Subscription	stable		Х	Х
Sharded Subscription	alpha		Х	Х
Event History	beta		Х	
(Interface) Topic Reflection	sketch		Х	

Table 2

Other Advanced Features

Feature	Status
Challenge-response Authentication	stable
Ticket authentication	beta
Cryptosign authentication	beta
RawSocket transport	stable
Batched WebSocket transport	sketch
HTTP Longpoll transport	beta
Session Meta API	beta
Call Rerouting	sketch
Payload Passthru Mode	sketch

Table 3

The status of the respective AP feature is marked as follows:

Status	Description
sketch	There is a rough description of an itch to scratch, but the feature use case isn't clear, and there is no protocol proposal at all.
alpha	The feature use case is still fuzzy and/or the feature definition is unclear, but there is at least a protocol level proposal.
beta	The feature use case is clearly defined and the feature definition in the spec is sufficient to write a prototype implementation. The feature definition and details may still be incomplete and change.
stable	The feature definition in the spec is complete and stable and the feature use case is field proven in real applications. There are multiple, interoperable implementations.

Table 4

1.2. Additional Messages

The Advanced Profile defines additional WAMP-level messages which are explained in detail in separate sections. The following 4 additional message types MAY be used in the Advanced Profile and their direction between peer roles. Here, "Tx" ("Rx") means the message is sent (received) by a peer of the respective role.

Code	Message	Publisher	Broker	Subscriber	Caller	Dealer	Callee
4	CHALLENGE	Rx	Tx	Rx	Rx	Tx	Rx
5	AUTHENTICATE	Tx	Rx	Тх	Tx	Rx	Tx
49	CANCEL				Tx	Rx	
69	INTERRUPT					Tx	Rx

Table 5

1.2.1. CHALLENGE

The CHALLENGE message is used with certain Authentication Methods. During authenticated session establishment, a **Router** sends a challenge message.

[CHALLENGE, AuthMethod|string, Extra|dict]

1.2.2. AUTHENTICATE

The AUTHENTICATE message is used with certain Authentication Methods. A **Client** having received a challenge is expected to respond by sending a signature or token.

[AUTHENTICATE, Signature|string, Extra|dict]

1.2.3. CANCEL

The CANCEL message is used with the Call Canceling advanced feature. A *Caller* can cancel and issued call actively by sending a cancel message to the *Dealer*.

[CANCEL, CALL.Request|id, Options|dict]

1.2.4. INTERRUPT

The INTERRUPT message is used with the Call Canceling advanced feature. Upon receiving a cancel for a pending call, a *Dealer* will issue an interrupt to the *Callee*.

[INTERRUPT, INVOCATION.Request|id, Options|dict]

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2. Meta API

2.1. Session Meta API

WAMP enables the monitoring of when sessions join a realm on the router or when they leave it via **Session Meta Events**. It also allows retrieving information about currently connected sessions via **Session Meta Procedures**.

Meta events are created by the router itself. This means that the events, as well as the data received when calling a meta procedure, can be accorded the same trust level as the router.

Note that an implementation that only supports a *Broker* or *Dealer* role, not both at the same time, essentially cannot offer the **Session Meta API**, as it requires both roles to support this feature.

The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in

- Compiled Binary Schema: <WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
- FlatBuffers Schema Source: <WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs

which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by **both** *Dealers* and *Brokers* via:

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. session_meta_api|bool := true

Here is a WELCOME message from a *Router* with support for both the *Broker* and *Dealer* role, and with support for **Session Meta API**:

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```
[
   2 .
  4 5 8 0 2 6 8 5 5 4 6 5 6 1 1 3.
    "authid":"OL 3 AeppwDLXiAAPbqm 9 IVhnw",
    "authrole": "anonymous",
    "authmethod": "anonymous",
    "roles": {
      "broker": {
         "features": {
           "session_meta_api": true
        }
      },
      "dealer": {
         "features": {
           "session_meta_api": true
        }
      }
    }
  }
]
```

Note in particular that the feature is announced on both the *Broker* and the *Dealer* roles.

2.1.1. Events

A client can subscribe to the following session meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a session:

- wamp.session.on_join: Fired when a session joins a realm on the router.
- wamp.session.on_leave: Fired when a session leaves a realm on the router or is disconnected.

Session Meta Events MUST be dispatched by the *Router* to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.

2.1.1.1. wamp.session.on_join

Fired when a session joins a realm on the router. The event payload consists of a single positional argument details|dict:

- session|id The session ID of the session that joined
- authid|string The authentication ID of the session that joined
- authrole|string The authentication role of the session that joined
- authmethod|string The authentication method that was used for authentication the session that joined
- authprovider|string- The provider that performed the authentication of the session that joined

• transport|dict - Optional, implementation defined information about the WAMP transport the joined session is running over.

See **Authentication** for a description of the authid, authrole, authmethod and authprovider properties.

2.1.1.2. wamp.session.on_leave

Fired when a session leaves a realm on the router or is disconnected. The event payload consists of three positional arguments:

- session|id The session ID of the session that left
- authid | string` The authentication ID of the session that left
- authrole|string The authentication role of the session that left

2.1.2. Procedures

A client can actively retrieve information about sessions, or forcefully close sessions, via the following meta-procedures:

- wamp.session.count: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the realm.
- wamp.session.list: Retrieves a list of the session IDs for all sessions currently attached to the realm.
- wamp.session.get: Retrieves information on a specific session.
- wamp.session.kill: Kill a single session identified by session ID.
- wamp.session.kill_by_authid: Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authid.
- wamp.session.kill_by_authrole: Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authrole.
- wamp.session.kill_all: Kill all currently connected sessions in the caller's realm.

Session meta procedures MUST be registered by the *Router* on the same realm as the WAMP session about which information is retrieved.

2.1.2.1. wamp.session.count

Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the realm.

Positional arguments

1. filter_authroles|list[string] - Optional filter: if provided, only count sessions with an authrole from this list.

Positional results

1. count|int - The number of sessions currently attached to the realm.

2.1.2.2. wamp.session.list

Retrieves a list of the session IDs for all sessions currently attached to the realm.

Positional arguments

1. filter_authroles|list[string] - Optional filter: if provided, only count sessions with an authrole from this list.

Positional results

1. session_ids|list - List of WAMP session IDs (order undefined).

2.1.2.3. wamp.session.get

Retrieves information on a specific session.

Positional arguments

1. session id - The session ID of the session to retrieve details for.

Positional results

- 1. details|dict Information on a particular session:
 - $^\circ$ session|id The session ID of the session that joined
 - ° authid|string The authentication ID of the session that joined
 - $^{\circ}$ authrole|string The authentication role of the session that joined
 - authmethod|string The authentication method that was used for authentication the session that joined
 - authprovider|string- The provider that performed the authentication of the session that joined
 - transport|dict Optional, implementation defined information about the WAMP transport the joined session is running over.

See **Authentication** for a description of the authid, authrole, authmethod and authprovider properties.

Errors

• wamp.error.no_such_session - No session with the given ID exists on the router.

2.1.2.4. wamp.session.kill

Kill a single session identified by session ID.

The caller of this meta procedure may only specify session IDs other than its own session. Specifying the caller's own session will result in a wamp.error.no_such_session since no *other* session with that ID exists.

The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE sent to the closed session.

Positional arguments

1. session id - The session ID of the session to close.

Keyword arguments

- 1. reason|uri reason for closing session, sent to client in GOODBYE.Reason.
- 2. message|string additional information sent to client in GOODBYE.Details under the key "message".

Errors

- wamp.error.no_such_session No session with the given ID exists on the router.
- wamp.error.invalid_uri A reason keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.

2.1.2.5. wamp.session.kill_by_authid

Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authid.

If the caller's own session has the specified authid, the caller's session is excluded from the closed sessions.

The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE sent to the closed session.

Positional arguments

1. authid|string - The authentication ID identifying sessions to close.

Keyword arguments

- 1. reason|uri reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
- 2. message|string additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details under the key "message".

Positional results

1. sessions|list - The list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed.

Errors

• wamp.error.invalid_uri - A reason keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.

2.1.2.6. wamp.session.kill_by_authrole

Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authrole.

If the caller's own session has the specified authrole, the caller's session is excluded from the closed sessions.

The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE sent to the closed session.

Positional arguments

1. authrole|string - The authentication role identifying sessions to close.

Keyword arguments

- 1. reason|uri reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
- 2. message|string additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details under the key "message".

Positional results

1. count | int - The number of sessions closed by this meta procedure.

Errors

• wamp.error.invalid_uri - A reason keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.

2.1.2.7. wamp.session.kill_all

Kill all currently connected sessions in the caller's realm.

The caller's own session is excluded from the closed sessions. Closing all sessions in the realm will not generate session meta events or testament events, since no subscribers would remain to receive these events.

The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE sent to the closed session.

Keyword arguments

- 1. reason|uri reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
- 2. message|string additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details under the key "message".

Positional results

1. count/int - The number of sessions closed by this meta procedure.

Errors

• wamp.error.invalid_uri - A reason keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.

2.2. Registration Meta API

Registration Meta Events are fired when registrations are first created, when *Callees* are attached (removed) to (from) a registration, and when registrations are finally destroyed.

Furthermore, WAMP allows actively retrieving information about registrations via **Registration Meta Procedures**.

Meta-events are created by the router itself. This means that the events as well as the data received when calling a meta-procedure can be accorded the same trust level as the router.

Note that an implementation that only supports a *Broker* or *Dealer* role, not both at the same time, essentially cannot offer the **Registration Meta API**, as it requires both roles to support this feature.

The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in:

- Compiled Binary Schema: <WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
- FlatBuffers Schema Source: <WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs

which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.

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Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by a *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via:

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. registration_meta_api|bool := true

Here is a WELCOME message from a *Router* with support for both the *Broker* and *Dealer* role, and with support for **Registration Meta API**:

```
[
   2.
   4 5 8 0 2 6 8 5 5 4 6 5 6 1 1 3,
  Ł
    "authid":"OL 3 AeppwDLXiAAPbqm 9 IVhnw",
    "authrole": "anonymous",
    "authmethod": "anonymous",
    "roles": {
      "broker": {
         "features": {
        }
      },
      "dealer": {
         "features": {
           "registration_meta_api": true
        }
      }
    }
  }
]
```

2.2.1. Events

A client can subscribe to the following registration meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a registration:

- wamp.registration.on_create: Fired when a registration is created through a registration request for a URI which was previously without a registration.
- wamp.registration.on_register: Fired when a *Callee* session is added to a registration.
- wamp.registration.on_unregister: Fired when a *Callee* session is removed from a registration.
- wamp.registration.on_delete: Fired when a registration is deleted after the last *Callee* session attached to it has been removed.

A wamp.registration.on_register event MUST be fired subsequent to a wamp.registration.on_create event, since the first registration results in both the creation of the registration and the addition of a session.

Similarly, the wamp.registration.on_delete event MUST be preceded by a wamp.registration.on_unregister event.

Registration Meta Events MUST be dispatched by the router to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.

2.2.1.1. wamp.registration.on_create

Fired when a registration is created through a registration request for a URI which was previously without a registration. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session|id: The session ID performing the registration request.
- RegistrationDetails|dict: Information on the created registration.

Object Schemas

```
RegistrationDetails :=
{
    "id": registration|id,
    "created": time_created|iso_ 8 6 0 1 _string,
    "uri": procedure|uri,
    "match": match_policy|string,
    "invoke": invocation_policy|string
}
```

See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match_policy.

NOTE: invocation_policy IS NOT YET DESCRIBED IN THE ADVANCED SPEC

2.2.1.2. wamp.registration.on_register

Fired when a session is added to a registration. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session|id: The ID of the session being added to a registration.
- registration id: The ID of the registration to which a session is being added.

2.2.1.3. wamp.registration.on_unregister

Fired when a session is removed from a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session id: The ID of the session being removed from a registration.
- registration id: The ID of the registration from which a session is being removed.

2.2.1.4. wamp.registration.on_delete

Fired when a registration is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session id: The ID of the last session being removed from a registration.
- registration id: The ID of the registration being deleted.

2.2.2. Procedures

A client can actively retrieve information about registrations via the following meta-procedures:

- wamp.registration.list: Retrieves registration IDs listed according to match policies.
- wamp.registration.lookup: Obtains the registration (if any) managing a procedure, according to some match policy.
- wamp.registration.match: Obtains the registration best matching a given procedure URI.
- wamp.registration.get: Retrieves information on a particular registration.
- wamp.registration.list_callees: Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the registration.
- wamp.registration.count_callees: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the registration.

2.2.2.1. wamp.registration.list

Retrieves registration IDs listed according to match policies.

Arguments

• None

Results

• RegistrationLists|dict: A dictionary with a list of registration IDs for each match policy.

Object Schemas

```
RegistrationLists := {
{
    "exact": registration_ids|list,
    "prefix": registration_ids|list,
    "wildcard": registration_ids|list
}
```

See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match policies.

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2.2.2.2. wamp.registration.lookup

Obtains the registration (if any) managing a procedure, according to some match policy.

Arguments

- procedure | uri: The procedure to lookup the registration for.
- (Optional) options|dict: Same options as when registering a procedure.

Results

• (Nullable) registration id: The ID of the registration managing the procedure, if found, or null.

2.2.2.3. wamp.registration.match

Obtains the registration best matching a given procedure URI.

Arguments

• procedure | uri: The procedure URI to match

Results

• (Nullable) registration id: The ID of best matching registration, or null.

2.2.2.4. wamp.registration.get

Retrieves information on a particular registration.

Arguments

• registration id: The ID of the registration to retrieve.

Results

• RegistrationDetails|dict: Details on the registration.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_registration: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.

Object Schemas

```
RegistrationDetails :=
{
    "id": registration|id,
    "created": time_created|iso_ 8 6 0 1 _string,
    "uri": procedure|uri,
    "match": match_policy|string,
    "invoke": invocation_policy|string
}
```

See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match policies.

NOTE: invocation_policy IS NOT YET DESCRIBED IN THE ADVANCED SPEC

2.2.2.5. wamp.registration.list_callees

Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the registration.

Arguments

• registration id: The ID of the registration to get callees for.

Results

• callee_ids|list: A list of WAMP session IDs of callees currently attached to the registration.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_registration: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.

2.2.2.6. wamp.registration.count_callees

Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to a registration.

Arguments

• registration id: The ID of the registration to get the number of callees for.

Results

• count|int: The number of callees currently attached to a registration.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_registration: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.

2.3. Subscriptions Meta API

Within an application, it may be desirable for a publisher to know whether a publication to a specific topic currently makes sense, i.e. whether there are any subscribers who would receive an event based on the publication. It may also be desirable to keep a current count of subscribers to a topic to then be able to filter out any subscribers who are not supposed to receive an event.

Subscription *meta-events* are fired when topics are first created, when clients subscribe/ unsubscribe to them, and when topics are deleted. WAMP allows retrieving information about subscriptions via subscription *meta-procedures*.

Support for this feature MUST be announced by Brokers via

HELLO.Details.roles.broker.features.subscription_meta_api| bool := true

Meta-events are created by the router itself. This means that the events as well as the data received when calling a meta-procedure can be accorded the same trust level as the router.

The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in

- Compiled Binary Schema: <WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
- FlatBuffers Schema Source: <WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs

which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by a *Brokers* (role := "nroker") via:

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. subscription_meta_api|bool := true

Here is a WELCOME message from a *Router* with support for both the *Broker* and *Dealer* role, and with support for **Subscription Meta API**:

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```
[
  2
  4 5 8 0 2 6 8 5 5 4 6 5 6 1 1 3.
    "authid":"OL 3 AeppwDLXiAAPbqm 9 IVhnw",
    "authrole": "anonymous",
    "authmethod": "anonymous",
    "roles": {
      "broker": {
        "features": {
          "subscription_meta_api": true
        }
      },
      "dealer": {
        "features": {
        }
      }
    }
 }
]
```

2.3.1. Events

A client can subscribe to the following session meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a subscription:

- wamp.subscription.on_create: Fired when a subscription is created through a subscription request for a topic which was previously without subscribers.
- wamp.subscription.on_subscribe: Fired when a session is added to a subscription.
- wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe: Fired when a session is removed from a subscription.
- wamp.subscription.on_delete: Fired when a subscription is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed.

A wamp.subscription.on_subscribe event MUST always be fired subsequent to a wamp.subscription.on_create event, since the first subscribe results in both the creation of the subscription and the addition of a session. Similarly, the wamp.subscription.on_delete event MUST always be preceded by a wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe event.

The WAMP subscription meta events shall be dispatched by the router to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.

2.3.1.1. wamp.subscription.on_create

Fired when a subscription is created through a subscription request for a topic which was previously without subscribers. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

• session id: ID of the session performing the subscription request.

• SubscriptionDetails|dict: Information on the created subscription.

Object Schemas

```
SubscriptionDetails :=
{
    "id": subscription|id,
    "created": time_created|iso_ 8 6 0 1 _string,
    "uri": topic|uri,
    "match": match_policy|string
}
```

See Pattern-based Subscriptions for a description of match_policy.

2.3.1.2. wamp.subscription.on_subscribe

Fired when a session is added to a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session id: ID of the session being added to a subscription.
- subscription | id: ID of the subscription to which the session is being added.

2.3.1.3. wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe

Fired when a session is removed from a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session|id: ID of the session being removed from a subscription.
- subscription | id: ID of the subscription from which the session is being removed.

2.3.1.4. wamp.subscription.on_delete

Fired when a subscription is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed. The event payload consists of positional arguments:

- session id: ID of the last session being removed from a subscription.
- subscription lid: ID of the subscription being deleted.

2.3.2. Procedures

A client can actively retrieve information about subscriptions via the following meta-procedures:

- wamp.subscription.list: Retrieves subscription IDs listed according to match policies.
- wamp.subscription.lookup: Obtains the subscription (if any) managing a topic, according to some match policy.

- wamp.subscription.match: Retrieves a list of IDs of subscriptions matching a topic URI, irrespective of match policy.
- wamp.subscription.get: Retrieves information on a particular subscription.
- wamp.subscription.list_subscribers: Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the subscription.
- wamp.subscription.count_subscribers: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the subscription.

2.3.2.1. wamp.subscription.list

Retrieves subscription IDs listed according to match policies.

Arguments - None

Results

The result consists of one positional argument:

• SubscriptionLists|dict: A dictionary with a list of subscription IDs for each match policy.

Object Schemas

```
SubscriptionLists :=
{
    "exact": subscription_ids|list,
    "prefix": subscription_ids|list,
    "wildcard": subscription_ids|list
}
```

See Pattern-based Subscriptions for information on match policies.

2.3.2.2. wamp.subscription.lookup

Obtains the subscription (if any) managing a topic, according to some match policy.

Arguments

- topic|uri: The URI of the topic.
- (Optional) options|dict: Same options as when subscribing to a topic.

Results

The result consists of one positional argument:

• (Nullable) subscription id: The ID of the subscription managing the topic, if found, or null.

2.3.2.3. wamp.subscription.match

Retrieves a list of IDs of subscriptions matching a topic URI, irrespective of match policy.

Arguments

• topic|uri: The topic to match.

Results

The result consists of positional arguments:

• (Nullable) subscription_ids|list: A list of all matching subscription IDs, or null.

2.3.2.4. wamp.subscription.get

Retrieves information on a particular subscription.

Arguments

• subscription lid: The ID of the subscription to retrieve.

Results

The result consists of one positional argument:

• SubscriptionDetails|dict: Details on the subscription.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_subscription: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.

Object Schemas

```
SubscriptionDetails :=
{
    "id": subscription|id,
    "created": time_created|iso_ 8 6 0 1_string,
    "uri": topic|uri,
    "match": match_policy|string
}
```

See Pattern-based Subscriptions for information on match policies.

2.3.2.5. wamp.subscription.list_subscribers

Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the subscription.

Arguments - subscription id: The ID of the subscription to get subscribers for.

Results

The result consists of positional arguments:

• subscribers_ids|list: A list of WAMP session IDs of subscribers currently attached to the subscription.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_subscription: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.

2.3.2.6. wamp.subscription.count_subscribers

Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to a subscription.

Arguments

• subscription id: The ID of the subscription to get the number of subscribers for.

Results

The result consists of one positional argument:

• count|int: The number of sessions currently attached to a subscription.

Error URIs

• wamp.error.no_such_subscription: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.

3. Advanced RPC

3.1. Progressive Call Results

A procedure implemented by a *Callee* and registered at a *Dealer* may produce progressive results. Progressive results can e.g. be used to return partial results for long-running operations, or to chunk the transmission of larger results sets.

Feature Announcement


Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

```
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.
progressive_call_results|bool := true
```

Additionally, *Callees* and *Dealers* MUST support Call Canceling, which is required for canceling progressive results if the original *Caller* leaves the realm. If a *Callee* supports Progressive Call Results, but not Call Canceling, then the *Dealer* disregards the *Callees* Progressive Call Results feature.

Message Flow

The message flow for progressive results involves:



A Caller indicates its willingness to receive progressive results by setting

CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool := true

Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL

```
[
    4 8,
    7 7 1 3 3,
    {
        "receive_progress": true
    },
        "com.myapp.compute_revenue",
    [2 0 1 0, 2 0 1 1, 2 0 1 2]
]
```

If the *Callee* supports Progressive Call Results, the *Dealer* will forward the *Caller's* willingness to receive progressive results by setting

INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress|bool := true

Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION

```
[
    6 8,
    8 7 6 8 3,
    3 2 4,
    {
        "receive_progress": true
    },
    [2 0 1 0, 2 0 1 1, 2 0 1 2]
]
```

An endpoint implementing the procedure produces progressive results by sending YIELD messages to the *Dealer* with

```
YIELD.Options.progress|bool := true
```

Example. Callee-to-Dealer progressive YIELDs

```
[
70,
87683,
{
"progress": true
},
["Y2010", 120]
]
```

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```
[
70,
87683,
{
"progress": true
},
["Y2011", 205]
]
```

Upon receiving an YIELD message from a *Callee* with YIELD.Options.progress == true (for a call that is still ongoing), the *Dealer* will **immediately** send a RESULT message to the original *Caller* with

```
RESULT.Details.progress|bool := true
```

Example. Dealer-to-Caller progressive RESULTs

```
[
50,
77133,
{
"progress": true
},
["Y2010", 120]
]
```

```
[
50,
77133,
{
"progress": true
},
["Y2011", 205]
]
```

and so on...

An invocation MUST *always* end in either a *normal* RESULT or ERROR message being sent by the *Callee* and received by the *Dealer*.

Example. Callee-to-Dealer final YIELD

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[70, 87683, {}, ["Total", 490]]

Example. Callee-to-Dealer final ERROR

A call MUST *always* end in either a *normal* RESULT or ERROR message being sent by the *Dealer* and received by the *Caller*.

Example. Dealer-to-Caller final RESULT

```
[
50,
77133,
{},
["Total", 490]
]
```

Example. Dealer-to-Caller final ERROR

In other words: YIELD with YIELD.Options.progress == true and RESULT with RESULT.Details.progress == true messages may only be sent *during* a call or invocation is still ongoing.

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The final YIELD and final RESULT may also be empty, e.g. when all actual results have already been transmitted in progressive result messages.

Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs

[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}, ["Y 2 0 1 0", 1 2 0]] [7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}, ["Y 2 0 1 1", 2 0 5]] ... [7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}, ["Total", 4 9 0]] [7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {]

Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs

[5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {"progress": true}, ["Y 2 0 1 0", 1 2 0]]
[5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {"progress": true}, ["Y 2 0 1 1 ", 2 0 5]]
...
[5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {"progress": true}, ["Total", 4 9 0]]
[5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {]

The progressive YIELD and progressive RESULT may also be empty, e.g. when those messages are only used to signal that the procedure is still running and working, and the actual result is completely delivered in the final YIELD and RESULT:

Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs

[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}]
[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}]
...
[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {}, [["Y 2 0 1 0", 1 2 0], ["Y 2 0 1 1", 2 0 5], ...,
["Total", 4 9 0]]]

Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs

Note that intermediate, progressive results and/or the final result MAY have different structure. The WAMP peer implementation is responsible for mapping everything into a form suitable for consumption in the host language.

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Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs

[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}, ["partial 1 ", 1 0]]
[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {"progress": true}, [], {"foo": 1 0,
 "bar": "partial 1 "}]
...
[7 0, 8 7 6 8 3, {}, [1, 2, 3], {"moo": "hello"}]


Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs

[5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {"progress": true}, ["partial 1 ", 1 0]] [5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {"progress": true}, [], {"foo": 1 0, "bar": "partial 1 "}] ... [5 0, 7 7 1 3 3, {}, [1, 2, 3], {"moo": "hello"}]

Even if a *Caller* has indicated its expectation to receive progressive results by setting CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool := true, a *Callee* is **not required** to produce progressive results. CALL.Options.receive_progress and INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress are simply indications that the *Caller* is prepared to process progressive results, should there be any produced. In other words, *Callees* are free to ignore such receive_progress hints at any time.

Caller Leaving


The *Dealer*'s behavior for when a *Caller* leaves or disconnects during a progressive results call shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the *Dealer* sends an INTERRUPT to the *Callee* with mode="killnowait". See <u>Caller Leaving During RPC</u> Invocation under the Basic Profile.



Such cancellation when the caller leaves addresses a potential security vulnerability: In cases where progressive results are used to stream data to *Callers*, and network connectivity is unreliable, *Callers* may often get disconnected in the middle of receiving such progressive results. Without the mandated cancellation behavior, recurring connect-call-disconnect cycles by a *Caller* would result in a rapidly growing backlog of unprocessed streaming results, overloading the router and further degrading network connectivity.

Callee Leaving

The *Dealer*'s behavior for when a *Callee* leaves or disconnects during a progressive results call shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the *Dealer* sends an ERROR message to the *Caller* with the wamp.error.canceled URI. See <u>Callee Leaving During an RPC Invocation</u> under the Basic Profile.



Ignoring Requests for Progressive Call Results

A *Callee* that does not support progressive results SHOULD ignore any INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress flag.

A *Callee* that supports progressive results, but does not support call canceling is considered by the *Dealer* to not support progressive results.

Timeouts

When the *Call Timeouts* feature is used in combination with Progressive Call Results, the CALL.Options.timeout|integer option shall represent the time limit between the initial call and the first result, and between results thereafter.

For Dealer-initiated timeouts, this corresponds to - the time between receipt of the CALL message and receipt of the first YIELD message, and, - the time between received YIELD messages thereafter.

For Callee-initiated timeouts, this corresponds to - the time between receipt of the INVOCATION message and acquisition of the first result, and, - the time between acquisition of successive results thereafter.

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Note that for progressive results, the timeout value does *not* correspond to the duration of the complete call from initiation to the final result. The rationale for this is that it would be unfeasible to compute a reasonable timeout value for a call having a non-deterministic number of progressive results.

3.2. Progressive Call Invocations

A *Caller* may issue a call having progressive invocations. This can be useful in a few cases:

- Payload is too big to send it whole in one request, e.g., uploading a file.
- Long-term data transfer that needs to be consumed early, such as a media stream.
- RPC is called too often and overall processing can be optimized: avoid the need to generate a new id for requests, initiate data structures for a new call, etc.

In such cases, a procedure implemented by a *Callee* and registered at a *Dealer* may be made to receive progressive call invocations, where the *Callee* may start processing the incoming data without awaiting the entire set of payload chunks.

Feature Announcement

Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.progressive_call_invocations|bool := true

Progressive call invocations can work only if all three peers support and announce this feature. In addition, *Callees* MUST announce support of the *Call Cancelling* feature via

HELLO.Details.roles.callee.features.call_cancelling|bool := true

As a consequence, Dealers MUST also announce support of the Call Cancelling feature via

WELCOME.Details.roles.dealer.features.call_cancelling|bool := true

The following cases, where a *Caller* sends a CALL message with progress := true, MUST be treated as *protocol errors* with the underlying WAMP sessions being aborted:


- The *Caller* did not announce the progressive call invocations feature during the HELLO handshake.
- The *Dealer* did not announce the progressive call invocations feature during the HELLO handshake.

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Otherwise, in cases where the *Caller* sends a CALL message with progress := true but the *Callee* does not support progressive call invocations or call cancelling, the call MUST be treated as an *application error* with the *Dealer* responding to the *Caller* with the wamp.error.feature_not_supported error message.

Message Flow

The message flow for a progressive call when a *Callee* waits for all chunks before processing and sending a single result:



As a progressive call chunks are part of the same overall call, the *Caller* must send the same Request id for every CALL and the *Dealer* must also use the same Request id with every INVOCATION to the *Callee*.

A *Caller* indicates its willingness to issue a progressive call by setting

CALL.Options.progress|bool := true

Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL

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If the *Callee* supports progressive call invocations, the *Dealer* shall forward the *Caller's* willingness to send progressive call invocations by setting

```
INVOCATION.Details.progress|bool := true
```

Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION

```
[

6 8,

3 5 2 2 4,

3 7 9,

{

"progress": true

},

[5 0.4 5 0 0 0 1, 3 0.5 2 3 3 3]
]
```

A call invocation MUST *always* end in a *normal* CALL without the "progress": true option, or explicitly set "progress": false which is the default.


Progressive Call Invocations and Shared Registration

RPCs can have a multiple registrations (see Shared Registration feature) with different <invocation_policies>. However, allowing progressive CALL messages to be routed to different *Callees* would lead to unexpected results. To prevent this the *Dealer* MUST make a first INVOCATION based on <invocation_policy> and then route all subsequent progressive calls to the same *Callee*.

Caller Leaving

The *Dealer*'s behavior for when a *Caller* leaves or disconnects during a call with progressive invocations shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the *Dealer* sends an INTERRUPT to the *Callee* with mode="killnowait". See <u>Caller Leaving During RPC Invocation</u> under the Basic Profile.


Oberstein



As in progressive call results, such cancellation when the caller leaves addresses a potential security vulnerability: In cases where progressive call invocations are used to stream data from a *Caller*, and network connectivity is unreliable, the *Caller* may often get disconnected in the middle of sending progressive data. This can lead to unneeded memory consumption for the *Dealer* and *Callee*, due to the need to store temporary metadata about ongoing calls.

Callee Leaving

The *Dealer*'s behavior for when a *Callee* leaves or disconnects during a call with progressive invocations shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the *Dealer* sends an ERROR message to the *Caller* with the wamp.error.canceled URI. See <u>Callee Leaving During an RPC</u> Invocation under the Basic Profile.



Continuations on Completed Calls

A call with progressive invocations is considered completed by the *Dealer* when the latter receives a correlated final YIELD or ERROR message from the *Callee*, or when the *Callee* leaves the realm.

Due to network delays, the *Caller* may be unaware that the call is completed by time it sends another progressive CALL continuation.


When a *Dealer* receives a CALL under the following conditions:

- the *Dealer* supports Progressive Call Invocations,
- the CALL request ID does not correspond to a new call request, and,
- the CALL request ID does not match any RPC invocation in progress,

then it MUST ignore and discard that CALL message without any further correlated response to the *Caller*. The rationale for this is that the *Caller* will eventually receive a correlated RESULT or ERROR message from the previous call completion and will be able to handle the call completion accordingly.

The sequence diagram below illustrates this sitation, where the Network actor models network delay.

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From the *Callee*'s perspective, a call with progressive invocations is considered completed when the *Callee* sends a correlated final YIELD or ERROR message.

Due to network delays, the *Dealer* may be unaware that the call is completed by time it sends another progressive INVOCATION.


When a *Callee* receives an INVOCATION under the following conditions:

- the Callee supports Progressive Call Invocations,
- the INVOCATION request ID does not correspond to a new call request, and,
- the INVOCATION request ID does not match any RPC invocation in progress,

then it MUST ignore and discard that INVOCATION message without any further correlated response to the *Dealer*. The rationale for this is that the *Dealer* will eventually receive a correlated YIELD or ERROR message from the *Callee* and then send a correlated RESULT or ERROR message to the *Caller*, thus the *Caller* and the *Dealer* will both be able to handle the call completion accordingly.

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The sequence diagram below illustrates this sitation, where the Network actor models network delay.



Verification of CALL Request IDs

When sending a CALL that continues a progressive call, its request ID is the same as the CALL that initiated the progressive call invocation. Therefore, when progressive call invocations are enabled, request IDs from CALL messages may not appear sequential. For example:

- 1. [CALL, 1, {"progress":true}, "foo"]
- 2. [CALL, 2 , {}, "bar"]
- 3. [CALL, 1, {}, "foo"] (OK, continues CALL request #1)

The requirement for CALL request IDs to be sequential session scope (see Protocol Violations) must therefore only apply to **new** RPC transactions:

- 1. [CALL, 1, {"progress":true}, "foo"]
- 2. [CALL, 2 , {}, "bar"]
- 3. [CALL, 4, {}, "baz"] (protocol violation, request ID 3 expected)

Let us define *watermark* as the maximum valid request ID of all received CALL messages during a *Dealer*'s run time.

Let us also define *continuation candiate* as a CALL with a request ID that is equal to or less than the *watermark*.

When a *Dealer* receives a CALL with a request ID that is exactly one above the watermark, then it shall be considered a new RPC transaction, and the requirement for sequential session scope IDs is verified.

When a *Dealer* receives a CALL with a request ID that is greater than one above the watermark, then this corresponds to a gap in the session scope ID sequence and MUST always be treated as a protocol violation.

When a *Dealer* receives a CALL with a request ID that is equal to or less than the watermark, then it is considered as a *continuation candidate* for a progressive invocation transfer.

As discussed in the previous section, a *Caller* may be unaware that a progressive invocation transfer is completed while sending a CALL continuation for that progressive invocation. Therefore, the *Dealer* cannot simply just check against progressive transfers in progress when verifying the validity of continuation candidates. It must also consider past progressive transfers that have been completed.

In order to validate the request ID of continuation candidates, it is suggested that a *Dealer* maintain a table of request IDs of completed progressive invocation transfers, where each entry is kept for a limited *grace period*. When a *Dealer* receives a continuation candidate with a request ID that is not in that table, nor in the list of active progressive invocations, then it is considered a protocol violation. Care must be taken in choosing the grace period: too short and data races can occur with slow networks, too long and memory usage of the table may become excessive when frequent progressive calls are made.

Due to resource constraints, it may not be desireable to implement such a grace period table, so *Dealers* MAY instead discard continuation candidates with request IDs that cannot be found in the list of active progressive invocation transfers.

The following pseudocode summarizes the algorithm for verifying CALL request IDs when progressive call invocations are enabled:

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```
if (request id == watermark + 1)
  watermark = watermak + 1
  initiate new call()
else if (request_id > watermark + 1)
  // Gap in request IDs
  abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation")
else
  // Continuation candidate
  if (active_call_records.contains(request_id, procedure_uri))
    record = active_call_records.at(request_id)
    if (record.is progressive invocation call())
      continue_call()
    else
      abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation")
    endif
  else if (strict_request_id_verification_enabled)
    if (grace period table.contains(request id, procedure uri))
       discard call()
    else
      abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation")
    endif
  else
    discard_call()
  endif
endif
```

Ignoring Progressive Call Invocations

Unlike some other advanced features, a *Callee* cannot be unaware of progressive call invocations. Therefore, if a *Callee* doesn't support this feature, the *Dealer* MUST respond to the *Caller* with an wamp.error.feature_not_supported error message.


A *Callee* that supports progressive call invocations, but does not support call canceling, shall be considered by the *Dealer* as not supporting progressive call invocations.

Progressive Call Invocations with Progressive Call Results

Progressive Call Invocations may be used in conjunction with *Progressive Call Results* if the *Caller*, *Dealer*, and *Callee* all support both features. This allows the *Callee* to start sending partial results back to the *Caller* after receiving one or more initial payload chunks. Efficient two-way streams between a *Caller* and *Callee* can be implemented this way.

The following message flow illustrates a call using progressive call invocations when a *Callee* starts sending progressive call results immediately. Note that YIELD messages don't need to be

matched with CALL/INVOCATION messages. For example, the *caller* can send a few CALL messages before starting to receive RESULT messages; they do not need to be matched pairs.



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Because they are part of the same call operation, the request ID is the same in all CALL, INVOCATION, YIELD, and ERROR messages in the above exchange.

Freezing of Options in Progressive Call Invocations

Except for progress, items in the Options dictionary of the **initiating** progressive CALL shall be effective for the entirety of the progressive call request. Only the progress option shall be considered by the *Dealer* in subsequent progressive call invocations (within the same overall request). Except for progress, items in the Details dictionary of corresponding INVOCATION messages shall be based on the initiating progressive CALL only.

For example, if disclose_me=true was specified in the initiating progressive call, all subsequent progressive call invocations (within the same call) shall be considered by the *Dealer* to implicitly have disclose_me=true as well. That is, all INVOCATION messages associated with the overall request shall contain caller identify information.

Any option besides progress SHOULD be omitted altogether by the *Caller* in subsequent progressive call invocations. Not having to repeat (and not being able to change) options is more in tune with the concept of a media stream where options are set up initially, and the source (*Caller*) only needs to keep uploading more data thereafter.

In subsequent call invocations:

- Dealers and Callees MUST ignore any option except for progress
- Dealers SHOULD NOT propagate any option passed by the Caller, except for progress

Dealers and *Callees* are responsible for remembering the options of the initiating progressive CALL.

For reference, here is a list of options that are frozen upon the initial progressive call invocations:

- CALL.Options.disclose_me|bool
- CALL.Options.ppt_cipher|string
- CALL.Options.ppt_keyid|string
- CALL.Options.ppt_scheme|string
- CALL.Options.ppt_serializer|string
- CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool
- CALL.Options.rkey
- CALL.Options.runmode|string
- CALL.Options.timeout|integer

These rules concerning progressive call invocation options also apply to custom options that are not part of this specification.

3.3. Call Timeouts

The Call Timeouts feature allows for **automatic** cancellation of a remote procedure call by the *Dealer* or *Callee* after a specified time duration.

A Caller specifies a timeout by providing

CALL.Options.timeout|integer

in milliseconds. Automatic call timeouts are deactivated if there is no timeout option, or if its value is **0**.

Dealer-Initiated Timeouts

If the *Callee* does not support Call Timeouts, a *Dealer* supporting this feature MUST start a timeout timer upon receiving a CALL message with a timeout option. The message flow for call timeouts is identical to Call Canceling, except that there is no CANCEL message that originates from the *Caller*. The cancellation mode is implicitly killnowait if the *Callee* supports call cancellation, otherwise the cancellation mode is skip.

The error message that is returned to the *Caller* MUST use wamp.error.timeout as the reason URI.

Callee-Initiated Timeouts

If the *Callee* supports Call Timeouts, the *Dealer* MAY propagate the CALL.Options.timeout|integer option via the INVOCATION message and allow the *Callee* to handle the timeout logic. If the operation times out, the *Callee* MUST return an ERROR message with wamp.error.timeout as the reason URI.

Callees wanting to handle the timeout logic MAY specify this intention via the REGISTER.Options.forward_timeout|boolean option. The *Dealer*, upon receiving a CALL with the timeout option set, checks if the matching RPC registration had the forward_timeout option set, then accordingly either forwards the timeout value or handles the timeout logic locally without forwarding the timeout value.

Dealers MAY choose to override the REGISTER.Options.forward_timeout|boolean option based on router configuration. For example, if a *Dealer* is resource-constrained and does not wish to maintain a queue of pending call timeouts, it may decide to always forward the CALL timeout option to *Callees*.

Caller-Initiated Timeouts

Callers may run their own timeout timer and send a CANCEL message upon timeout. This is permitted if the *Dealer* supports Call Canceling and is not considered to be a usage of the Call Timeouts feature.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Dealers* (role := "dealer") and MAY be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_timeout|bool := true

If a *Callee* does not support Call Timeouts, it may optionally announce support for Call Cancellation via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_canceling|bool := true

3.4. Call Canceling

A *Caller* might want to actively cancel a call that was issued, but not has yet returned. An example where this is useful could be a user triggering a long running operation and later changing his mind or no longer willing to wait.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_canceling|bool := true

Message Flow

The message flow between *Callers*, a *Dealer* and *Callees* for canceling remote procedure calls involves the following messages:


- CANCEL
- INTERRUPT
- ERROR

A call may be canceled at the *Callee* or at the *Dealer* side. Cancellation behaves differently depending on the mode:


- **skip**: The pending call is canceled and ERROR is sent immediately back to the caller. No INTERRUPT is sent to the callee and the result is discarded when received.
- **kill**: INTERRUPT is sent to the callee, but ERROR is not returned to the caller until after the callee has responded to the canceled call. In this case the caller may receive <u>RESULT</u> or <u>ERROR</u> depending whether the callee finishes processing the invocation or the interrupt first.
- **killnowait**: The pending call is canceled and ERROR is sent immediately back to the caller. INTERRUPT is sent to the callee and any response to the invocation or interrupt from the callee is discarded when received.

If the callee does not support call canceling, then behavior is **skip**.


Message flow during call canceling when *Callee* supports this feature and mode is kill



Message flow during call canceling when Callee does not support this feature or mode is skip



Message flow during call canceling when Callee supports this feature and mode is killnowait



A *Caller* cancels a remote procedure call initiated (but not yet finished) by sending a CANCEL message to the *Dealer*:

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[CANCEL, CALL.Request|id, Options|dict]

A *Dealer* cancels an invocation of an endpoint initiated (but not yet finished) by sending a INTERRUPT message to the *Callee*:

[INTERRUPT, INVOCATION.Request|id, Options|dict]

Options:

CANCEL.Options.mode|string == "skip" | "kill" | "killnowait"

Ignoring Results after Cancel

After the *Dealer* sends an INTERRUPT when mode="killnowait", any responses from the *Callee* are ignored. This means that it is not necessary for the *Callee* to respond with an ERROR message, when mode="killnowait", since the *Dealer* ignores it.

3.5. Call Re-Routing

A *CALLEE* might not be able to attend to a call. This may be due to a multitude of reasons including, but not limited to:

- CALLEE is busy handling other requests and is not able to attend
- CALLEE has dependency issues which prevent it from being able to fulfil the request
- In a HA environment, the *Callee* knows that it is scheduled to be taken off the HA cluster and as such should not handle the request.

A *unavailable* response allows for **automatic** reroute of a call by the *Dealer* without the *CALLER* ever having to know about it.

When such a situation occurs, the *Callee* responds to a INVOCATION message with the error uri:

wamp.error.unavailable

When the *Dealer* receives the wamp.error.unavailable message in response to an INVOCATION, it will reroute the CALL to another *registration* according to the rerouting rules of the invocation_policy of the procedure, as given below.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

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HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_reroute|bool := true

Rerouting Rules

The *Dealer* MUST adhere to the invocation policy of the procedure when rerouting the CALL, while assuming that the unavailable registration virtually does not exist.

For different invocation policy the *Dealer* MUST follow:

Invocation Policy	Operation
single	Responds with a wamp.error.no_available_callee error message to the <i>CALLER</i>
roundrobin	Picks the next registration from the Registration Queue of the Procedure
random	Picks another registration at random from the Registration Queue of the <i>Procedure</i> , as long as it is not the same registration
first	Picks the registration which was registered after the <i>called</i> registration was registered
last	Picks the registration which was registered right before the <i>called</i> registration was registered

Table 6

Failure Scenario

In case all available registrations of a *Procedure* responds with a wamp.error.unavailable for a *CALL*, the *Dealer* MUST respond with a wamp.error.no_available_callee to the *CALLER*

3.6. Caller Identification

A *Caller* MAY **request** the disclosure of its identity (its WAMP session ID) to endpoints of a routed call via

CALL.Options.disclose_me|bool := true

Example

```
[ 4 8 , 7 8 1 4 1 3 5 , {"disclose_me": true}, "com.myapp.echo",
["Hello, world!"]]
```

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If above call is issued by a *Caller* with WAMP session ID **3 3 5 6 5 6**, the *Dealer* sends an INVOCATION message to *Callee* with the *Caller's* WAMP session ID in INVOCATION.Details.caller:

Example

[68,6131533,9823526,{"caller":3335656},["Hello, world!"]]

Note that a *Dealer* MAY disclose the identity of a *Caller* even without the *Caller* having explicitly requested to do so when the *Dealer* configuration (for the called procedure) is setup to do so.

Identity Information

When *Caller* disclosure is allowed for a particular CALL message, the corresponding INVOCATION message MUST contain an INVOCATION.Details.caller/integer property set to the *Caller*'s session ID.

The following additional properties MAY also be included::

- INVOCATION.Details.caller_authid|string
- INVOCATION.Details.caller_authrole|string

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. caller_identification|bool := true

Request Identification

A *Dealer* MAY deny a *Caller's* request to disclose its identity:

Example

[8, 7 8 1 4 1 3 5, "wamp.error.disclose_me.not_allowed"]

A Callee MAY request the disclosure of caller identity via

REGISTER.Options.disclose_caller|bool := true

Example

[6 4 , 9 2 7 6 3 9 1 1 4 0 8 8 4 4 8 , {"disclose_caller":true}, "com.maypp.add 2 "]

With the above registration, the registered procedure is called with the caller's sessionID as part of the call details object.

3.7. Call Trust Levels

A *Dealer* may be configured to automatically assign *trust levels* to calls issued by *Callers* according to the *Dealer* configuration on a per-procedure basis and/or depending on the application defined role of the (authenticated) *Caller*.

A Dealer supporting trust level will provide

INVOCATION.Details.trustlevel|integer

in an INVOCATION message sent to a *Callee*. The trustlevel • means lowest trust, and higher integers represent (application-defined) higher levels of trust.

Example

[68,6131533,9823526,{"trustlevel":2},["Hello, world!"]]

In above event, the *Dealer* has (by configuration and/or other information) deemed the call (and hence the invocation) to be of trustlevel **2**.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_trustlevels|bool := true

3.8. Pattern-based Registrations

By default, *Callees* register procedures with **exact matching policy**. That is a call will only be routed to a *Callee* by the *Dealer* if the procedure called (CALL.Procedure) *exactly* matches the endpoint registered (REGISTER.Procedure).

A *Callee* might want to register procedures based on a *pattern*. This can be useful to reduce the number of individual registrations to be set up or to subscribe to a open set of topics, not known beforehand by the *Subscriber*.

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If the *Dealer* and the *Callee* support **pattern-based registrations**, this matching can happen by

- prefix-matching policy
- wildcard-matching policy

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. pattern_based_registration|bool := true

3.8.1. Prefix Matching

A Callee requests prefix-matching policy with a registration request by setting

REGISTER.Options.match|string := "prefix"

Example

```
[

6 4,

6 1 2 3 5 2 4 3 5,

{

"match": "prefix"

},

"com.myapp.myobject 1 "

]
```

When a **prefix-matching policy** is in place, any call with a procedure that has REGISTER.Procedure as a *prefix* will match the registration, and potentially be routed to *Callees* on that registration.

In above example, the following calls with CALL.Procedure

- com.myapp.myobject 1 .myprocedure 1
- com.myapp.myobject 1 -mysubobject 1
- com.myapp.myobject 1 .mysubobject 1 .myprocedure 1
- com.myapp.myobject 1

will all apply for call routing. A call with one of the following CALL.Procedure

• com.myapp.myobject 2

com.myapp.myobject

will not apply.

3.8.2. Wildcard Matching

A *Callee* requests **wildcard-matching policy** with a registration request by setting

REGISTER.Options.match|string := "wildcard"

Wildcard-matching allows to provide wildcards for whole URI components.

Example

```
[

    6 4 ,

    6 1 2 3 5 2 4 3 5 ,

    {

        "match": "wildcard"

    },

    "com.myapp..myprocedure 1 "

]
```

In the above registration request, the 3rd URI component is empty, which signals a wildcard in that URI component position. In this example, calls with CALL.Procedure e.g.

- com.myapp.myobject 1 .myprocedure 1
- com.myapp.myobject 2 .myprocedure 1

will all apply for call routing. Calls with CALL.Procedure e.g.

- com.myapp.myobject 1 .myprocedure 1 .mysubprocedure 1
- com.myapp.myobject 1 .myprocedure 2
- com.myapp 2 .myobject 1 .myprocedure 1

will not apply for call routing.

When a single call matches more than one of a *Callees* registrations, the call MAY be routed for invocation on multiple registrations, depending on call settings.

3.8.3. Design Aspects

No set semantics

Since each *Callee*'s' registrations "stands on its own", there is no *set semantics* implied by pattern-based registrations.

E.g. a *Callee* cannot register to a broad pattern, and then unregister from a subset of that broad pattern to form a more complex registration. Each registration is separate.

Calls matching multiple registrations

There can be situations, when some call URI matches more then one registration. In this case a call is routed to one and only one best matched RPC registration, or fails with ERROR wamp.error.no_such_procedure.

The following algorithm MUST be applied to find a single RPC registration to which a call is routed:

- 1. Check for exact matching registration. If this match exists (U+2014) use it.
- 2. If there are prefix-based registrations, find the registration with the longest prefix match. Longest means it has more URI components matched, e.g. for call URI a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 registration a 1 .b 2 .c 3 has higher priority than registration a 1 .b 2 . If this match exists (U+2014) use it.
- 3. If there are wildcard-based registrations, find the registration with the longest portion of URI components matched before each wildcard. E.g. for call URI a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 registration a 1 .b 2 ..d 4 has higher priority than registration a 1 ...d 4, see below for more complex examples. If this match exists (U+2014) use it.
- 4. If there is no exact match, no prefix match, and no wildcard match, then *Dealer* MUST return ERROR wamp.error.no_such_procedure.

Examples

Registered RPCs: 1 . 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 .e 5 5 ' (exact), 2 . 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 ' (prefix), 3 . 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 ' (prefix), 4 . 'a 1 .b 2d 4 .e 5 ', 5 . 'a 1 .b 2d 4 .e 5 ', 6 . 'a 1 .b 2d 4 .e 5g 7 ', 7 . 'a 1 .b 2d 4f 6 .g 7 '
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 .e 5 5 ' \rightarrow exact match. Use RPC 1
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 9 8 .e 7 4 ' → no exact match, single prefix match. Use RPC 2
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 .d 4 .e 3 2 5 ' → no exact match, 2 prefix matches (2, 3), select longest one. Use RPC 3
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 5 5 .d 4 .e 5 ' → no exact match, no prefix match, single wildcard match. Use RPC 4
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 3 3 .d 4 .e 5 ' → no exact match, no prefix match, 2 wildcard matches (4 , 5), select longest one. Use RPC 5
Call request RPC URI: 'a 1 .b 2 .c 8 8 .d 4 .e 5 .f 6 .g 7 ' \rightarrow no exact match, no prefix match, 2 wildcard matches (6 , 7), both having equal first portions (a 1 .b 2), but RPC 6 has longer second portion (d 4 .e 5). Use RPC 6 Call request RPC URI: 'a 2 .b 2 .c 2 .d 2 .e 2 ' \rightarrow
no exact match, no prefix match, no wildcard match. Return wamp.error.no_such_procedure

Concrete procedure called

If an endpoint was registered with a pattern-based matching policy, a *Dealer* MUST supply the original CALL.Procedure as provided by the *Caller* in

```
INVOCATION.Details.procedure
```

to the Callee.

Example

```
[

6 8,

6 1 3 1 5 3 3,

9 8 2 3 5 2 7,

{

"procedure": "com.myapp.procedure.proc 1 "

},

["Hello, world!"]

]
```

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3.9. Shared Registration

Feature status: **alpha**

As a default, only a single **Callee** may register a procedure for a URI.

There are use cases where more flexibility is required. As an example, for an application component with a high computing load, several instances may run, and load balancing of calls across these may be desired. As another example, in an application a second or third component providing a procedure may run, which are only to be called in case the primary component is no longer reachable (hot standby).

When shared registrations are supported, then the first **Callee** to register a procedure for a particular URI MAY determine that additional registrations for this URI are allowed, and what **Invocation Rules** to apply in case such additional registrations are made.

This is done through setting

REGISTER.Options.invoke|string := <invocation_policy>

where <invocation_policy> is one of

- 'single'
- 'roundrobin'
- 'random'
- 'first'
- 'last'

If the option is not set, 'single' is applied as a default.

With 'single', the **Dealer** MUST fail all subsequent attempts to register a procedure for the URI while the registration remains in existence.

With the other values, the **Dealer** MUST fail all subsequent attempts to register a procedure for the URI where the value for this option does not match that of the initial registration.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. shared_registration|bool := true

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3.9.1. Load Balancing

For sets of registrations registered using either 'roundrobin' or 'random', load balancing is performed across calls to the URI.

For 'roundrobin', callees are picked subsequently from the list of registrations (ordered by the order of registration), with the picking looping back to the beginning of the list once the end has been reached.

For 'random' a callee is picked randomly from the list of registrations for each call.

3.9.2. Hot Stand-By

For sets of registrations registered using either 'first' or 'last', the first respectively last callee on the current list of registrations (ordered by the order of registration) is called.

3.10. Sharded Registration

Feature status: sketch

Sharded Registrations are intended to allow calling a procedure which is offered by a sharded database, by routing the call to a single shard.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.sharded_registration|bool := true

3.10.1. "All" Calls

Write me.

3.10.2. "Partitioned" Calls

If CALL.Options.runmode == "partition", then CALL.Options.rkey MUST be present.

The call is then routed to all endpoints that were registered ..

The call is then processed as for "All" Calls.

3.11. Registration Revocation

Feature status: alpha

This feature allows a *Dealer* to actively revoke a previously granted registration. To achieve this, the existing UNREGISTERED message is extended as described below.

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Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Callees* (role := "callee") and *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. registration_revocation|bool := true

If the *Callee* does not support registration_revocation, the *Dealer* may still revoke a registration to support administrative functionality. In this case, the *Dealer* MUST NOT send an **UNREGISTERED** message to the *Callee*. The *Callee* MAY use the registration meta event wamp.registration.on_unregister to determine whether a session is removed from a registration.

Extending UNREGISTERED

When revoking a registration, the router has no request ID to reply to. So it's set to zero and another argument is appended to indicate which registration to revoke. Optionally, a reason why the registration was revoked is also appended.

[UNREGISTERED, **0**, Details|dict]

where

- Details.registration|bool MUST be a previously issued registration ID.
- Details.reason|string MAY provide a reason as to why the registration was revoked.

Example

[6 7, 0, {"registration": 1 2 9 3 7 2 2, "reason": "moving endpoint to other callee"}]

4. Advanced PubSub

4.1. Subscriber Black- and Whitelisting

Subscriber Black- and Whitelisting is an advanced *Broker* feature where a *Publisher* is able to restrict the set of receivers of a published event.

Under normal Publish & Subscriber event dispatching, a *Broker* will dispatch a published event to all (authorized) *Subscribers* other than the *Publisher* itself. This set of receivers can be further reduced on a per-publication basis by the *Publisher* using **Subscriber Black- and Whitelisting**.

The *Publisher* can explicitly **exclude** *Subscribers* based on WAMP sessionid, authid or authrole. This is referred to as **Blacklisting**.

A *Publisher* may also explicitly define a **eligible** list of *Subscribers* based on WAMP sessionid, authid or authrole. This is referred to as **Whitelisting**.

Use Cases include the following.

Avoiding Callers from being self-notified

Consider an application that exposes a procedure to update a product price. The procedure might not only actually update the product price (e.g. in a backend database), but additionally publish an event with the updated product price, so that **all** application components get notified actively of the new price.

However, the application might want to exclude the originator of the product price update (the **Caller** of the price update procedure) from receiving the update event - as the originator naturally already knows the new price, and might get confused when it receives an update the **Caller** has triggered himself.

The product price update procedure can use PUBLISH.Options.exclude|list[int] to exclude the **Caller** of the procedure.

Note that the product price update procedure needs to know the session ID of the **Caller** to be able to exclude him. For this, please see **Caller Identification**.

A similar approach can be used for other CRUD-like procedures.

Restricting receivers of sensitive information

Consider an application with users that have different authroles, such as "manager" and "staff" that publishes events with updates to "customers". The topics being published to could be structured like

com.example.myapp.customer.<customer ID>

The application might want to restrict the receivers of customer updates depending on the authrole of the user. E.g. a user authenticated under authrole "manager" might be allowed to receive any kind of customer update, including personal and business sensitive information. A user under authrole "staff" might only be allowed to receive a subset of events.

The application can publish **all** customer updates to the **same** topic com.example.myapp.customer.<customer ID> and use PUBLISH.Options.eligible_authrole|list[string] to safely restrict the set of actual receivers as desired.

Feature Definition

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A *Publisher* may restrict the actual receivers of an event from the set of *Subscribers* through the use of

- Blacklisting Options
 - PUBLISH.Options.exclude|list[int]
 - PUBLISH.Options.exclude_authid|list[string]
 - PUBLISH.Options.exclude_authrole|list[string]
- Whitelisting Options
 - PUBLISH.Options.eligible|list[int]
 - PUBLISH.Options.eligible_authid|list[string]
 - ° PUBLISH.Options.eligible_authrole|list[string]

PUBLISH.Options.exclude is a list of integers with WAMP sessionids providing an explicit list of (potential) *Subscribers* that won't receive a published event, even though they may be subscribed. In other words, PUBLISH.Options.exclude is a **blacklist** of (potential) *Subscribers*.

PUBLISH.Options.eligible is a list of integers with WAMP WAMP sessionids providing an explicit list of (potential) *Subscribers* that are allowed to receive a published event. In other words, PUBLISH.Options.eligible is a **whitelist** of (potential) *Subscribers*.

The exclude_authid, exclude_authrole, eligible_authid and eligible_authrole options work similar, but not on the basis of WAMP sessionid, but authid and authrole.

An (authorized) *Subscriber* to topic T will receive an event published to T if and only if all of the following statements hold true:

- 1. if there is an eligible attribute present, the Subscriber's sessionid is in this list
- 2. if there is an eligible_authid attribute present, the Subscriber's authid is in this list
- 3. if there is an eligible_authrole attribute present, the *Subscriber*'s authrole is in this list
- 4. if there is an exclude attribute present, the Subscriber's sessionid is NOT in this list
- 5. if there is an exclude_authid attribute present, the *Subscriber*'s authid is NOT in this list
- 6. if there is an exclude_authrole attribute present, the *Subscriber*'s authrole is NOT in this list

For example, if both PUBLISH.Options.exclude and PUBLISH.Options.eligible are present, the *Broker* will dispatch events published only to *Subscribers* that are not explicitly excluded in PUBLISH.Options.exclude **and** which are explicitly eligible via PUBLISH.Options.eligible.

Example

```
[
    1 6,
    2 3 9 7 1 4 7 3 5,
    {
        "exclude": [
            7 8 9 1 2 5 5,
            1 2 4 5 7 5 1
    ]
    },
    "com.myapp.mytopic 1 ",
    [
        "Hello, world!"
    ]
]
```

The above event will get dispatched to all *Subscribers* of com.myapp.mytopic 1, but not WAMP sessions with IDs 7 8 9 1 2 5 5 or 1 2 4 5 7 5 1 (and also not the publishing session).

Example

```
[
    1 6,
    2 3 9 7 1 4 7 3 5,
    {
        "eligible": [
            7 8 9 1 2 5 5,
            1 2 4 5 7 5 1
     ]
    },
    "com.myapp.mytopic 1 ",
    [
        "Hello, world!"
    ]
]
```

The above event will get dispatched to WAMP sessions with IDs 7 8 9 1 2 5 5 or

1 2 4 5 7 5 1 only - but only if those are actually subscribed to the topic com.myapp.mytopic 1.

Example

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```
[
  16,
  239714735,
 {
   "eligible": [
    7891255,
     1 2 4 5 7 5 1,
     9 9 1 2 3 1 5
   1,
   "exclude": [
     7 8 9 1 2 5 5
   1
 },
 "com.myapp.mytopic 1 ",
 Ι
   "Hello, world!"
 ]
]
```

The above event will get dispatched to WAMP sessions with IDs 1 2 4 5 7 5 1 or

9 9 1 2 3 1 5 only, since **7 8 9 1 2 5 5** is excluded - but only if those are actually subscribed to the topic com.myapp.mytopic 1.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Publishers* (role := "publisher") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

```
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.
subscriber_blackwhite_listing|bool := true
```

4.2. Publisher Exclusion

By default, a *Publisher* of an event will **not** itself receive an event published, even when subscribed to the Topic the *Publisher* is publishing to. This behavior can be overridden using this feature.

To override the exclusion of a publisher from its own publication, the PUBLISH message must include the following option:

```
PUBLISH.Options.exclude_me|bool
```

When publishing with PUBLISH.Options.exclude_me := false, the *Publisher* of the event will receive that event, if it is subscribed to the Topic published to.

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Example

```
[

1 6,

2 3 9 7 1 4 7 3 5,

{

"exclude_me": false

},

"com.myapp.mytopic 1 ",

["Hello, world!"]

]
```

In this example, the *Publisher* will receive the published event, if it is subscribed to com.myapp.mytopic **1**.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Publishers* (role := "publisher") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publisher_exclusion|bool := true

4.3. Publisher Identification

A *Publisher* may request the disclosure of its identity (its WAMP session ID) to receivers of a published event by setting

```
PUBLISH.Options.disclose_me|bool := true
```

Example

```
[ 1 6 , 2 3 9 7 1 4 7 3 5 , {"disclose_me": true}, "com.myapp.mytopic 1 ", ["Hello, world!"]]
```

If above event is published by a *Publisher* with WAMP session ID 3 3 3 5 6 5 6, the *Broker* would send an EVENT message to *Subscribers* with the *Publisher's* WAMP session ID in EVENT.Details.publisher:

Example

Internet-Draft

[3 6 , 5 5 1 2 3 1 5 3 5 5 , 4 4 2 9 3 1 3 5 6 6 , {"publisher": 3 3 3 5 6 5 6 }, ["Hello, world!"]]

Note that a *Broker* may deny a *Publisher's* request to disclose its identity:

Example

```
[8, 2 3 9 7 1 4 7 3 5, {}, "wamp.error.option_disallowed.disclose_me"]
```

A *Broker* may also (automatically) disclose the identity of a *Publisher* even without the *Publisher* having explicitly requested to do so when the *Broker* configuration (for the publication topic) is set up to do so.

Additional Identity Information

When publisher disclosure is allowed for a particular PUBLISH message, the corresponding EVENT message MAY also contain the following additional properties in its Details dictionary:

- EVENT.Details.publisher_authid|string
- EVENT.Details.publisher_authrole|string

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Publishers* (role := "publisher"), *Brokers* (role := "broker") and *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publisher_identification|bool := true

4.4. Publication Trust Levels

A *Broker* may be configured to automatically assign *trust levels* to events published by *Publishers* according to the *Broker* configuration on a per-topic basis and/or depending on the application defined role of the (authenticated) *Publisher*.

A Broker supporting trust level will provide

EVENT.Details.trustlevel|integer

in an EVENT message sent to a *Subscriber*. The trustlevel • means lowest trust, and higher integers represent (application-defined) higher levels of trust.

Example

[3 6 , 5 5 1 2 3 1 5 3 5 5 , 4 4 2 9 3 1 3 5 6 6 , {"trustlevel": 2 }, ["Hello, world!"]]

In above event, the *Broker* has (by configuration and/or other information) deemed the event publication to be of trustlevel **2**.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publication_trustlevels|bool := true

4.5. Pattern-based Subscription

By default, *Subscribers* subscribe to topics with **exact matching policy**. That is an event will only be dispatched to a *Subscriber* by the *Broker* if the topic published to (PUBLISH.Topic) *exactly* matches the topic subscribed to (SUBSCRIBE.Topic).


A *Subscriber* might want to subscribe to topics based on a *pattern*. This can be useful to reduce the number of individual subscriptions to be set up and to subscribe to topics the *Subscriber* is not aware of at the time of subscription, or which do not yet exist at this time.


Let's review the event publication flow. When one peer decides to publish a message to a topic, it results in a PUBLISH WAMP message with fields for the Publication id, Details dictionary, and, optionally, the payload arguments.

A given event received by the router from a publisher via a PUBLISH message will match one or more subscriptions:

- zero or one exact subscription
- zero or more prefix subscriptions
- zero or more wildcard subscriptions

The same published event is then forwarded to subscribers for every matching subscription. Thus, a given event might be sent multiple times to the same client under different subscriptions. Every subscription instance, based on a topic URI and some options, has a unique ID. All subscribers of the same subscription are given the same subscription ID.





- prefix-matching policy
- wildcard-matching policy

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

```
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.
pattern_based_subscription|bool := true
```

4.5.1. Prefix Matching

A Subscriber requests prefix-matching policy with a subscription request by setting

```
SUBSCRIBE.Options.match|string := "prefix"
```

Example

```
[

    3 2,

    9 1 2 8 7 3 6 1 4,

    {

    "match": "prefix"

    },

    "com.myapp.topic.emergency"

]
```

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When a **prefix-matching policy** is in place, any event with a topic that has SUBSCRIBE.Topic as a *prefix* will match the subscription, and potentially be delivered to *Subscribers* on the subscription.

In the above example, events with PUBLISH.Topic

- com.myapp.topic.emergency. 1 1
- com.myapp.topic.emergency-low
- com.myapp.topic.emergency.category.severe
- com.myapp.topic.emergency

will all apply for dispatching. An event with PUBLISH.Topic e.g. com.myapp.topic.emerge will not apply.

4.5.2. Wildcard Matching

A Subscriber requests wildcard-matching policy with a subscription request by setting

SUBSCRIBE.Options.match|string := "wildcard"

Wildcard-matching allows to provide wildcards for **whole** URI components.

Example

```
[

    3 2,

    9 1 2 8 7 3 6 1 4,

    {

        "match": "wildcard"

    },

    "com.myapp..userevent"

]
```

In above subscription request, the 3rd URI component is empty, which signals a wildcard in that URI component position. In this example, events with PUBLISH.Topic

- com.myapp.foo.userevent
- com.myapp.bar.userevent
- com.myapp.a 1 2 .userevent

will all apply for dispatching. Events with PUBLISH.Topic

• com.myapp.foo.userevent.bar

- com.myapp.foo.user
- com.myapp 2 .foo.userevent

will not apply for dispatching.

4.5.3. Design Aspects

No set semantics

Since each *Subscriber's* subscription "stands on its own", there is no *set semantics* implied by pattern-based subscriptions.

E.g. a *Subscriber* cannot subscribe to a broad pattern, and then unsubscribe from a subset of that broad pattern to form a more complex subscription. Each subscription is separate.

Events matching multiple subscriptions

When a single event matches more than one of a *Subscriber's* subscriptions, the event will be delivered for each subscription.

The *Subscriber* can detect the delivery of that same event on multiple subscriptions via EVENT.PUBLISHED.Publication, which will be identical.

Concrete topic published to

If a subscription was established with a pattern-based matching policy, a *Broker* MUST supply the original PUBLISH.Topic as provided by the *Publisher* in

EVENT.Details.topic|uri

to the Subscribers.

Example

```
[

3 6,

5 5 1 2 3 1 5 3 5 5,

4 4 2 9 3 1 3 5 6 6,

{

"topic": "com.myapp.topic.emergency.category.severe"

},

["Hello, world!"]

]
```

4.6. Sharded Subscription

Feature status: alpha

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Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Publishers* (role := "publisher"), *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.shareded_subscriptions| bool := true

Resource keys: PUBLISH.Options.rkey|string is a stable, technical **resource key**.

E.g. if your sensor has a unique serial identifier, you can use that.

Example

```
[16, 239714735, {"rkey": "sn 239019"}, "com.myapp.sensor.sn 239019.
temperature", [33.9]]
```

Node keys: SUBSCRIBE.Options.nkey|string is a stable, technical **node key**.

E.g. if your backend process runs on a dedicated host, you can use its hostname.

Example

```
[ 3 2 , 9 1 2 8 7 3 6 1 4 , {"match": "wildcard", "nkey": "node 2 3 "},
"com.myapp.sensor..temperature"]
```

4.7. Event History

Instead of complex QoS for message delivery, a *Broker* may provide *Event History*. With event history, a *Subscriber* is responsible for handling overlaps (duplicates) when it wants "exactly-once" message processing across restarts.

The event history may be transient, or it may be persistent where it survives *Broker* restarts.

The *Broker* implementation may allow for configuration of event history on a per-topic or pertopic-pattern basis. Such configuration could enable/disable the feature, set the event history storage location, set parameters for sub-features such as compression, or set the event history data retention policy.

Event History saves events published to discrete subscriptions, in the chronological order received by the broker. Let us examine an example.

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Subscriptions:

- 1. Subscription to exact match 'com.mycompany.log.auth' topic
- 2. Subscription to exact match 'com.mycompany.log.basket' topic
- 3. Subscription to prefix-based 'com.mycompany.log' topic

Publication messages:

- 1. Publication to topic 'com.mycompany.log.auth'. Forwarded as events to subscriptions 1 and 3.
- 2. Publication to topic 'com.mycompany.log.basket'. Delivered as event to subscriptions 2 and 3.
- Publication to topic 'com.mycompany.log.basket'. Delivered as events to subscriptions 2 and
 3.
- 4. Publication to topic 'com.mycompany.log.basket'. Delivered as events subscriptions 2 and 3.
- 5. Publication to topic 'com.mycompany.log.checkout'. Delivered as an event to subscription 3 only.

Event History:

- Event history for subscription 1 contains publication 1 only.
- Event history for subscription 2 contains publications 2, 3, and 4.
- Event history for subscription 3 contains all publications.

Feature Announcement

A *Broker* that implements *event history* must indicate HELLO.roles.broker.features.event_history = true, must announce the role HELLO.roles.callee, and must provide the meta procedures described below.

Receiving Event History

A Caller can request message history by calling the Broker meta procedure

wamp.subscription.get_events

With payload:

- Arguments = [subscription|id]. The subscription id for which to retrieve event history
- ArgumentsKw:
 - reverse. Boolean. Optional. Traverses events in reverse order of occurrence. The default is to traverse events in order of occurrence.
 - limit. Positive integer. Optional. Indicates the maximum number of events to retrieve.
 Can be used for pagination.

- from_time. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring at the given timestamp or after (using >= comparison).
- after_time. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring after the given timestamp (using > comparison).
- before_time. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring before the given timestamp (using < comparison).
- until_time. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring before the given timestamp including date itself (using <= comparison).
- topic. WAMP URI. Optional. For pattern-based subscriptions, only include publications to the specified topic.
- from_publication. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred at or following the event with the given publication id (includes the event with the given publication id in the results).
- after_publication. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred following the event with the given publication_id (excludes the event with the given publication|id in the results). Useful for pagination: pass the publication|id attribute of the last event returned in the previous page of results when navigating in order of occurrence (reverse argument absent or false).
- before_publication. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred previously to the event with the given publication|id (excludes the event with the given publication|id in the results). Useful for pagination: pass the publication|id attribute of the last event returned in the previous page of results when navigating in reverse order of occurrence (reverse=true).
- until_publication. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred at or previously to the event with the given publication|id (includes the event with the given publication|id in the results).

It is possible to pass multiple options at the same time. In this case they will be treated as conditions with logical AND. Note that the publication id event attribute is not ordered as it belongs to the Global scope. But since events are stored in the order they are received by the broker, it is possible to find an event with the specified publication id and then return events including or excluding the matched one depending on the * _publication filter attributes.

The arguments payload field returned by the above RPC uses the same schema: an array of Event objects containing an additional timestamp string attribute in RFC3339 format. It can also be an

empty array in the case where there were no publications to the specified subscription, or all events were filtered out by the specified criteria. Additional general information about the query may be returned via the argumentsKw payload field.

```
[
{
    format
        "subscription": 2 3 4 2 4 2 3 , // The subscription ID of the event
        "publication": 3 2 4 4 5 2 3 5 , // The original publication ID of the event
        "details": {}, // The original details of the event
        "args": [], // The original list arguments payload of the event. May be ommited
        "kwargs": {} // The original key-value arguments payload of the event. May be ommited
    }
]
```

Clients should not rely on timestamps being unique and monotonic. When events occur in quick succession, it's possible for some of them to have the same timestamp. When a router in an IoT system is deployed off-grid and is not synchronized to an NTP server, it's possible for the timestamps to jump backwards when the router's wall clock time or time zone is manually adjusted.

In cases where the events list is too large to send as a single RPC result, router implementations may provide additional options, such as pagination or returning progressive results.

As the Event History feature operates on subscription id, there can be situations when there are

not yet any subscribers to a topic of interest, but publications to the topic occur. In this situation, the *Broker* cannot predict that events under that topic should be stored. If the *Broker* implementation allows configuration on a per-topic basis, it may overcome this situations by preinitializing history-enabled topics with "dummy" subscriptions even if there are not yet any real subscribers to those topics.

Sometimes, a client may not be willing to subscribe to a topic just for the purpose of obtaining a subscription id. In that case a client may use other Subscriptions Meta API RPC for retrieving subscription IDs by topic URIs if the router supports it.

Security Aspects

TODO/FIXME: This part of Event History needs more discussion and clarification. But at least provides some basic information to take into account.

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In order to request event history, a peer must be allowed to subscribe to a desired subscription first. Thus, if a peer cannot subscribe to a topic resulting in a subscription, it means that it cannot receive events history for that topic either. To sidestep this problem, a peer must be allowed to call related meta procedures for obtaining the event history as described above. Prohibited Event History meta procedure calls must fail with the wamp.error.not_authorized error URI.

Original publications may include additional options, such as black-white-listing that triggers special event processing. These same rules must also apply to event history requests. For example, if the original publication contains eligible_authrole = 'admin', but the request for history came from a peer with authrole = 'user', then even if user is authorized to subscribe to the topic (and thus is authorized to ask for event history), this publication must be filtered out from the results of this specific request, by the router side.

The black-white-listing feature also allows the filtering of event delivery on a session ID basis. In the context of event history, this can result in unexpected behaviour: session ids are generated randomly at runtime for every session establishment, so newly connected sessions asking for event history may receive events that were originally excluded, or, vice versa, may not receive expected events due to session ID mismatch. To prevent this unexpected behaviour, all events published with Options.exclude|list[int] or Options.eligible|list[int] should be ignored by the Event History mechanism and not be saved at all.

Finally, Event History should only filter according to attributes that do not change during the run time of the router, which are currently authrole and authid. Filtering based on ephemeral attributes like session ID – (U+2013) and perhaps other future custom attributes – (U+2013) should result in the event not being stored in the history at all, to avoid unintentional leaking of event information.

4.8. Event Retention

Event Retention is where a particular topic has an event associated with it which is delivered upon an opting-in client subscribing to the topic.

It can be used for topics that generally have single or very few Publishers notifying Subscribers of a single updating piece of data -- for example, a topic where a sensor publishes changes of temperature & humidity in a data center. It may do this every time the data changes (making the time between updates potentially very far apart), which causes an issue for new Subscribers who may need the last-known value upon connection, rather than waiting an unknown period of time until it is updated. Event Retention covers this use case by allowing the Publisher to mark a event as 'retained', bound to the topic it was sent to, which can be delivered upon a new client subscription that asks for it. It is similar to Event History, but allows the publisher to decide what the most important recent event is on the topic, even if other events are being delivered. A *Broker* that advertises support MAY provide *event retention* on topics it provides. This event retention SHOULD be provided on a best-effort basis, and MUST NOT be interpreted as permanent or reliable storage by clients. This event retention is limited to one event that all subscribers would receive, and MAY include other supplemental events that have limited distribution (for example, a event published with subscriber black/whitelisting).

A *Publisher* can request storage of a new Retained Event by setting Publish.Options.retain|bool to true. Lack of the key in Publish.Options MUST be interpreted as a false value. A Broker MAY decline to provide event retention on certain topics by ignoring the Publish.Options.retain value. Brokers that allow event retention on the given topic MUST set the topic Retained Event to this if it were eligible to be published on the topic.

Subscribers may request access to the Retained Event by setting Subscribe.Options.get_retained| bool to true. Lack of the key in Subscribe.Options MUST be interpreted as a false value. When they opt-in to receiving the Retained Event, the Broker MUST send the Subscriber the **most recent** Retained Event that they would have received if they were subscribing when it was published. The Broker MUST NOT send the Subscriber a Retained Event that they would not be eligible to receive if they were subscribing when it was published. The *Retained Event*, as sent to the subscribing client, MUST have Event.Details.retained|bool set to true, to inform subscribers that it is not an immediately new message

is not an immediately new message.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

Welcome.Details.roles.broker.features.event_retention|bool := true

4.9. Subscription Revocation

Feature status: **alpha**

This feature allows a *Broker* to actively revoke a previously granted subscription. To achieve this, the existing UNSUBSCRIBED message is extended as described below.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. subscription_revocation|bool := true

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If the *Subscriber* does not support subscription_revocation, the *Broker* MAY still revoke a subscription to support administrative functionality. In this case, the *Broker* MUST NOT send an **UNSUBSCRIBED** message to the *Subscriber*. The *Subscriber* MAY use the subscription meta event wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe to determine whether a session is removed from a subscription.

Extending UNSUBSCRIBED

When revoking a subscription, the router has no request ID to reply to. So it's set to zero and another argument is appended to indicate which subscription to revoke. Optionally, a reason why the subscription was revoked is also appended.

[UNSUBSCRIBED, 0, Details|dict]

where

- Details.subscription|bool MUST be a previously issued subscription ID.
- Details.reason|string MAY provide a reason as to why the subscription was revoked.

Example

[3 5, 0, {"subscription": 1 2 9 3 7 2 2, "reason": "no longer authorized"}]

4.10. Session Testament

When a WAMP client disconnects, or the WAMP session is destroyed, it may want to notify other subscribers or publish some fixed data. Since a client may disconnect uncleanly, this can't be done reliably by them. A *Testament*, however, set on the server, can be reliably sent by the *Broker* once either the WAMP session has detached or the client connection has been lost, and allows this functionality. It can be triggered when a Session is either detached (the client has disconnected from it, or frozen it, in the case of Session Resumption) or destroyed (when the WAMP session no longer exists on the server).

This allows clients that otherwise would not be able to know when other clients disconnect get a notification (for example, by using the WAMP Session Meta API) with a format the disconnected client chose.

Feature Announcement

Support for this feature MUST be announced by *Dealers* (role := "dealer") via

HELLO.Details.roles.dealer.features. testament_meta_api|bool := true

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Testament Meta Procedures

A *Client* can call the following procedures to set/flush Testaments:

- wamp.session.add_testament to add a Testament which will be published on a particular topic when the Session is detached or destroyed.
- wamp.session.flush_testaments to remove the Testaments for that Session, either for when it is detached or destroyed.

wamp.session.add_testament

Adds a new testament:

Positional arguments

- 1. topic|uri the topic to publish the event on
- 2. args|list positional arguments for the event
- 3. kwargs|dict keyword arguments for the event

Keyword arguments

- 1. publish_options|dict options for the event when it is published -- see Publish.Options. Not all options may be honoured (for example, acknowledge). By default, there are no options.
- 2. scope|string When the testament should be published. Valid values are detached (when the WAMP session is detached, for example, when using Event Retention) or destroyed (when the WAMP session is finalized and destroyed on the Broker). Default MUST be destroyed.

wamp.session.add_testament does not return a value.

wamp.session.flush_testaments

Removes testaments for the given scope:

Keyword arguments

1. scope|string - Which set of testaments to be removed. Valid values are the same as wamp.session.add_testament, and the default MUST be destroyed.

wamp.session.flush_testaments does not return a value.

Testaments in Use

A *Client* that wishes to send some form of data when their *Session* ends unexpectedly or their *Transport* becomes lost can set a testament using the WAMP Testament Meta API, when a *Router* supports it. For example, a client may call add_testament (this example uses the implicit scope option of destroyed):

yield self.call('wamp.session.add_testament', 'com.myapp.mytopic', ['Seeya!'], {'my_name': 'app 1 '})

The *Router* will then store this information on the WAMP Session, either in a detached or destroyed bucket, in the order they were added. A client MUST be able to set multiple testaments per-scope. If the *Router* does not support Session Resumption (therefore removing the distinction between a detached and destroyed session), it MUST still use these two separate buckets to allow wamp.session.flush_testaments to work.

When a *Session* is *detached*, the *Router* will inspect it for any Testaments in the detached scope, and publish them in the order that the Router received them, on the specified topic, with the specified arguments, keyword arguments, and publish options. The *Router* MAY ignore publish options that do not make sense for a Testament (for example, acknowledged publishes).

When a *Session* is going to be *destroyed*, the *Router* will inspect it for any Testaments in the destroyed scope, and publish them in the same way as it would for the detached scope, in the order that they were received.

A *Router* that does not allow Session Resumption MUST send detached-scope Testaments before destroyed-scope Testaments.

A *Client* can also clear testaments if the information is no longer relevant (for example, it is shutting down completely cleanly). For example, a client may call wamp.session.flush_testaments:

yield self.call('wamp.session.flush_testaments', scope='detached') yield self.call('wamp.session.flush_testaments', scope='destroyed')

The *Router* will then flush all Testaments stored for the given scope.

5. Authentication Methods

Authentication is a complex area. Some applications might want to leverage authentication information coming from the transport underlying WAMP, e.g. HTTP cookies or TLS certificates.

Some transports might imply trust or implicit authentication by their very nature, e.g. Unix domain sockets with appropriate file system permissions in place.

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Other application might want to perform their own authentication using external mechanisms (completely outside and independent of WAMP).

Some applications might want to perform their own authentication schemes by using basic WAMP mechanisms, e.g. by using application-defined remote procedure calls.

And some applications might want to use a transport independent scheme, nevertheless predefined by WAMP.

WAMP-level Authentication

The message flow between Clients and Routers for establishing and tearing down sessions MAY involve the following messages which authenticate a session:

- 1. CHALLENGE
- 2. AUTHENTICATE



Concrete use of CHALLENGE and AUTHENTICATE messages depends on the specific authentication method.

See WAMP Challenge-Response Authentication or ticket authentication for the use in these authentication methods.

If two-factor authentication is desired, then two subsequent rounds of CHALLENGE and RESPONSE may be employed.

CHALLENGE

An authentication MAY be required for the establishment of a session. Such requirement MAY be based on the Realm the connection is requested for.

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To request authentication, the Router MUST send a CHALLENGE message to the Endpoint.

[CHALLENGE, AuthMethod|string, Extra|dict]

AUTHENTICATE

In response to a CHALLENGE message, the Client MUST send an AUTHENTICATE message.

[AUTHENTICATE, Signature|string, Extra|dict]

If the authentication succeeds, the Router MUST send a WELCOME message, else it MUST send an ABORT message.

Transport-level Authentication

Cookie-based Authentication

When running WAMP over WebSocket, the transport provides HTTP client cookies during the WebSocket opening handshake. The cookies can be used to authenticate one peer (the client) against the other (the server). The other authentication direction cannot be supported by cookies.

This transport-level authentication information may be forwarded to the WAMP level within HELLO.Details.transport.auth|any in the client-to-server direction.

TLS Certificate Authentication

When running WAMP over a TLS (either secure WebSocket or raw TCP) transport, a peer may authenticate to the other via the TLS certificate mechanism. A server might authenticate to the client, and a client may authenticate to the server (TLS client-certificate based authentication).

This transport-level authentication information may be forwarded to the WAMP level within HELLO.Details.transport.auth|any in both directions (if available).

5.1. Ticket-based Authentication

With *Ticket-based authentication*, the client needs to present the server an authentication "ticket" - some magic value to authenticate itself to the server.

This "ticket" could be a long-lived, pre-agreed secret (e.g. a user password) or a short-lived authentication token (like a Kerberos token). WAMP does not care or interpret the ticket presented by the client.

Caution: This scheme is extremely simple and flexible, but the resulting security may be limited. E.g., the ticket value will be sent over the wire. If the transport WAMP is running over is not encrypted, a man-in-the-middle can sniff and possibly hijack the ticket. If the ticket value is reused, that might enable replay attacks.

A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO message specifying the ticket method as (one of) the authentication methods:

```
[ 1 , "realm 1 ",
{
"roles": ...,
"authmethods": ["ticket"],
"authid": "joe"
}
]
```

The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For Ticket-based, this MUST include "ticket".

The HELLO.Details.authid|string is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For Ticket-based authentication, this MUST be provided.

If the server is unwilling or unable to perform Ticket-based authentication, it'll either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an ABORT message.

If the server is willing to let the client authenticate using a ticket and the server recognizes the provided authid, it'll send a CHALLENGE message:

```
[ 4 , "ticket", {}]
```

The client will send an AUTHENTICATE message containing a ticket:

```
[ 5 , "secret!!!", {}]
```

The server will then check if the ticket provided is permissible (for the authid given).

If the authentication succeeds, the server will finally respond with a WELCOME message:

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```
[ 2 , 3 2 5 1 2 7 8 0 7 2 1 5 2 1 6 2 ,
{
    "authid": "joe",
    "authrole": "user",
    "authmethod": "ticket",
    "authprovider": "static",
    "roles": ...
}
```

where

- 1. authid|string: The authentication ID the client was (actually) authenticated as.
- 2. authrole|string: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.
- 3. authmethod|string: The authentication method, here "ticket"
- 4. authprovider|string: The actual provider of authentication. For Ticket-based authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static or dynamic.

The WELCOME.Details again contain the actual authentication information active. If the authentication fails, the server will response with an ABORT message.

5.2. Challenge Response Authentication

WAMP Challenge-Response ("WAMP-CRA") authentication is a simple, secure authentication mechanism using a shared secret. The client and the server share a secret. The secret never travels the wire, hence WAMP-CRA can be used via non-TLS connections. The actual pre-sharing of the secret is outside the scope of the authentication mechanism.

A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO message specifying the wampcra method as (one of) the authentication methods:

```
[ 1 , "realm 1 ",
    {
        "roles": ...,
        "authmethods": ["wampcra"],
        "authid": "peter"
    }
]
```

The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For WAMP-CRA, this MUST include "wampcra".

The HELLO.Details.authid|string is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For WAMP-CRA, this MUST be provided.

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If the server is unwilling or unable to perform WAMP-CRA authentication, it MAY either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an ABORT message.

If the server is willing to let the client authenticate using WAMP-CRA, and the server recognizes the provided authid, it MUST send a CHALLENGE message:

The CHALLENGE.Details.challenge|string is a string the client needs to create a signature for. The string MUST BE a JSON serialized object which MUST contain:

- 1. authid|string: The authentication ID the client will be authenticated as when the authentication succeeds.
- 2. authrole|string: The authentication role the client will be authenticated as when the authentication succeeds.
- 3. authmethod|string: The authentication methods, here "wampcra"
- 4. authprovider|string: The actual provider of authentication. For WAMP-CRA, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. userdb.
- 5. nonce|string: A random value.
- 6. timestamp|string: The UTC timestamp (ISO8601 format) the authentication was started, e.g. 2 0 1 4 0 6 2 2 T 1 6 : 5 1 : 4 1 . 6 4 3 Z.
- 7. session|int: The WAMP session ID that will be assigned to the session once it is authenticated successfully.

The client needs to compute the signature as follows:

signature := HMAC[SHA 2 5 6]_{secret} (challenge)

That is, compute the HMAC-SHA256 using the shared secret over the challenge.

After computing the signature, the client will send an AUTHENTICATE message containing the signature, as a base64-encoded string:

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[5 , "gir 1 mSx+deCDUV 7 wRM 5 SGIn/+R/ClqLZuH 4 m 7 FJeBVI=", {}]

The server will then check if

- the signature matches the one expected
- the AUTHENTICATE message was sent in due time

If the authentication succeeds, the server will finally respond with a WELCOME message:

```
[2, 3 2 5 1 2 7 8 0 7 2 1 5 2 1 6 2,
{
    "authid": "peter",
    "authrole": "user",
    "authmethod": "wampcra",
    "authprovider": "userdb",
    "roles": ...
}
```

The WELCOME.Details again contain the actual authentication information active.

If the authentication fails, the server will response with an ABORT message.

Server-side Verification

The challenge sent during WAMP-CRA contains

- 1. random information (the nonce) to make WAMP-CRA robust against replay attacks
- 2. timestamp information (the timestamp) to allow WAMP-CRA timeout on authentication requests that took too long
- 3. session information (the session) to bind the authentication to a WAMP session ID
- 4. all the authentication information that relates to authorization like authid and authrole

Three-legged Authentication

The signing of the challenge sent by the server usually is done directly on the client. However, this is no strict requirement.

E.g. a client might forward the challenge to another party (hence the "three-legged") for creating the signature. This can be used when the client was previously already authenticated to that third party, and WAMP-CRA should run piggy packed on that authentication.

The third party would, upon receiving a signing request, simply check if the client is already authenticated, and if so, create a signature for WAMP-CRA.

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In this case, the secret is actually shared between the WAMP server who wants to authenticate clients using WAMP-CRA and the third party server, who shares a secret with the WAMP server.

This scenario is also the reason the challenge sent with WAMP-CRA is not simply a random value, but a JSON serialized object containing sufficient authentication information for the third party to check.

Password Salting

WAMP-CRA operates using a shared secret. While the secret is never sent over the wire, a shared secret often requires storage of that secret on the client and the server - and storing a password verbatim (unencrypted) is not recommended in general.

WAMP-CRA allows the use of salted passwords following the PBKDF2 key derivation scheme. With salted passwords, the password itself is never stored, but only a key derived from the password and a password salt. This derived key is then practically working as the new shared secret.

When the password is salted, the server will during WAMP-CRA send a CHALLENGE message containing additional information:

```
[4, "wampcra",
{
    "challenge": "{\"nonce\": \"LHRTC 9 zeOIrt_ 9 U 3 \",
    \"authprovider\": \"userdb\", \"authid\": \"peter\",
    \"timestamp\": \" 2 0 1 4 - 0 6 - 2 2 T 1 6 : 3 6 : 2 5 . 4 4 8 Z\",
    \"authrole\": \"user\", \"authmethod\": \"wampcra\",
    \"session\": 3 2 5 1 2 7 8 0 7 2 1 5 2 1 6 2 }",
    "salt": "salt 1 2 3 ",
    "keylen": 3 2,
    "iterations": 1 0 0 0
}
```

The CHALLENGE.Details.salt|string is the password salt in use. The CHALLENGE.Details.keylen|int and CHALLENGE.Details.iterations|int are parameters for the PBKDF2 algorithm.

5.3. Salted Challenge Response Authentication

The WAMP Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism ("WAMP-SCRAM"), is a password-based authentication method where the shared secret is neither transmitted nor stored as cleartext. WAMP-SCRAM is based on RFC5802 (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) and RFC7677 (SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS).

WAMP-SCRAM supports the Argon2 (draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2) password-based key derivation function, a memory-hard algorithm intended to resist cracking on GPU hardware. PBKDF2 (RFC2898) is also supported for applications that are required to use primitives currently approved by cryptographic standards.

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Security Considerations

With WAMP-SCRAM, if the authentication database is stolen, an attacker cannot impersonate a user unless they guess the password offline by brute force.

In the event that the server's authentication database is stolen, and the attacker either eavesdrops on one authentication exchange or impersonates a server, the attacker gains the ability to impersonate that particular user on that server. If the same salt is used on other servers, the attacker would gain the ability to impersonate that user on all servers using the same salt. That's why it's important to use a per-user random salt.

An eavesdropper that captures a user authentication exchange has enough information to mount an offline, brute-force dictionary attack for that particular user. If passwords are sufficiently strong, the cost/time needed to crack a password becomes prohibitive.

Note that when HTML/JavaScript assets are served to a web browser, WAMP-SCRAM does not safeguard against a man-in-the-middle tampering with those assets. Those assets could be tampered with in a way that captures the user's password and sends it to the attacker.

In light of the above security concerns, a secure TLS transport is therefore advised to prevent such attacks. The channel binding feature of SCRAM can be used to ensure that the TLS endpoints are the same between client and router.

Deviations from RFC5802

- To simplify parsing, SCRAM attributes in the authentication exchange messages are encoded as members of the Options/Details objects without escaping the , and = characters. However, the AuthMessage used to compute the client and server signatures DOES use the exact syntax specified in RFC5802, section 7. This makes it possible to use existing test vectors to verify WAMP-SCRAM implementations.
- 2. Hashing based on the weaker SHA-1 specified in RFC5802 is intentionally not supported by WAMP-SCRAM, in favor of the stronger SHA-256 specified in RFC7677.
- 3. The Argon2 key derivation function MAY be used instead of PBKDF2.
- 4. Nonces are required to be base64-encoded, which is stricter than the printable syntax specification of RFC5802.
- 5. The "y" channel binding flag is not used as there is currently no standard way for WAMP routers to announce channel binding capabilities.
- 6. The use of authzid for user impersonation is not supported.

authmethod Type String

"wamp-scram" SHALL be used as the authmethod type string for WAMP-SCRAM authentication. Announcement by routers of WAMP-SCRAM support is outside the scope of this document.

Base64 encoding

Base64 encoding of octet strings is restricted to canonical form with no whitespace, as defined in RFC4648 (*The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings*).

Nonces

In WAMP-SCRAM, a *nonce* (number used once) is a base64-encoded sequence of random octets. It SHOULD be of sufficient length to make a replay attack unfeasible. A length of 16 octets (128 bits) is recommended for each of the client and server-generated nonces.

See RFC4086 (Randomness Requirements for Security) for best practices concerning randomness.

Salts

A *salt* is a base64-encoded sequence of random octets.

To prevent rainbow table attacks in the event of database theft, the salt MUST be generated randomly by the server **for each user**. The random salt is stored with each user record in the authentication database.

Username/Password String Normalization

Username and password strings SHALL be normalized according to the *SASLprep* profile described in RFC4013, using the *stringprep* algorithm described in RFC3454.

While SASLprep preserves the case of usernames, the server MAY choose to perform case insensitive comparisons when searching for a username in the authentication database.

Channel Binding

Channel binding is a feature that allows a higher layer to establish that the other end of an underlying secure channel is bound to its higher layer counterpart. See RFC5056 (*On the Use of Channel Bindings*) for an in-depth discussion.

RFC5929 defines binding types for use with TLS transports, of which tls-unique and tls-server-endpoint are applicable for WAMP-SCRAM. For each channel binding type, there is a corresponding definition of the *channel binding data* that must be sent in response to the authentication challenge.

Negotiation and announcement of channel binding is outside the scope of this document. RFC5929 section 6 recommends that application protocols use tls-unique exclusively, except perhaps where server-side proxies are commonly deployed.

Note that WAMP-SCRAM channel binding is not generally possible with web browser clients due to the lack of a suitable API for this purpose.

The tls-unique Channel Binding Type

The tls-unique channel binding type allows the WAMP layer to establish that the other peer is authenticating over the same, unique TLS connection. The channel binding data for this type corresponds to the bytes of the first TLS Finished message, as described in RFC5929, section 3. RFC5929 section 10.2 addresses the concern of disclosing this data over the TLS channel (in short, the TLS Finished message would already be visible to eavesdroppers).

To safeguard against the *triple handshake attack* described in RFC7627, this channel binding type MUST be used over a TLS channel that uses the *extended master secret* extension, or over a TLS channel where session resumption is not permitted.

The tls-server-end-point Channel Binding Type

The tls-server-end-point channel binding type allows the WAMP layer to establish that the other

peer is authenticating over a TLS connection to a server having been issued a Public Key Infrastructure Certificate. The channel binding data for this type is a hash of the TLS server's certificate, computed as described in RFC5929, section 4.1. The certificate is hashed to accommodate memory-constrained implementations.

Authentication Exchange

WAMP-SCRAM uses a single round of challenge/response pairs after the client authentication request and before the authentication outcome.

SCRAM Message	WAMP Message
client-first-message	HELLO
server-first-message	CHALLENGE
client-final-message	AUTHENTICATE
server-final-message with verifier	WELCOME
server-final-message with server-error	ABORT

The mapping of RFC5802 messages to WAMP messages is as follows:

Table 7

Initial Client Authentication Message

WAMP-SCRAM authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO message specifying the wamp-scram method as (one of) the authentication methods:

```
[ 1 , "realm 1 ",
    {
        "roles": ...,
        "authmethods": ["wamp-scram"],
        "authid": "user",
        "authextra":
        {
            "nonce": "egVDf 3 DMJh 0 =",
            "channel_binding": null
        }
    }
]
```

where:

- 1. authid|string: The identity of the user performing authentication. This corresponds to the username parameter in RFC5802.
- 2. authextra.nonce|string: A base64-encoded sequence of random octets, generated by the client. See Nonces.
- 3. authextra.channel_binding|string: Optional string containing the desired channel binding type. See Channel Bindings.

Upon receiving the HELLO message, the server MUST terminate the authentication process by sending an ABORT message under any of the following circumstances:

- The server does not support the WAMP-SCRAM authmethods, and there are no other methods left that the server supports for this authid.
- The the server does not support the requested channel_binding type.
- (Optional) The server does not recognize the given authid. In this case, the server MAY proceed with a mock CHALLENGE message to avoid leaking information on the existence of usernames. This mock CHALLENGE SHOULD contain a generated salt value that is always the same for a given authid, otherwise an attacker may discover that the user doesn't actually exist.

Initial Server Authentication Message

If none of the above failure conditions apply, and the server is ready to let the client authenticate using WAMP-SCRAM, then it SHALL send a CHALLENGE message:

```
[ 4 , "wamp-scram",
    {
        "nonce": "egVDf 3 DMJh 0 =SBmkFIh 7 sSo=",
        "salt": "aBc+fx 0 NAVA=",
        "kdf": "pbkdf 2 ",
        "iterations": 4 0 9 6,
        "memory": null
    }
]
```

where:

- 1. nonce|string: A server-generated nonce that is appended to the client-generated nonce sent in the previous HELLO message. See Nonces.
- 2. salt|string: The base64-encoded salt for this user, to be passed to the key derivation function. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database. See Salts.
- 3. kdf: The key derivation function (KDF) used to hash the password. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database. See Key Derivation Functions.
- 4. iterations|integer: The execution time cost factor to use for generating the SaltedPassword hash. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database.
- 5. memory|integer: The memory cost factor to use for generating the SaltedPassword hash. This is only used by the Argon2 key derivation function, where it is stored with each user record in the authentication database.

The client MUST respond with an ABORT message if CHALLENGE.Details.nonce does not begin with the client nonce sent in HELLO.Details.nonce.

The client SHOULD respond with an ABORT message if it detects that the cost parameters are unusually low. Such low-cost parameters could be the result of a rogue server attempting to obtain a weak password hash that can be easily cracked. What constitutes unusually low parameters is implementation-specific and is not covered by this document.

Final Client Authentication Message

Upon receiving a valid CHALLENGE message, the client SHALL respond with an AUTHENTICATE message:

```
[ 5 , "dHzbZapWIk 4 jUhN+Ute 9 ytag 9 zjfMHgsqmmiz 7 AndVQ=",
    {
        "nonce": "egVDf 3 DMJh 0 =SBmkFIh 7 sSo=",
        "channel_binding": null,
        "cbind_data": null
    }
]
```

where:

- 1. Signature|string argument: The base64-encoded ClientProof, computed as described in the SCRAM-Algorithms section.
- 2. nonce|string: The concatenated client-server nonce from the previous CHALLENGE message.
- 3. channel_binding|string: Optional string containing the channel binding type that was sent in the original HELLO message.
- 4. cbind_data|string: Optional base64-encoded channel binding data. MUST be present if and only if channel_binding is not null. The format of the binding data is dependent on the binding type. See Channel Binding.

Upon receiving the AUTHENTICATE message, the server SHALL then check that:

- The AUTHENTICATE message was received in due time.
- The ClientProof passed via the Signature|string argument is validated against the StoredKey and ServerKey stored in the authentication database. See SCRAM Algorithms.
- nonce matches the one previously sent via CHALLENGE.
- The channel_binding matches the one sent in the HELLO message.
- The cbind_data sent by the client matches the channel binding data that the server sees on its side of the channel.

Final Server Authentication Message - Success

If the authentication succeeds, the server SHALL finally respond with a WELCOME message:

```
[2, 3 2 5 1 2 7 8 0 7 2 1 5 2 1 6 2,
{
    "authid": "user",
    "authrole": "frontend",
    "authmethod": "wamp-scram",
    "authprovider": "static",
    "roles": ...,
    "authextra":
    {
        "verifier":
        "verifier":
        "v= 6 rriTRBi 2 3 WpRR/wtup+mMhUZUn/dB 5 nLTJRsjl 9 5 G 4 ="
    }
]
```

where:

1. authid|string: The authentication ID the client was actually authenticated as.

- 2. authrole|string: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.
- 3. authmethod|string: The authentication method, here "wamp-scram".
- 4. authprovider|string: The actual provider of authentication. For WAMP-SCRAM authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static or dynamic.
- 5. authextra.verifier|string: The base64-encoded ServerSignature, computed as described in the SCRAM Algorithms section.

The client SHOULD check the verifier for mutual authentication, terminating the session if invalid.

Final Server Authentication Message - Failure

If the authentication fails, the server SHALL respond with an ABORT message.

The server MAY include a SCRAM-specific error string in the ABORT message as a Details.scram attribute. SCRAM error strings are listed in RFC5802, section 7, under server-error-value.

SCRAM Algorithms

This section is non-normative.

RFC5802 specifies the algorithms used to compute the ClientProof, ServerSignature, ServerKey, and StoredKey values referenced by this document. Those algorithms are summarized here in pseudocode for reference.

Notation

- "=": The variable on the left-hand side is the result of the expression on the right-hand side.
- "+": String concatenation.
- IfNull(attribute, value, else): If the given attribute is absent or null, evaluates to the given value, otherwise evaluates to the given else value.
- Decimal(integer): The decimal string representation of the given integer.
- Base 6 4 (octets): Base64 encoding of the given octet sequence, restricted to canonical form with no whitespace, as defined in RFC4648.
- UnBase 6 4 (str): Decode the given Base64 string into an octet sequence.
- Normalize(str): Normalize the given string using the SASLprep profile RFC4013 of the "stringprep" algorithm RFC3454.
- XOR: The exclusive-or operation applied to each octet of the left and right-hand-side octet sequences.
- SHA 2 5 6 (str): The SHA-256 cryptographic hash function.

- HMAC(key, str): Keyed-hash message authentication code, as defined in RFC2104, with SHA-256 as the underlying hash function.
- KDF(str, salt, params...): One of the supported key derivations function, with the output key length the same as the SHA-256 output length (32 octets). params... are the additional parameters that are applicable for the function: iterations and memory.
- Escape(str): Replace every occurrence of "," and "=" in the given string with "= 2 C" and "= 3 D" respectively.

Data Stored on the Server

For each user, the server needs to store:

- 1. A random, per-user salt.
- 2. The type string corresponding to the key derivation function (KDF) used to hash the password (e.g. "argon 2 id 1 3 "). This is needed to handle future revisions of the KDF, as well as allowing migration to stronger KDFs that may be added to WAMP-SCRAM in the future. This may also be needed if the KDF used during user registration is configurable or selectable on a per-user basis.
- 3. Parameters that are applicable to the key derivation function : iterations and possibly memory.

4. The StoredKey.

5. The ServerKey.

where StoredKey and ServerKey are computed as follows:

```
SaltedPassword = KDF(Normalize(password), salt, params...)
ClientKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key")
StoredKey = SHA 2 5 6 (ClientKey)
ServerKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key")
```

Note that "Client Key" and "Server Key" are string literals.

The manner in which the StoredKey and ServerKey are shared with the server during user registration is outside the scope of SCRAM and this document.

AuthMessage

In SCRAM, AuthMessage is used for computing ClientProof and ServerSignature. AuthMessage is computed using attributes that were sent in the first three messages of the authentication exchange.

```
ClientFirstBare = "n=" + Escape(HELLO.Details.authid) + "," +
"r=" + HELLO.Details.authextra.nonce
```

```
ServerFirst = "r=" + CHALLENGE.Details.nonce + "," +
"s=" + CHALLENGE.Details.salt + "," +
"i=" + Decimal(CHALLENGE.Details.iterations)
```

CBindName = AUTHENTICATE.Extra.channel_binding

CBindData = AUTHENTICATE.Extra.cbind_data

CBindFlag = IfNull(CBindName, "n", "p=" + CBindName)

```
CBindInput = CBindFlag + ",," +
IfNull(CBindData, "", UnBase 6 4 (CBindData))
ClientFinalNoProof = "c=" + Base 6 4 (CBindInput) + "," +
"r=" + AUTHENTICATE.Extra.nonce
```

```
AuthMessage = ClientFirstBare + "," + ServerFirst + "," +
ClientFinalNoProof
```

ClientProof

ClientProof is computed by the client during the authentication exchange as follows:

```
SaltedPassword = KDF(Normalize(password), salt, params...)

ClientKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key")

StoredKey = SHA 2 5 6 (ClientKey)

ClientSignature = HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage)

ClientProof = ClientKey XOR ClientSignature
```

The ClientProof is then sent to the server, base64-encoded, via the AUTHENTICATE.Signature argument.

The server verifies the ClientProof by computing the RecoveredStoredKey and comparing it to the actual StoredKey:

ClientSignature = HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage) RecoveredClientKey = ClientSignature XOR ReceivedClientProof RecoveredStoredKey = SHA 2 5 6 (RecoveredClientKey)

Note that the client MAY cache the ClientKey and StoredKey (or just SaltedPassword) to avoid

having to perform the expensive KDF computation for every authentication exchange. Storing these values securely on the client is outside the scope of this document.

ServerSignature

ServerSignature is computed by the server during the authentication exchange as follows:

ServerSignature = HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)

The ServerSignature is then sent to the client, base64-encoded, via the WELCOME.Details.authextra.verifier attribute.

The client verifies the ServerSignature by computing it and comparing it with the ServerSignature sent by the server:

```
ServerKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key")
ServerSignature = HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)
```

Key Derivation Functions

SCRAM uses a password-based key derivation function (KDF) to hash user passwords. WAMP-SCRAM supports both Argon2 and PBKDF2 as the KDF. Argon2 is recommended because of its memory hardness and resistance against GPU hardware. PBKDF2, which does not feature memory hardness, is also supported for applications that are required to use primitives currently approved by cryptographic standards.

The following table maps the CHALLENGE.Details.kdf type string to the corresponding KDF.

KDF type string	Function
"argon 2 id 1 3 "	Argon2id variant of Argon2, version 1.3
"pbkdf 2 "	PBKDF2
Table 8	

To promote interoperability, WAMP-SCRAM client/server implementations SHOULD support both of the above KDFs. During authentication, there is no "negotiation" of the KDF, and the client MUST use the same KDF than the one used to create the keys stored in the authentication database.

Which KDF is used to hash the password during user registration is up to the application and/or server implementation, and is not covered by this document. Possibilities include:

- making the KDF selectable at runtime during registration,
- making the KDF statically configurable on the server, or,
- hard-coding the KDF selection on the server.

Argon2

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The Argon2 key derivation function, proposed in draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2, is computed using the following parameters:

- CHALLENGE.Details.salt as the cryptographic salt,
- CHALLENGE.Details.iterations as the number of iterations,
- CHALLENGE.Details.memory as the memory size (in kibibytes),
- 1 as the parallelism parameter,
- Argon2id as the algorithm variant, and,
- 32 octets as the output key length.

For WAMP-SCRAM, the parallelism parameter is fixed to 1 due to the password being hashed on the client side, where it is not generally known how many cores/threads are available on the client's device.

Section 4 of the Argon2 internet draft recommends the general procedure for selecting parameters, of which the following guidelines are applicable to WAMP-SCRAM:

- A 128-bit salt is recommended, which can be reduced to 64-bit if space is limited.
- The memory parameter is to be configured to the maximum amount of memory usage that can be tolerated on client devices for computing the hash.
- The iterations parameter is to be determined experimentally so that execution time on the client reaches the maximum that can be tolerated by users during authentication. If the execution time is intolerable with iterations = 1, then reduce the memory parameter as needed.

PBKDF2

The PBKDF2 key derivation function, defined in RFC2898, is used with SHA-256 as the pseudorandom function (PRF).

The PDBKDF2 hash is computed using the following parameters:

- CHALLENGE.Details.salt as the cryptographic salt,
- CHALLENGE.Details.iterations as the iteration count, and,
- 32 octets as the output key length (dkLen), which matches the SHA-256 output length.

RFC2898 section 4.1 recommends at least 64 bits for the salt.

The iterations parameter SHOULD be determined experimentally so that execution time on the client reaches the maximum that can be tolerated by users during authentication. RFC7677 section 4 recommends an iteration count of at least 4096, with a significantly higher value on non-mobile clients.

5.4. Cryptosign-based Authentication

WAMP-Cryptosign is a WAMP authentication method based on *public-private key cryptography*. Specifically, it is based on Ed25519 digital signatures as described in [RFC8032].

Ed25519 is an elliptic curve signature scheme that instantiates the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) with elliptic curve parameters which are equivalent to Curve25519. **Curve25519** is a SafeCurve, which means it is easy to implement and avoid security issues resulting from common implementation challenges and bugs. Ed25519 is intended to operate at around the 128-bit security level, and there are robust native implementations available as open-source, e.g. libsodium, which can be used from script languages, e.g. PyNaCl.

An implementation of *WAMP-Cryptosign* MUST provide

• Client Authentication

and MAY implement one or more of

- TLS Channel Binding
- Router Authentication
- Trustroots and Certificates
- Remote Attestation

The following sections describe each of above features of *WAMP-Cryptosign*.

Examples of complete authentication message exchanges can be found at the end of this chapter in Example Message Exchanges.

In WAMP, the following **cryptographic primitives** are used with *WAMP-Cryptosign* authentication:

Elliptic Curves:

SECG	Usage in WAMP
secp256r1	Transport Encryption (WAMP transport encryption)
curve25519	Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign authentication)
secp256k1	Data Signatures (WAMP-Cryptosign certificates, WAMP E2E encryption)
Table 9	

- RFC4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- RFC7748: Elliptic Curves for Security

Hash Functions:

SECG	Usage in WAMP
sha256	Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign authentication)
keccak256	Data Signatures (WAMP-Cryptosign certificates, WAMP E2E encryption)
Table 10	

Note that sha 2 5 6 refers to the SHA-2 algorithm, while sha 3 - 2 5 6 is a different algorithm refering to SHA-3.

Signature Schemes:

SECG	Usage in WAMP
ed25519	Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign Authentication)
ecdsa	Data Signatures (Ethereum, WAMP-Cryptosign Certificates, WAMP-E2E)
Table 11	

5.4.1. Client Authentication

A *Client* is authenticated to a *Router* by:

- 1. sending a HELLO, announcing its public key
- 2. signing a (random) challenge received in CHALLENGE with its private key
- 3. let the router verify the signature, proofing the client actually controls the private key, and thus the authenticity of the client as identified by the public key
- 4. let the router admit the client to a realm under a role, based on the public key

Thus, the client is identified using its public key, and the *Router* needs to know said public key and its desired realm and role in advance.

A *Client* for which the *Router* does not previously know the client's public key MAY use the Trustroots and Certificates feature to trust a *Client* based on an additional certificate presented by the client.

A *Router* is optionally (see <u>Router Authentication</u>) authenticated to a *Client* by:

- 1. client includes a (random) HELLO.Details.challenge|string
- 2. the router sends the signature as part of its challenge to the client, in CHALLENGE.extra.signature|string

Again, in this case, the *Router* includes a trustroot and certificate for the client to verify.

5.4.1.1. Computing the Signature

The challenge sent by the router is a 32 bytes random value, encoded as a Hex string in CHALLENGE.extra.challenge|string.

When no channel binding is active, the Ed25519 signature over the 32 bytes message MUST be computed using the WAMP-Cryptosign *private key* of the authenticating client.

When channel binding is active, the challenge MUST first be XOR'ed bytewise with the channel ID, e.g. the 32 bytes from TLS with channel binding "tls-unique", and the resulting message (which again has length 32 bytes) MUST be signed using the WAMP-Cryptosign *private key* of the authenticating client.

The client MUST return the concatenation of the signature and the message signed (96 bytes) in the AUTHENTICATE message.

5.4.1.2. Example Message Flow

A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO message specifying the cryptosign method as (one of) the authentication methods:

```
[1, "realm 1 ", {
    "roles": {/ * see below * /},
    "authmethods": ["cryptosign"],
    "authid": "client 0 1 @example.com",
    "authextra": {
        "pubkey":
        "5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 ef 3 6 c 7 0 8 b 9 6 ee 6 f
        6 2 dddad 9 1 2 2"
      }
}]
```

The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For WAMP-Cryptosign, this MUST include "cryptosign".

The HELLO.Details.authid|string is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For WAMP-Cryptosign authentication, this MAY be provided. If no authid is provided, the router SHOULD automatically chose and assign an authid (e.g. the Hex encode public key).

The HELLO.Details.authextra|dict contains the following members for WAMP-Cryptosign:

Field	Туре	Required	Description
pubkey	string	yes	The client public key (32 bytes) as a Hex encoded string, e.g. 5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 e

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Field	Туре	Required	Description
channel_binding	string	no	If TLS channel binding is in use, the TLS channel binding type, e.g. "
challenge	string	no	A client chosen, random challenge (32 bytes) as a Hex encoded strin
trustroot	string	no	When the client includes a client certificate (see below), the Ethereu chain to be used, e.g. 0 x 7 2 b 3 4 8 6 d 3 8 E 9 f 4 9 2 1 5 b 4 8 7 0 Standalone Trustroot or an On-chain Trustroot (see Trustroots)

Table 12

The client needs to announce the WAMP roles and features it supports, for example:

("calleo": ("foaturos": ("call capcoling": True
{"callee": {"features": {"call_canceling": True, "caller identification": True,
"pattern_based_registration": True,
"progressive_call_results": True,
"registration_revocation": True,
"shared_registration": True}},
"caller": {"features": {"call_canceling": True,
"caller_identification": True,
"progressive_call_results": True}},
"publisher": {"features": {"publisher_exclusion": True,
"publisher_identification": True,
"subscriber_blackwhite_listing": True}},
"subscriber": {"features": {"pattern_based_subscription": True,
"publisher_identification": True,
"subscription_revocation": True}}}

If the router is unwilling or unable to perform WAMP-Cryptosign authentication, it'll either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an <u>ABORT</u> message.

If the router is willing to let the client authenticate using WAMP-Cryptosign and the router recognizes the provided HELLO.Details.authextra.pubkey|string, it'll send a CHALLENGE message:

```
[4, "cryptosign", {

"challenge":

"fa 0 3 4 0 6 2 ad 7 6 3 5 2 b 5 3 a 2 5 3 5 8 8 5 4 5 7 7 7 3 0 db 8 2 f 3 6 7 aa 4 3 9 7

0 9 c 9 1 2 9 6 d 0 4 a 5 7 1 6 c",

"channel_binding": null

}]
```

The client will send an AUTHENTICATE message containing a signature:

[5		
'e 2 f 0 2 9 7 a 1 9	3 b 6 3 b 7 a 4 a 9 2 0 2 8 e 9 e	2 e 6 1 0 7 f 8 2 7 3 0 5 6 0 d 5 4 a 6 5
7 bd 9 8 2 cb 4 b 3	1 5 1 4 9 0 3 9 9 debbbde 9 9	9 8 e 4 9 4 d 3 c 3 b 2 a 5 e 2 e 9 1 2 7 1 2
9 1 e 1 0 dee 8 5 a	a 6 cfaa 1 2 7 8 8 5 ddd 8 b 0 afa	0 3 4 0 6 2 ad 7 6 3 5 2 b 5 3 a 2 5 3 5
8 8 5 4 5 7 7 7 3	3 0 db 8 2 f 3 6 7 aa 4 3 9 7 0 9	9 c 9 1 2 9 6 d 0 4 a 5 7 1 6 c', {}]

If the authentication succeeds, the server will router respond with a WELCOME message:

```
[2, 7 5 6 2 1 2 2 3 9 7 1 1 9 7 8 6, {
    "authextra": {
        "x_cb_node": "intel-nuci 7 - 2 7 5 3 2 ",
        "x_cb_peer": "tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 4 9 0 3 2 ",
        "x_cb_pid": 2 7 6 3 7,
        "x_cb_worker": "worker 0 0 1 "
    },
    "authid": "client 0 1 @example.com",
    "authmethod": "cryptosign",
    "authprovider": "static",
    "authrole": "user",
    "realm": "realm 1 ",
    "roles": {/ * see below * /}
}]
```

where

- 1. authid|string: The authentication ID the client was (actually) authenticated as.
- 2. authrole|string: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.
- 3. authmethod|string: The authentication method, here "cryptosign"
- 4. authprovider|string: The actual provider of authentication. For Ticket-based authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static or dynamic.

The WELCOME.Details again contain the actual authentication information active. If the authentication fails, the router will response with an ABORT message.

When the authentication is successful, WELCOME.Details.roles|dict will announce the roles and features the router supports:

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{"broker": {"features": {"	event_retention": True,	
"pat	tern_based_subscription": True,	
"put	olisher_exclusion": True,	
	blisher_identification": True,	
	sion_meta_api": True,	
	oscriber_blackwhite_listing": True,	
	oscription_meta_api": True,	
	oscription_revocation": True}},	
	es": {"call_canceling": True,	
-	ler identification": True,	
"pat	tern_based_registration": True,	
	ogressive_call_results": True,	
•	jistration_meta_api": True,	
	jistration_revocation": True,	
	sion_meta_api": True,	
	ared_registration": True,	
	tament_meta_api": True}}	
}		
-		

5.4.1.3. Test Vectors

The following test vectors allow to verify an implementation of WAMP-Cryptosign signatures. You can use channel_id, private_key and challenge as input, and check the computed signature matches signature.

The test vectors contain instances for both with and without a channel_id, which represents the TLS channel ID when using TLS with tls-unique channel binding.

test_vectors_1 = [
{ 'channel_id': None,
'private_key': ' 4 d 5 7 d 9 7 a 6 8 f 5 5 5 6 9 6 6 2 0 a 6 d 8 4 9 c 0 ce 5 8 2 5 6 8 5 1 8 d 7 2 9 eb 7 5 3 dc 7 c 7 3 2 de 2 8 0 4 5 1 0 ', 'challenge': 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
'b 3 2 6 7 5 b 2 2 1 f 0 8 5 9 3 2 1 3 7 3 7 bef 8 2 4 0 e 7 c 1 5 2 2 8 b 0 7 0 2 8 e 1 9 5 9 5 2 9 4 6 7 8 c 9 0 d 1 1 c 0 cae 8 0 a 3 5 7 3 3 1 bfc 5 cc 9 fb 7 1 0 8 1 4 6 4 e 6 e 7 5 0 1 3 5 1 7 c 2 cf 0 6 7 ad 5 6 6 a 6 b 7 b 7 2 8 e 5 d 0 3 fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
}, { ichannel_id': None,
'private_key': 'd 5 1 1 fe 7 8 e 2 3 9 3 4 b 3 dadb 5 2 fcd 0 2 2 9 7 4 b 8 0 bd 9 2 bccc 7 c 5 cf 4 0 4 e 4 6 cc 0 a 8 a 2 f 5 cd',
'challenge': 'b 2 6 c 1 f 8 7 c 1 3 fc 1 da 1 4 9 9 7 f 1 b 5 a 7 1 9 9 5 dff 8 fbe 0 a 6 2 fae 8 4 7 3 c 7 bdbd 0 5 bfb 6 0 7 d', 'signature':
'signature': 'd 4 2 0 9 ad 1 0 d 5 aff 6 bfbc 0 0 9 d 7 e 9 2 4 7 9 5 de 1 3 8 a 6 3 5 1 5 efc 7 afc 6 b 0 1 b 7 fe 5 2 0 1 3 7 2 1 9 0 3 7 4 8 8 6 a 7 0 2 0 7 b 0 4 2 2 9 4 af 5 bd 6 4 ce 7 2 5 cd 8 dce b 3 4 4 e 6 d 1 1 c 0 9 d 1 aaaf 4 d 6 6 0 fb 2 6 c 1 f 8 7 c 1 3 fc 1 da 1 4 9 9 7 f 1 b 5 a 7 1 9 9 5 dff 8 fbe 0 a 6 2 fae 8 4 7 3 c 7 bdbd 0 5 bfb 6 0 7 d'
}, { 'channel_id': None, 'private_key':
private_key. '6e1fde9cf9e2359a87420b65a87dc0c66136e66945196ba247 5990d8a0c3a25b', 'challenge':
'b 0 5 e 6 b 8 ad 4 d 6 9 abf 7 4 aa 3 be 3 c 0 ee 4 0 ae 0 7 d 6 6 e 1 8 9 5 b 9 ab 0 9 2 8 5 a 2 f 1 1 9 2 d 5 6 2 d 2 ', 'signature':
' 7 beb 2 8 2 1 8 4 baadd 0 8 f 1 6 6 f 1 6 dd 6 8 3 b 3 9 cab 5 3 8 1 6 ed 8 1 e 6 9 5 5 def 9 5 1 cb 2 ddad 1 ec 1 8 4 e 2 0 6 7 4 6 fd 8 2 bda 0 7 5 af 0 3 7 1 1 d 3 d 5 6 5 8 fc 8 4 a 7 6 1 9 6 b 0 fa 8 d 1 ebc 9 2 ef 9 f 3 0 bb 0 5 e 6 b 8 ad 4 d 6 9 abf 7 4 aa 3 be 3 c 0 ee 4 0 ae 0 7 d 6 6 e 1 8 9 5 b 9 ab 0 9 2 8 5 a 2 f 1 1 9 2 d 5 6 2 d 2 '
}, { 'channel_id':
'6 2 e 9 3 5 ae 7 5 5 f 3 d 4 8 f 8 0 d 4 d 5 9 f 6 1 2 1 3 5 8 c 4 3 5 7 2 2 a 6 7 e 8 5 9 cc 0 c aa 8 b 5 3 9 0 2 7 f 2 ff', 'private_key':
'4 d 5 7 d 9 7 a 6 8 f 5 5 5 6 9 6 6 2 0 a 6 d 8 4 9 c 0 ce 5 8 2 5 6 8 5 1 8 d 7 2 9 eb 7 5 3 dc 7 c 7 3 2 de 2 8 0 4 5 1 0', 'challenge': 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
'signature': '9b6f4 1 5 4 0 c 9 b 9 5 b 4 b 7 b 2 8 1 c 3 0 4 2 fa 9 c 5 4 cef 4 3 c 8 4 2 d 6 2 ea 3 fd 6 0 3 0 fcb 6 6 e 7 0 b 3 e 8 0 d 4 9 d 4 4 c 2 9 d 1 6 3 5 da 9 3 4 8 d 0 2 ec 9 3 f 3 ed 1 ef 2 2 7 dfb 5 9 a 0 7 b 5 8 0 0 9 5 c 2 b 8 2 f 8 0 f 9 d 1 6 ca 5 1 8 aa 0 c 2 b 7 0 7 f 2 b 2 a 6 0 9 edec a 7 3 b ca 8 dd 5 9 8 1 7 a 6 3 3 f 3 5 5 7 4 ac 6 fd 8 0 d 0 0 ' },

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{ 'channel id': '6 2 e 9 3 5 ae 7 5 5 f 3 d 4 8 f 8 0 d 4 d 5 9 f 6 1 2 1 3 5 8 c 4 3 5 7 2 2 a 6 7 e 8 5 9 cc 0 c aa 8 b 5 3 9 0 2 7 f 2 ff', 'private_key': 'd 5 1 1 fe 7 8 e 2 3 9 3 4 b 3 dadb 5 2 fcd 0 2 2 9 7 4 b 8 0 bd 9 2 bccc 7 c 5 cf 4 0 4 e 4 6 cc 0 a 8 a 2 f 5 cd', 'challenge': 'b 2 6 c 1 f 8 7 c 1 3 f c 1 da 1 4 9 9 7 f 1 b 5 a 7 1 9 9 5 dff 8 fbe 0 a 6 2 fae 8 4 7 3 c 7 bdbd 0 5 bfb 6 0 7 d', 'signature': ' 3 0 5 aaa 3 ac 2 5 e 9 8 f 6 5 1 4 2 7 6 8 8 b 3 fc 4 3 fe 7 d 8 a 6 8 a 7 ec 1 d 7 d 6 1 c 6 1 5 1 7 c 5 1 9 bd 4 a 4 2 7 c 3 0 1 5 5 9 9 d 8 3 ca 2 8 b 4 c 6 5 2 3 3 3 9 2 0 2 2 3 8 4 4 ef 0 7 2 5 eb 5 dc 2 feb fd 6 af 7 6 7 7 b 7 3 f 0 1 d 0 8 5 2 a 2 9 b 4 6 0 fc 9 2 ec 9 4 3 2 4 2 ac 6 3 8 a 0 5 3 bbacc 2 0 0 5 1 2 b 1 8 b 3 0 d 1 5 0 8 3 cbdc 9 2 8 2 ' }, { 'channel id': '6 2 e 9 3 5 ae 7 5 5 f 3 d 4 8 f 8 0 d 4 d 5 9 f 6 1 2 1 3 5 8 c 4 3 5 7 2 2 a 6 7 e 8 5 9 cc 0 c aa 8 b 5 3 9 0 2 7 f 2 ff', 'private_key': '6 e 1 fde 9 cf 9 e 2 3 5 9 a 8 7 4 2 0 b 6 5 a 8 7 dc 0 c 6 6 1 3 6 e 6 6 9 4 5 1 9 6 ba 2 4 7 5 9 9 0 d 8 a 0 c 3 a 2 5 b', 'challenge': 'b 0 5 e 6 b 8 ad 4 d 6 9 abf 7 4 aa 3 be 3 c 0 ee 4 0 ae 0 7 d 6 6 e 1 8 9 5 b 9 ab 0 9 2 8 5 a 2 f 1 1 9 2 d 5 6 2 d 2 ', 'signature': 'ee 3 c 7 6 4 4 fd 8 0 7 0 5 3 2 b c 1 fde 3 d 7 0 d 7 4 2 2 6 7 d a 5 4 5 d 8 c 8 f 0 3 e 6 3 b d a 6 3 f 1 ad 4 2 1 4 f 4 d 2 c 4 bfdb 4 eb 9 5 2 6 def 4 2 deeb 7 e 3 1 6 0 2 a 6 ff 9 9 eba 8 9 3 e 0 a 4 ad 4 d 4 5 8 9 2 ca 7 5 e 6 0 8 d 2 b 7 5 e 2 4 a 1 8 9 a 7 f 7 8 ca 7 7 6 ba 3 6 fc 5 3 f 6 c 3 e 3 1 c 3 2 f 2 5 1 f 2 c 5 2 4 f 0 a 4 4 2 0 2 f 2 9 0 2 d' },]

5.4.2. TLS Channel Binding

TLS Channel Binding is an optional feature for WAMP-Cryptosign when running on top of TLS for link encryption. The use of "channel binding" to bind authentication at application layers to secure sessions at lower layers in the network stack protects against certain attack scenarios. For more background information, please see

- RFC5056: On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels
- Binding Security Tokens to TLS Channels

A client that wishes to use TLS Channel Binding with WAMP-Cryptosign must include an attribute channel_binding in the authextra sent in HELLO.Details:

```
[ 1 , 'realm 1 ', {
    'authextra': {
        'channel_binding': 'tls-unique',
        'pubkey':
    '5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 ef 3 6 c 7 0 8 b 9 6 ee 6 f
    6 2 dddad 9 1 2 2 '
    },
    'authmethods': ['cryptosign']
    }]
```

The channel_binding, if present, MUST be a string with a value of tls-unique or tls-exporter, to specify the channel binding type that is to be used:

- tls-unique: RFC5929: Channel Bindings for TLS
- tls-exporter: RFC9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3

When a router receives a HELLO message from a client with a TLS channel binding attribute present, the router MUST:

- 1. get the TLS channel ID (32 bytes) of the TLS session with the respective channel type requested
- 2. generate new challenge (32 random bytes)
- 3. expect the client to send back a signature in AUTHENTICATE computed over challenge XOR channel_id

and send back the channel_binding in use, and the challenge in a CHALLENGE message:

```
[ 4 , 'cryptosign', {
    'challenge':
    '0 e 9 1 9 2 b c 0 8 5 1 2 c 8 1 9 8 da 1 5 9 c 1 ae 6 0 0 ba 9 1 7 2 9 2 1 5 f 3 5 d 5 6 1 0
    2 ee 3 1 8 5 5 8 e 7 7 3 5 3 7 ',
    'channel_binding': 'tls-unique'}]
```

The authenticating client MUST verify the actual channel binding in use matches the one it requested. If a router does not support the channel_binding the client requested, it may chose to continue the authentication without channel binding, and hence CHALLENGE.Extra would not contain a channel_binding.

The client MUST then locally fetch the channel_id from the underlying TLS connection and sign CHALLENGE.Extra.challenge XOR channel_id using its private key.

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5.4.3. Router Authentication

With the basic *Client Authentication* mechanism in WAMP-Cryptosign, the router is able to authenticate the client, since to successfully sign CHALLENGE.Extra.challenge the client will need the private key corresponding to the public key which the client announced in HELLO.Details.pubkey to be authenticated under.

However, from this alone, the client can not be sure the router against which it is authenticating is actually valid, as in authentic. *Router Authentication* adds this capability.

To request a router to authenticate, a client will start the authentication handshake by sending HELLO.Details.challenge|string:

```
[1, 'realm 1', {
    'authextra': {
        'challenge':
        'bbae 6 0 ea 4 4 cdd 7 b 2 0 dc 7 0 1 0 a 6 1 8 b 0 f 0 8 0 3 fab 2 5 a 8 1 7 5 2 0 b 4 b 7 f 0 5
7 2 9 9 b 5 2 4 deb',
        'pubkey':
    '5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 ef 3 6 c 7 0 8 b 9 6 ee 6 f
        2 dddad 9 1 2 2'
        }]]
```

Similar to *Client Authentication*, the challenge must encode a 32 bytes random value as a string in HEX format, and the router MUST respond by signing this challenge value with its (the router's) private key, and send back the signature in CHALLENGE.Extra.signature

```
[ 4 , 'cryptosign', {
    'challenge':
    '0 e 9 1 9 2 b c 0 8 5 1 2 c 8 1 9 8 da 1 5 9 c 1 ae 6 0 0 ba 9 1 7 2 9 2 1 5 f 3 5 d 5 6 1 0
    2 ee 3 1 8 5 5 8 e 7 7 3 5 3 7',
    'pubkey':
    '4 a 3 8 3 8 f 6 f e 7 5 2 5 1 e 6 1 3 3 2 9 d 5 3 f c 6 9 b 2 6 2 d 5 eac 9 7 fb 1 d 7 3 bebbaed
    4 0 1 5 b 5 3 c 8 6 2',
    'signature':
    'fd 5 1 2 8 d 2 d 2 0 7 ba 5 8 a 9 d 1 d 6 f 4 1 b 7 2 c 7 4 7 9 6 4 ad 9 d 1 2 9 4 0 7 7 b 3 b 1
    eee 6 1 3 0 b 0 5 8 4 3 ab 1 2 c 5 3 c 7 f 2 5 1 9 f 7 3 d 4 feb 8 2 db 1 9 d 8 ca 0 f c 2 6 b 6 2 b
    de 6 5 1 8 e 7 9 a 8 8 2 f 5 7 9 5 b c 9 f 0 0 bbae 6 0 ea 4 4 cdd 7 b 2 0 dc 7 0 1 0 a 6 1 8 b 0
    f 0 8 0 3 fab 2 5 a 8 1 7 5 2 0 b 4 b 7 f 0 5 7 2 9 9 b 5 2 4 deb'}]
```

When *Router Authentication* is used, the router MUST also send its public key in CHALLENGE.Extra.pubkey.

Further, *Router Authentication* can be combined with *TLS Channel Binding*, in which case the value signed by the router will be HELLO.Details.challenge XOR channel_id.

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5.4.4. Trustroots and Certificates

5.4.4.1. Certificate Chains

A public-key certificate is a signed statement that is used to establish an association between an identity and a public key. This is called a machine identity. The entity that vouches for this association and signs the certificate is the issuer of the certificate and the identity whose public key is being vouched for is the subject of the certificate. In order to associate the identity and the public key, a chain of certificates is used. The certificate chain is also called the certification path or chain of trust.

What is a Certificate Chain?

A certificate chain is a list of certificates (usually starting with an end-entity certificate) followed by one or more CA certificates (usually the last one being a self-signed certificate), with the following properties:

- The **issuer** of each certificate (except the last one) matches the **subject of** the next certificate in the list.
- Each certificate (except the last one) is supposed to be signed by the secret key corresponding to the next certificate in the chain (i.e. the signature of one certificate can be verified using the public key contained in the following certificate).
- The last certificate in the list is a **trust anchor**: a certificate that you trust because it was delivered to you by some trustworthy procedure. A trust anchor is a CA certificate (or more precisely, the public verification key of a CA) used by a relying party as the starting point for path validation.

More information about certificate chains, while in the context of x509, can be found in this white paper published by the *PKI forum*: Understanding Certification Path Construction.

What are On-chain Trust Anchors?

In x509, the set of trusted root CA certificates are stored in a machine/device local certificate store. This set of trusted root CA certificates are:


- 1. filled and fixed by the software or device vendor with a default root CA certificates set
- 2. may be extendable or replaceable by a user provided custom root CA certificates set

With 1., the user implicitly trusts the vendor, and all root CAs in the set installed by the vendor. With 2., the user must manage a public-private key infrastructure, and when information is to be shared with other parties, the use PKI must be made available to those parties, and the parties will operationally and administratively depend on the PKI hosting party. In summary, x509 follows a centralized and hierarchical trust model. With WAMP-Cryptosign, we use a public blockchain for certificate chain trust anchors. Using a public blockchain, specifically Ethereum, provides a decentralized, shared and cryptographically secure storage for root CA certificates, that is trust anchors. These anchors can be associated with other entities stored on-chain, such as *federated Realms*.

The following diagram shows the structure of certificate chains in WAMP-Cryptosign:

	EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate
++	<pre>+ chainId</pre>
	EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate
++	chainId Intermediate Certificate verifyingContract validFrom * stored off-chain issuer <+ * same realm as issueing cert subject * subset of capabilities realm of issueing cert capabilities meta + issuerSignature
	al hierarchical chain of intermediate certificates EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate
i ++	chainId Intermediate Certificate verifyingContract validFrom * stored off-chain > issuer * same realm as issueing cert subject+ * subset of capabilities realm of issueing cert capabilities meta + issuerSignature

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5.4.4.2. Certificate Types

The certificate types EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate and EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate follow EIP712 and use Ethereum signatures.

EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate:

[{ "name": "chainId", "type": "uint 2 5 6 " }, { "name": "verifyingContract", "type": "address" }, { "name": "validFrom", "type": "uint **2 5 6** " }, { "name": "issuer", "type": "address" }, { "name": "subject", "type": "address" }, { "name": "realm", "type": "address" }, { "name": "capabilities", "type": "uint 6 4 " }, { "name": "meta", "type": "string" }]

EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate:

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```
[
  {
    "name": "chainId",
    "type": "uint 2 5 6 "
  },
  {
    "name": "verifyingContract",
    "type": "address"
  },
  {
    "name": "validFrom",
    "type": "uint 2 5 6 "
  },
  {
    "name": "delegate",
    "type": "address"
  },
  {
    "name": "csPubKey",
    "type": "bytes 3 2
  },
  {
    "name": "bootedAt",
     "type": "uint 6 4 "
  },
  {
    "name": "meta",
    "type": "string"
  }
]
```

The EIP712 types for certificates contain:

- chainId: the chain ID of the blockchain this signed typed data is bound to
- verifyingContract: the address of the (main) smart contract this signed typed data is bound to

This prevents cross-chain and cross-contract attacks. The chainId is an integer according to EIP155:

- Ethereum Mainnet (ChainID 1)
- Goerli Testnet (ChainID 5)
- zkSync 2.0 Alpha Testnet (ChainID 280)

Besides EIP712, other comparable approaches to specify cryptographically hashable, typed structured data ("messages") include:

• Veriform: cryptographically verifiable and canonicalized message format similar to Protocol Buffers, with an "embedded-first" (heapless) implementation suitable for certificates or other signed objects

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• objecthash: A way to cryptographically hash objects (in the JSON-ish sense) that works cross-language. And, therefore, cross-encoding.

5.4.4.3. Capabilities

- Bit 0: CAPABILITY_ROOT_CA
- **Bit 1**: CAPABILITY_INTERMEDIATE_CA
- Bit 2: CAPABILITY_PUBLIC_RELAY
- Bit 3: CAPABILITY_PRIVATE_RELAY
- Bit 4: CAPABILITY_GATEWAY
- Bit 5: CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE
- Bit 6: CAPABILITY_PROVIDER
- Bit 7: CAPABILITY_CONSUMER
- Bits 8 63: future use, all set to •

Permission to create a CAPABILITY_PUBLIC_RELAY certificate on a realm can be configured by the realm owner for:

- PRIVATE: signed by realm owner
- PERMISSIONED: signed by requestor and realm owner
- OPEN: signed by requestor

Permission for CAPABILITY_ROOT_CA is always PRIVATE.

5.4.4.4. Certificate Chain Verification

use of a specific method/mechanism, when it comes to establishing trust (i.e. certifying public keys).

To verify a certificate chain and respective certificate signatures

[(EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate, Signature), (EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate, Signature),	// delegate certificate // intermediate CA certificate
 (EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate, Signature), (EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate, Signature)]	// intermediate CA certificate // root CA certificate

the following Certificate Chain Rules (CCR) must be checked:

1. **CCR-1**: The chainId and verifyingContract must match for all certificates to what we expect, and validFrom before current block number on the respective chain.

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- 2. CCR-2: The realm must match for all certificates to the respective realm.
- 3. **CCR-3**: The type of the first certificate in the chain must be a EIP **7 1 2** DelegateCertificate, and all subsequent certificates must be of type EIP **7 1 2** AuthorityCertificate.
- 4. **CCR-4**: The last certificate must be self-signed (issuer equals subject), it is a root CA certificate.
- 5. **CCR-5**: The intermediate certificate's issuer must be equal to the subject of the previous certificate.
- 6. CCR-6: The root certificate must be validFrom before the intermediate certificate
- 7. CCR-7: The capabilities of intermediate certificate must be a subset of the root cert
- 8. CCR-8: The intermediate certificate's subject must be the delegate certificate delegate
- 9. CCR-9: The intermediate certificate must be validFrom before the delegate certificate
- 10. **CCR-10**: The root certificate's signature must be valid and signed by the root certificate's issuer.
- 11. **CCR-11**: The intermediate certificate's signature must be valid and signed by the intermediate certificate's issuer.
- 12. CCR-12: The delegate certificate's signature must be valid and signed by the delegate.

5.4.4.5. Trustroots

Certificate chains allow to verify a delegate certificate following the Issuers-Subjects up to a *Root CA*, which is a self-signed certificate (issuer and subject are identical). The *Root CA* represents the *Trustroot* of all involved delegates.

When both a connecting WAMP client and the WAMP router are using the same *Root CA* and thus use a common *Trustroot*, they are said to be authorized in the same trust domain (identified by the trustroot).

Trustroots are identified by their Ethereum address, which is computed from the issuer public key according to EIP-55.

There are two types of *Root CAs* and *Trustroots*:

- 1. Standalone Trustroot
- 2. On-chain Trustroot

A *Standalone Trustroot* is managed by a single operator/owner, does not allow infrastructure elements (nodes, client, realms) to be integrated between different operators/owners and is privately stored on the respective operators systems only, usually as files or in databases.

Note that the Ethereum *address*, can be *computed* deterministically from the public key of the issuer of a certificate, even when the certificate (or the issuer) is *not* stored on-chain.

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An *On-chain Trustroot* in contrast is stored in Ethereum and publically shared between different operators/owners which allows infrastructure elements (nodes, clients, realms) to be integrated. For example, clients/nodes operated by different operators can authenticate to each other and nodes operated by different operators can authenticate to each other sharing the hosting of one realm.

The management of *On-Chain Trustroots* depends on the policy of the trustroot which is chosen and fixed when the trustroot is created:

- 1. Open
- 2. Permitted
- 3. Private

With an *Open On-chain Trustroot*, new certificates can be added to a certificate chain freely and only requires a signature by the respective intermediate CA issuer.

5.4.4.5.1. Standalone Trustroots

For a *Standalone Trustroot* the trustroot MUST be specified in HELLO.Details.authextra.trustroot| string

and certificates MUST contain

- a single EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate, and have the complete certificate chain of
- EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificates up to trustroot pre-agreed (locally stored or built-in) OR
- the complete chain of certificates starting with a EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate followed by one or more EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificates up to trustroot.

Example 3 contains an example gor the latter, with a bundled complete certificate chain, that is the last certificate in the list is self-signed (is a root CA certificate) and matches trustroot

```
trustroot == 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7
== certificates[- 1 ].issuer
== certificates[- 1 ].subject
```

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5.4.4.5.2. On-chain Trustroots

For an *On-chain Trustroot* the trustroot MUST be specified in HELLO.Details.authextra.trustroot| string

and certificates MUST contain a single EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate, and have the complete certificate chain of EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificates up to trustroot stored on-chain (Ethereum).

This is called a free-standing, on-chain CA.

When the trustroot is associated with an on-chain *Realm* that has trustroot configured as the *Realm CA*, this is called *On-chain CA with CA associated with On-chain Realm*.

5.4.5. Remote Attestation

Remote attestation is a method by which a host (WAMP client) authenticates its hardware and software configuration to a remote host (WAMP router). The goal of remote attestation is to enable a remote system (challenger) to determine the level of trust in the integrity of the platform of another system (attestator).

Remote attestation allows to


- perform security decisions based on security policy and measurement log
- tie device identity into authentication infrastructure
- verify device state in access control decisions
- avoid exfiltration of credentials

Remote attestation is requested by the router sending CHALLENGE.extra.attest|list[int] with a list of device PCRs to be quoted. A list of all PCRs available (usually 24) in a PCR bank of a device can be obtained running tpm2_pcrread without arguments.

A client receiving such a CHALLENGE MUST include an *Event Log* with PCRs collected from *measured boot* signed by the device's security module's *Attestation Key (AK)* and using the challenge sent by the router CHALLENGE.extra.challenge|string as a nonce. TPM 2.0 of the TCG specifies a suitable function in tss2_quote (also see here).

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The client MUST include the signed attestation in AUTHENTICATE.Extra.quote and the corresponding measurement log in AUTHENTICATE.Extra.measurement. The following diagram illustrates *Remote Attestation* with WAMP-Cryptosign:



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5.4.6. Example Message Exchanges

- Example 1
- Example 2
- Example 3

5.4.6.1. Example 1

- with router challenge
- without TLS channel binding

WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >>
HELLO::
[1 , 'devices',
{'authextra': {'challenge':
bbae 6 0 ea 4 4 cdd 7 b 2 0 dc 7 0 1 0 a 6 1 8 b 0 f 0 8 0 3 fab 2 5 a 8 1 7 5 2 0 b 4 b 7 f 0 5
7 2 9 9 b 5 2 4 deb',
'channel_binding': None,
'pubkey':
'5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 ef 3 6 c 7 0 8 b 9 6 ee 6 f
6 2 dddad 9 1 2 2 '},
'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
'caller_identification': True,
'pattern_based_registration': True,
'progressive_call_results': True,
'registration_revocation': True,
'shared_registration': True}},
'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
'caller_identification': True,
'progressive_call_results': True}},
'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True,
'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}},
'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True,
'publisher_identification': True,
'subscription_revocation': True}}}]
>>>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) <<
CHALLENGE:: [4 ,
'cryptosign',
{'challenge':
'0 e 9 1 9 2 b c 0 8 5 1 2 c 8 1 9 8 d a 1 5 9 c 1 a e 6 0 0 b a 9 1 7 2 9 2 1 5 f 3 5 d 5 6 1 0
2 ee 3 1 8 5 5 8 e 7 7 3 5 3 7',
'channel_binding': None,
'pubkey': ' 4 a 3 8 3 8 f 6 f e 7 5 2 5 1 e 6 1 3 3 2 9 d 5 3 f c 6 9 b 2 6 2 d 5 eac 9 7 fb 1 d 7 3 bebbaed
4 0 1 5 b 5 3 c 8 6 2',
'signature':
'fd 5 1 2 8 d 2 d 2 0 7 ba 5 8 a 9 d 1 d 6 f 4 1 b 7 2 c 7 4 7 9 6 4 ad 9 d 1 2 9 4 0 7 7 b 3 b 1
eee 6 1 3 0 b 0 5 8 4 3 ab 1 2 c 5 3 c 7 f 2 5 1 9 f 7 3 d 4 feb 8 2 db 1 9 d 8 ca 0 fc 2 6 b 6 2 b
de 6 5 1 8 e 7 9 a 8 8 2 f 5 7 9 5 bc 9 f 0 0 bbae 6 0 ea 4 4 cdd 7 b 2 0 dc 7 0 1 0 a 6 1 8 b 0 f 0 8 0 3 fab 2 5 a 8 1 7 5 2 0 b 4 b 7 f 0 5 7 2 9 9 b 5 2 4 deb'}]
<<
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >>
AUTHENTICATE::
[5,
'a 3 a 1 7 8 fe 7 9 2 ed 7 7 2 a 8 fc 0 9 2 f 8 3 4 1 e 4 5 5 de 9 6 6 7 0 c 8 9 0 1 2 6 4 a 7 c
3 1 2 dbf 9 4 0 d 5 7 4 3 6 2 6 fe 9 fbc 2 9 b 2 3 dcd 2 1 6 9 b 3 0 8 eca 3 0 9 de 8 5 a 8 9 c
cd 2 9 6 b 2 4 8 3 5 de 3 d 9 5 b 1 6 b 7 7 0 3 0 e 9 1 9 2 b c 0 8 5 1 2 c 8 1 9 8 da 1 5 9 c

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```
1 ae 6 0 0 ba 9 1 7 2 9 2 1 5 f 3 5 d 5 6 1 0 2 ee 3 1 8 5 5 8 e 7 7 3 5 3 7 ',
  {}]
>>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) <<
 WELCOME::
  [2,
3735119691078036,
  {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 4 9 8 7 9 '
           'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 3 9 7 6 ',
'x_cb_pid': 4 9 9 8 7,
           'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '},
   'authid': 'client 0 1 @example.com',
   'authmethod': 'cryptosign',
   'authprovider': 'static',
   'authrole': 'device',
   'realm': 'devices',
   'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True,
                       'pattern_based_subscription': True,
                       'publisher_exclusion': True,
                       'publisher_identification': True,
                       'session_meta_api': True,
                       'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True,
                       'subscription_meta_api': True,
                       'subscription_revocation': True}},
         'dealer': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
                       'caller_identification': True,
                       'pattern_based_registration': True,
                       'progressive_call_results': True,
                       'registration meta api': True,
                       'registration_revocation': True,
                       'session_meta_api': True,
                       'shared_registration': True,
                       'testament_meta_api': True}}},
   'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 4 9 8 7 9',
   'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 3 9 7 6 ',
   'x_cb_pid': 4 9 9 8 7,
   'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '}]
<<
WAMP-Transmit(3 7 3 5 1 1 9 6 9 1 0 7 8 0 3 6, client 0 1 @example.com) >>
 GOODBYE::
  [ 6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal']
>>
WAMP-Receive(3 7 3 5 1 1 9 6 9 1 0 7 8 0 3 6, client 0 1 @example.com) <<
 GOODBYE::
 [ 6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal']
<<
```

5.4.6.2. Example 2

- with router challenge
- with TLS channel binding

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WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> HELLO::
[1, 'devices',
{'authextra': {'challenge': '4f8 6 1f1 2 7 9 6 c 2 9 7 2 b 7 b 0 0 2 6 5 2 2 a 6 8 7 a a 8 5 1 d 9 0 3 5 5 1 2 2 a 6 1
d 4 f 1 fdce 4 d 0 6 b 5 6 4 f', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique',
'pubkey': ' 5 4 5 efb 0 a 2 1 9 2 db 8 d 4 3 f 1 1 8 e 9 bf 9 aee 0 8 1 4 6 6 e 1 ef 3 6 c 7 0 8 b 9 6 ee 6 f 6 2 dddad 9 1 2 2 '},
'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True,
'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_revocation': True,
'shared_registration': True}}, 'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
'caller_identification': True, 'progressive_call_results': True},
'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True,
'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}}, 'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True,
'publisher_identification': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}}]
>>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) << CHALLENGE::
[4 , 'cryptosign',
{'challenge': ' 3 5 8 6 2 5 3 1 2 c 6 c 3 bf 6 4 ed 5 1 d 1 7 d 2 1 0 ce 2 1 af 1 6 3 9 c 7 7 4 cabf 5 7 3 5 a
9 6 5 1 d 7 d 9 1 fc 6 a', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique',
'pubkey': ' 4 a 3 8 3 8 f 6 fe 7 5 2 5 1 e 6 1 3 3 2 9 d 5 3 fc 6 9 b 2 6 2 d 5 eac 9 7 fb 1 d 7 3 bebbaed
4 0 1 5 b 5 3 c 8 6 2 ', 'signature': 'aa 0 5 f 4 cd 7 7 4 7 d 3 6 b 7 9 4 4 3 f 1 d 4 7 0 3 a 6 8 1 e 1 0 7 edc 0 8 5 d 8 7 6 b 5 0 8
7 1 4 e 2 a 3 a 8 1 3 5 bacaae 1 c 0 1 8 4 5 2 c 4 acb 3 ad 2 8 1 8 aa 9 7 a 6 d 2 3 e 5 ac 7 e 3 7 3 4 c 7 b 1 f 4 0 e 6 2 3 2 a 7 0 9 3 8 2 0 5 a 6 f 5 a 1 f 0 3 4 a 2 8 0 9 0 b 1 9 5 fb 2 ce 2
4 5 4 a 8 2 5 3 2 f 5 c 8 baf 6 ba 1 dfb 5 ddae 6 3 c 0 9 ce 7 2 f'}] <<
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> AUTHENTICATE::
' 2 5 1 1 4 4 7 4 5 8 0 d 6 e 9 9 a 6 1 2 6 b 0 9 1 b 4 5 6 5 c 2 3 db 5 6 7 d 6 8 6 c 5 b 8 c 3 a 9 4 e 3 f 2 f 0 9 dc 8 0 3 0 0 c 5 b 4 0 a 1 2 4 2 3 6 7 3 3 fa 5 6 3 9 6 df 7 2 1 eb 1 2 ac 0 9 2 3 6 2 3 7 9 bd 5 b 2 7 b 4 db 9 e 2 beaa 1 4 0 8 dcf 5 9 bd 3 6 1 a 2 9 2 1 4 4 8 f 0 e

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```
4 5 e 1 2 f 3 0 3 0 9 7 9 2 4 f 5 7 9 8 a 8 3 b 8 9 5 c f 6 b 1 7 9 a 6 d 6 6 4 d 0 a',
  {}]
>>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) <<
 WELCOME::
  [ 2 ,
7 3 2 5 9 6 6 1 4 0 4 4 5 4 6 1 ,
  {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 4 9 8 7 9 ',
            'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 4 0 4 6 ',
'x_cb_pid': 4 9 9 8 7,
            'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '},
   'authid': 'client 0 1 @example.com',
   'authmethod': 'cryptosign',
   'authprovider': 'static',
   'authrole': 'device',
   'realm': 'devices',
   'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True,
                       'pattern_based_subscription': True,
                       'publisher_exclusion': True,
                       'publisher_identification': True,
                       'session_meta_api': True,
                       'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True,
                       'subscription_meta_api': True,
                       'subscription revocation': True}},
         'dealer': {'features': {'call_canceling': True,
                       'caller_identification': True,
                       'pattern_based_registration': True,
                       'progressive_call_results': True,
                       'registration meta api': True,
                       'registration revocation': True,
                       'session_meta_api': True,
                       'shared_registration': True,
                       'testament_meta_api': True}}},
   'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 4 9 8 7 9',
   'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 4 0 4 6 ',
   'x_cb_pid': 4 9 9 8 7
   'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '}]
<<
2 0 2 2 - 0 7 - 1 3 T 1 7 : 3 8 : 2 9 + 0 2 0 0 session joined: {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-
nuci 7 - 4 9 8 7 9',
        'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4:1 2 7.0.0.1:5 4 0 4 6',
        'x_cb_pid': 4 9 9 8 7,
        'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '},
'authid': 'client 0 1 @example.com',
'authmethod': 'cryptosign',
'authprovider': 'static',
'authrole': 'device',
'realm': 'devices',
'resumable': False,
'resume_token': None,
'resumed': False,
'serializer': 'cbor.batched',
'session': 7 3 2 5 9 6 6 1 4 0 4 4 5 4 6 1,
'transport': {'channel_framing': 'websocket',
```

'channel_id': {'tls-unique': b'\xe 9 s\xbe\xe 2 M\xce\xa 9 \xe 2 ' b'\x 0 6 %\xf 9 I\xc 0 \xe 3 \xcd(' b'\xd 6 2 \xcc\xbe\xfeI\x 0 7 \xc 2 ' b'\xfa\xc 2 r\x 8 7 \x 1 0 \xf 7 \xb 1 `'}, 'channel serializer': None, 'channel_type': 'tls', 'http_cbtid': None, 'http_headers_received': None, 'http_headers_sent': None, 'is_secure': True, 'is server': False, 'own': None, 'own_fd': - 1 , 'own_pid': 5 0 6 9 0, 'own_tid': 5 0 6 9 0, 'peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7.0.0.1:8 0 8 0', 'peer_cert': None, 'websocket_extensions_in_use': None, 'websocket_protocol': None}} WAMP-Transmit(7 3 2 5 9 6 6 1 4 0 4 4 5 4 6 1, client 0 1 @example.com) >> GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] >> WAMP-Receive(7 3 2 5 9 6 6 1 4 0 4 4 5 4 6 1, client 0 1 @example.com) << GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] <<

5.4.6.3. Example 3

- with router challenge
- with TLS channel binding
- with client trustroot and certificates

WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> HELLO:: [1, 'devices', {'authextra': {'certificates': [({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': '1'}, 'message': {'bootedAt': 1 6 5 8 7 6 5 7 5 6 6 8 0 6 2 8 9 5 9, 'chainId': 1, 'csPubKey': '1 2 ae 0 1 8 4 b 1 8 0 e 9 a 9 c 5 e 4 5 b e 4 a 1 afbce 3 c 6 4 9 1 3 2 0 0 6 3 7 0 1 cd 9 c 4 0 1 1 a 7 7 7 d 0 4 0 8 9', 'delegate': '0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6', 'meta': ", 'validFrom': 1 5 2 1 2 7 0 3, 'verifyingContract': ' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 '}, 'primaryType': 'EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate', 'types': {'EIP 7 1 2 DelegateCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId', 'type': 'uint 2 5 6 '}, {'name': 'verifyingContract', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'validFrom', 'type': 'uint 2 5 6 '}, {'name': 'delegate', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'csPubKey', 'type': 'bytes 3 2 '}, {'name': 'bootedAt', 'type': 'uint 6 4 '}, {'name': 'meta', 'type': 'string'}], 'EIP 7 1 2 Domain': [{'name': 'name', 'type': 'string'}, {'name': 'version', 'type': 'string'}]}}, '8 fe 0 6 bb 2 6 9 1 1 0 c 6 bc 0 e 0 1 1 ea 2 b 7 da 0 7 0 9 1 c 6 7 4 f 7 fe 6 7 4 5 8 c 1 8 0 5 1 5 7 1 5 7 da 7 0 2 b 7 0 b 5 6 cdf 6 6 2 6 6 6 dc 3 8 6 8 2 0 ded 0 1 1 6 b 6 b 8 4 1 5 1 df 1 ed 6 5 2 1 0 eeecd 7 e 4 7 7 cdb 7 6 5 b 1 b'), ({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': ' 1 '}, 'message': {'capabilities': 1 2, 'chainId': 1, 'issuer': ' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 ', 'meta': '', 'realm': '0 xA 6 e 6 9 3 CC 4 A 2 b 4 F 1 4 0 0 3 9 1 a 7 2 8 D 2 6 3 6 9 D 9 b 8 2 e f 9 6 ', 'subject': '0 xf 5 1 7 3 a 6 1 1 1 B 2 A 6 B 3 C 2 0 fceD 5 3 B 2 A 8 4 0 5 EC 1 4 2 bF 6 ', 'validFrom': 1 5 2 1 2 7 0 3, 'verifyingContract': ' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 '}, 'primaryType': 'EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate', 'types': {'EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId', 'type': 'uint 2 5 6 '},

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<pre>{'name': 'verifyingContract',</pre>
' 0 c 0 eb 6 0 a 1 0 8 dbd 7 2 a 2 0 4 b 4 1 c 1 d 1 8 5 0 5 3 5 8 e 4 e 7 8 8 6 b 0 c 9 7 8 7 1 9 2 a 3 3 a c 9 e 0 f 9 4 c 9 2 c e 1 5 8 f 8 de 5 7 6 f a 9 c c f 2 8 a 8 c 9 4 0 4 ed 6 6 c 2 d 3 5 5 e a 4 a e 7 e e 6 5 c ff 0 b 7 3 2 1 5 b 9 1 b b 1 c'), ({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': ' 1 '}, 'message': {'capabilities': 6 3, 'chainId': 1,
'issuer':
' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 ', 'meta': '', 'realm':
'0 xA 6 e 6 9 3 CC 4 A 2 b 4 F 1 4 0 0 3 9 1 a 7 2 8 D 2 6 3 6 9 D 9 b 8 2 ef 9 6 ',
'subject':
' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 ',
'validFrom': 1 5 2 1 2 7 0 3,
'verifyingContract':
' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 '},
'primaryType': 'EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate',
'types': {'EIP 7 1 2 AuthorityCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId',
'type': 'uint 2 5 6 '},
{'name': 'verifyingContract',
'type': 'address'},
{'name': 'validFrom',
'type': 'uint 2 5 6 '},
{'name': 'issuer',
'type': 'address'},
{'name': 'subject',
'type': 'address'},
{'name': 'realm',
'type': 'address'},
{'name': 'capabilities',
'type': 'uint 6 4 '},
{'name': 'meta',
'type': 'string'}],
'EIP 7 1 2 Domain': [{'name': 'name',
'type': 'string'},
{'name': 'version',

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'type': 'string'}]}},
'be 3 5 c 8 d 6 ae 7 3 5 d 3 bd 8 b 5 e 2 7 b 1 e 1 a 0 6 7 eba 5 3 e 6 a 1 cb 4 ef 0 f 6 0 7 c 4 7 1 7 4 3 5 e 8 ffa 6 7 6 2 4 6 e 7 d 0 8 dfb 4 e 8 3 c 7 8 ad 2 6 f 4 2 3 b 7 2 7 b 5 d 2 c 9 0 6 2 7 bdf 6 c 9 4 c 1 dbdf 0 1 9 7 9 c 3 4 b 1 c')], 'challenge':
' 2 7 6 3 e 7 fdb 1 c 3 4 a 7 4 e 8 4 9 7 daf 6 c 9 1 3 7 4 4 d 1 1 1 6 1 a 9 4 cec 3 b 1 6 aeec 6 0 a 7 8 8 6 1 2 e 1 7',
'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': ' 1 2 ae 0 1 8 4 b 1 8 0 e 9 a 9 c 5 e 4 5 be 4 a 1 afbce 3 c 6 4 9 1 3 2 0 0 6 3 7 0 1 cd 9 c 4
0 1 1 a 7 7 7 d 0 4 0 8 9 ', 'trustroot': ' 0 xf 7 6 6 Dc 7 8 9 CF 0 4 CD 1 8 aE 7 5 af 2 c 5 fAf 2 DA 6 6 5 0 Ff 5 7 '},
'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True,
'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True,
'registration_revocation': True, 'shared_registration': True}},
'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'progressive_call_results': True}},
'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True,
'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}}, 'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True,
'publisher_identification': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}}] >>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) <<
CHALLENGE:: [4 , 'cryptosign',
{'challenge': 'e 4 b 4 0 f 7 2 f 9 6 0 4 7 5 4 7 8 9 d 4 7 2 2 2 5 4 8 3 bace 9 2 6 b 9 6 6 8 d 7 2 c 9 1 2
2 5 4 5 e 5 4 0 d 8 d 9 8 f 2 3 ', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey':
' 4 a 3 8 3 8 f 6 f e 7 5 2 5 1 e 6 1 3 3 2 9 d 5 3 f c 6 9 b 2 6 2 d 5 eac 9 7 f b 1 d 7 3 bebbaed 4 0 1 5 b 5 3 c 8 6 2 ',
'signature': 'ce 4 5 6 0 9 2 9 9 8 d 7 9 6 5 3 3 d 7 ef 2 bab 5 4 3 3 0 0 4 0 9 d 1 6 1 0 6 6 c 9 5 2 0 c 9 2 8 4 df 6 bbfb 8 2 9 4 7 b 3 7 fb 7 8 d 6 9 fd 5 6 e 5 1 1 8 afec 6 2 e 3 5 e 0 1 5 c 6 0 5
6 9 af 2 e 1 8 ed 9 2 fedc 7 3 8 5 5 2 2 4 2 d 0 3 9 a 3 8 7 9 0 e 9 c 9 4 0 6 4 d 8 9 3 3 5 3 9 3 d 3 9 9 7 3 c 1 4 0 7 4 cd 1 0 0 8 d 7 2 6 6 de 7 4 c 6 4 1 1 0 3 e 3 0 6 0 9 '}] <<
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> AUTHENTICATE:: [5 ,
' 1 6 c 8 9 6 2 9 e 7 2 aff 3 f 4 4 6 6 1 e 7 0 1 3 4 1 b 2 2 2 1 a 2 fa 9 d 9 3 2 0 5 8 2 6 fad 8 5 e 7 0 d 3 a 8 dab 7 0 a 8 f 5 4 3 1 4 c 1 4 d 4 7 0 ebeb 7 7 a 0 dd 1 6 c 8 3 3 9 2 8 c 0 1

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```
1 3 4 a 5 2 b 2 e 7 3 8 6 2 b 7 d 3 f 2 5 8 b 6 0 0 0 5 9 e f 9 1 8 1 d 4 3 7 0 b 6 d 1 9 e 7 6
9 1 e 9 a 4 0 7 f 2 9 7 8 4 3 1 5 dfc 9 4 9 d 4 6 9 6 ce 5 e 1 f 6 5 3 5 ba 7 3 d',
  {}]
>>
WAMP-Receive(-, -) <<
 WELCOME::
  [2,
   8 6 9 9 9 6 5 0 9 1 9 1 2 6 0,
  {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 3 0 9 6 9 ',
           'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4 : 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 9 1 7 2 ',
           'x_cb_pid': 3 1 0 9 0,
           'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '},
   'authid': ' 0 xf 5 1 7 3 a 6 1 1 1 B 2 A 6 B 3 C 2 0 fceD 5 3 B 2 A 8 4 0 5 EC 1 4 2 bF 6 ',
   'authmethod': 'cryptosign',
   'authprovider': 'static',
   'authrole': 'user',
   'realm': 'realm 1 '
   'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True,
                      'pattern_based_subscription': True,
                      'publisher exclusion': True,
                      'publisher_identification': True,
                      'session_meta_api': True,
                      'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True,
                      'subscription_meta_api': True,
                      'subscription_revocation': True}},
         'dealer': {'features': {'call canceling': True,
                      'caller identification': True,
                      'pattern based registration': True,
                      'progressive_call_results': True,
                      'registration_meta_api': True,
                      'registration_revocation': True,
                      'session_meta_api': True,
                      'shared_registration': True,
                      'testament meta api': True}}},
   'x cb node': 'intel-nuci 7 - 3 0 9 6 9 '
   'x_cb_peer': 'tcp 4:1 2 7.0.0.1:5 9 1 7 2',
   'x_cb_pid': 3 1 0 9 0,
   'x_cb_worker': 'worker 0 0 1 '}]
<<
WAMP-Transmit(8 6 9 9 9 6 5 0 9 1 9 1 2 6 0,
0 xf 5 1 7 3 a 6 1 1 1 B 2 A 6 B 3 C 2 0 fceD 5 3 B 2 A 8 4 0 5 EC 1 4 2 b F 6 )>>
 GOODBYE::
  [ 6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal']
>>
WAMP-Receive(8 6 9 9 9 6 5 0 9 1 9 1 2 6 0,
0 xf 5 1 7 3 a 6 1 1 1 B 2 A 6 B 3 C 2 0 fceD 5 3 B 2 A 8 4 0 5 EC 1 4 2 bF 6 ) <<
 GOODBYE::
  [ 6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal']
<<
```

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5.5. Dynamic Authentication API

Write me.

5.6. Authorization

WAMP allows user services to integrate seamlessly while enabling *Clients* to perform *Actions*, namely, to

- register procedures using fully qualified URIs or URI patterns in order to receive invocations
- call procedures at (fully qualified) URIs
- **subscribe** to topics using fully qualified URIs or URI patterns in order to receive events
- publish events to (fully qualified) URIs

Performing these actions requires *Clients* to have an open *Session* to the same shared *Realm*.

A Session is established between a Client to a Router, and is initiated by a Client.

*Session*s MAY be required to Authenticate access to a Realm hosted by a Router.

Authentication is the sequence of operations that allow a *Router* to verify the identity of a *Session*, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources within a *Realm*.

When the Session authenticates to a Router successfully, the Router will have established the

- realm|string,
- authrole|string, and
- authid|string

for that *Session* running in the *Client*.

The triple (realm, authrole, authid) is called *Principal*, and a *Session* is authenticated under that *Principal*.

At any moment, there can be zero, one, or many *Session*s with different *session ids* authenticated under the *same Principal*.

*Session*s MAY be required to *Authorize* in order to perform a specific *Action* on an URI — (U+2014) or an URI pattern — (U+2014) within a *Realm*.

This distinction between *Authentication* and *Authorization* follows the established practice called "AAA":

- Authentication: Establishes who it is ("subject")
- Authorization: Decides within a *Realm* whether an *Action* ("**operation**") on an URI or URI pattern ("**object**") is allowed for the requesting *Principal* ("**subject**")

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• Accounting: Records, for a *Realm*, what *Action* ("**operation**") on what URI or URI pattern ("**object**") was requested by which *Principal* ("**subject**"), and whether it was allowed or denied

6. Advanced Security Features

This section covers some advanced features and techniques provided by WAMP mainly but not limited to security and cryptography.

6.1. Payload Passthru Mode

In some situations, you may want to reduce the access the router has to the information users transmit, or payload data is presented in some specific format that can not be simply recognized by WAMP router serializer.

Here are some use cases:

- Using WAMP via gateways to other technologies like MQTT Brokers or AMQP Queues. So the actual payload is, for example, MQTT message that should be delivered to a WAMP topic as is.
- Sensitive user data that should be delivered to a target *Callee* without any possibility of unveiling it in transit.

The above use cases can be fulfilled with the Payload Passthru Mode feature. This feature allows:

- Specifying additional attributes within CALL, PUBLISH, EVENT, YIELD, RESULT messages to signal the *Router* to skip payload inspection/conversion.
- The forwarding of these additional attributes via INVOCATION and ERROR messages
- Encrypting and decrypting payload using cryptographic algorithms.
- Providing additional information about payload format and type.

Feature Announcement

Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by *Callers* (role := "caller"), *Callees* (role := "callee"), *Dealers* (role := "dealer"), *Publishers* (role := "publisher"), *Subscribers* (role := "subscriber") and *Brokers* (role := "broker") via

HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.payload_passthru_mode|bool := true

Payload Passthru Mode can work only if all three nodes (*Caller, Dealer, Callee* or *Publisher, Broker, Subscriber*) support and announced this feature.

Cases where a *Caller* sends a CALL message with payload passthru without announcing it during the HELLO handshake MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

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Cases where a *Caller* sends a CALL message with payload passthru to a *Dealer*, the latter not announcing payload passthru support during WELCOME handshake MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

Cases where a *Caller* sends a CALL message with payload passthru to a *Dealer* that supports this feature, which then must be routed to a *Callee* which doesn't support payload passthru, MUST be treated as *APPLICATION ERRORS* and the *Dealer* MUST respond to the *Caller* with a wamp.error.feature_not_supported error message.

Cases where a *Publisher* sends a PUBLISH message with payload passthru, without announcing it during HELLO handshake, MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

Cases where a *Publisher* sends a PUBLISH message with payload passthru to a *Broker*, with the latter not announcing payload passthru support during the WELCOME handshake, MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

Cases where a *Publisher* sends a PUBLISH message with payload passthru to a *Broker* that supports this feature, which then must be routed to a *Subscriber* which doesn't support payload passthru, cannot be recognized at the protocol level due to asynchronous message processing and must be covered at the *Subscriber* side.

Cases where a *Callee* sends a YIELD message with payload passthru without announcing it during the HELLO handshake MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

Cases where a *Callee* sends a YIELD message with payload passthru to a *Dealer*, with the latter not announcing payload passthru support during the WELCOME handshake, MUST be treated as *PROTOCOL ERRORS* and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation error reason.

Cases where a *Callee* sends a YIELD message with payload passthru to a *Dealer* that supports this feature, which then must be routed to the *Caller* which doesn't support payload passthru, MUST be treated as *APPLICATION ERRORS* and the *Dealer* MUST respond to the *Callee* with a wamp.error.feature_not_supported error message.

Message Attributes

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To use payload passthru mode, the options for CALL, PUBLISH and YIELD messages MUST be extended with additional attributes. These additional attributes must be forwarded via INVOCATION, EVENT and RESULT messages, respectively, as well as ERROR messages in the case of failures.

CALL.Options.ppt_scheme|string CALL.Options.ppt_serializer|string CALL.Options.ppt_cipher|string CALL.Options.ppt_keyid|string ----INVOCATION.Details.ppt scheme|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_serializer|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_cipher|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_keyid|string YIELD.Options.ppt_scheme|string YIELD.Options.ppt_serializer|string YIELD.Options.ppt_cipher|string YIELD.Options.ppt_keyid|string RESULT.Details.ppt_scheme|string RESULT.Details.ppt_serializer|string RESULT.Details.ppt_cipher|string RESULT.Details.ppt_keyid|string ---ERROR.Details.ppt scheme|string ERROR.Details.ppt serializer|string ERROR.Details.ppt_cipher|string ERROR.Details.ppt_keyid|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_scheme|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_serializer|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_cipher|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_keyid|string EVENT.Details.ppt_scheme|string EVENT.Details.ppt_serializer|string EVENT.Details.ppt_cipher|string EVENT.Details.ppt_keyid|string

ERROR.Options.ppt_scheme|string ERROR.Options.ppt_serializer|string ERROR.Options.ppt_cipher|string ERROR.Options.ppt_keyid|string

ppt_scheme Attribute

The ppt_scheme identifies the Payload Schema. It is a required string attribute. For End-2-End Encryption flow this attribute can contain the name or identifier of a key management provider that is known to the target peer, so it can be used with help of additional ppt_ * attributes to obtain information about encryption keys. For gateways and external schemas this can contain the name of related technology. The one predefined is mqtt. Others may be introduced later. A *Router* can recognize that Payload Passthru Mode is in use by checking the existence and non-empty value of this attribute within the options of CALL, PUBLISH and YIELD messages.

ppt_serializer Attribute

The ppt_serializer attribute is optional. It specifies what serializer was used to encode the payload. It can be a native value to indicate that the incoming data is tunneling through other technologies specified by the ppt_scheme, or it can be ordinary json, msgpack, cbor, flatbuffers data serializers. For some predefined ppt_scheme schemas this option may be omitted as schema defines the concrete serializer. See predefined schemas below.

ppt_cipher Attribute

The ppt_cipher attribute is optional. It is required if the payload is encrypted. This attribute specifies the cryptographic algorithm that was used to encrypt the payload. It can be xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5, aes 2 5 6 gcm for now.

ppt_keyid Attribute

The ppt_keyid attribute is optional. This attribute can contain the encryption key id that was used to encrypt the payload. The ppt_keyid attribute is a string type. The value can be a hex-encoded string, URI, DNS name, Ethereum address, UUID identifier - any meaningful value which allows the target peer to choose a private key without guessing. The format of the value may depend on the ppt_scheme attribute.

ppt_Predefined Schemes

MQTT Predefined Scheme

Attribute	Required ?	Value		
ppt_scheme	Y	mqtt		
ppt_serializer	N*	native, json, msgpack, cbor		
ppt_cipher	Ν	-		
ppt_keyid	Ν	-		
Table 13				

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*: If ppt_serializer is not provided then it is assuming as native. So no additional serialization will be applied to payload and payload will be serialized within WAMP message with session serializer.

End-to-End Encryption Predefined Scheme

For End-to-End Encryption flow both peers must support chosen ppt_serializer regardless of their own session serializer.

Attribute	Required?	Value
ppt_scheme	Y	wamp
ppt_serializer	Y	cbor, flatbuffers
ppt_cipher	Ν	xsalsa20poly1305, aes256gcm
ppt_keyid	Ν	*

Table 14

*: The least significant 20 bytes (160 bits) of the SHA256 of the public key (32 bytes) of the data encryption key, as a hex-encoded string with prefix • x and either uppercase/lowercase alphabetic characters, encoding a checksum according to EIP55.

Custom Scheme Example

Required?	Value
Y	x_my_ppt
Ν	custom
Ν	custom
Ν	custom
	Y N N

Table 15

When Payload Passthru Mode is used for gateways to other technologies, such as MQTT Brokers, then the ppt_serializer attribute may be set to the native value. This means that the payload is not to be modified by WAMP peers, nor serialized in any manner, and is delivered as-is from the originating peer. Another possible case is when the ppt_serializer attribute is set to any valid serializer, for example msgpack. In this case the originating WAMP client peer first applies ppt_serializer to serialize the payload (without encryption), then the resulting binary payload is embedded in the WAMP message, the latter having possibly a different serializer depending on the one chosen during WAMP Session establishment.

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Important Note Regarding JSON Serialization

With Payload Passthru Mode, payloads are treated as binary. To send these binary payloads, the WAMP session serializer MUST support byte arrays. Most serialization formats known to WAMP support byte arrays, but JSON does not support them natively. To use Payload Passthru Mode with a JSON serializer, WAMP peers MUST perform the special Binary serialization in JSON. This conversion may have unacceptable overhead, so it is generally advised to use WAMP session serializers with native byte array support, for example, MessagePack, CBOR, or FlatBuffers.

Message Structure

When Payload Passthru Mode is in use, the message payload MUST be sent as one binary item within Arguments|list, while ArgumentsKw|dict MUST be absent or empty.

Since many WAMP messages assume the possibility of simultaneous use of Arguments|list and ArgumentsKw|dict, WAMP client implementations must package arguments into the following hash table and then serialize it and transmit as a single element within Arguments|list.

```
{
	"args": Arguments|list,
	"kwargs": ArgumentsKw|dict
}
```

This will allow maintaining a single interface for client applications, regardless of whether the Payload Passthru Mode mode, or especially Payload End-to-End Encryption which is built on top of Payload End-to-End Encryption is used or not.

Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL with encryption and key ID

```
[
    4 8,
    2 5 4 7 1,
    {
        "ppt_scheme": "wamp",
        "ppt_serializer": "cbor",
        "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",
        "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evIWpKGQAPdOh 0 ="
    },
    "com.myapp.secret_rpc_for_sensitive_data",
    [Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Caller-to-Dealer progressive CALL with encryption and key ID.

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Note that nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode with other features such as, for example, Progressive Call Results or Progressive Call Invocations.

```
[
4 8,
2 5 4 7 1,
{
    "ppt_scheme": "wamp",
    "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",
    "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",
    "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evIWpKGQAPdOh 0 =",
    "progress": true
},
"com.myapp.progressive_rpc_for_sensitive_data",
[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL with MQTT payload. Specifying "ppt_serializer": "native" means that the original MQTT message payload is passed as WAMP payload message as is, without any transcoding.

```
[

4 8,

2 5 4 7 1,

{

"ppt_scheme": "mqtt",

"ppt_serializer": "native"

},

"com.myapp.mqtt_processing",

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL with MQTT payload. Specifying "ppt_scheme": "mqtt" simply indicates that the original source of payload data is received from a related system. Specifying "ppt_serializer": "json" means that the original MQTT message payload was parsed and encoded with the json serializer before embedding it into WAMP message.

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```
[

4 8,

2 5 4 7 1,

{

"ppt_scheme": "mqtt",


"ppt_serializer": "json"

},

"com.myapp.mqtt_processing",

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION with encryption and key ID



Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION with MQTT payload

Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELD with encryption and key ID

Oberstein

```
[

7 0,

8 7 6 8 3,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 ="

},

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Callee-to-Dealer progressive YIELD with encryption and key ID

Nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode with other features such as, for example, Progressive Call Results.

```
[

7 0,

8 7 6 8 3,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 =",

"progress": true

},

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULT with encryption and key ID

```
[

50,

77133,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 20 poly 1 30 5",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 37 XGJO 2O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 ="

},

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Dealer-to-Caller progressive RESULT with encryption and key ID

Oberstein

Nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode with other features such as, for example,

Progressive Call Results.

```
[

5 0,

7 7 1 3 3,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 =",

"progress": true

},

[Payload|binary]
]
```

Example. Callee-to-Dealer ERROR with encryption and key ID

Example. Publishing event to a topic with encryption and key ID

```
[

1 6,

4 5 6 7 7,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "cbor",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 ="

},

"com.myapp.mytopic 1 ",

[Payload|binary]

]
```

Example. Receiving event for a topic with encryption and key ID

Oberstein

```
[

3 6,

5 5 1 2 3 1 5 3 5 5,

4 4 2 9 3 1 3 5 6 6,

{

"ppt_scheme": "wamp",

"ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers",

"ppt_cipher": "xsalsa 2 0 poly 1 3 0 5 ",

"ppt_keyid": "GTtQ 3 7 XGJO 2 O 4 R 8 Dvx 4 AUo 8 pe 6 1 D 9 evNSpGMDQWdOh 1 ="

},

[Payload|binary]

]
```

About Supported Serializers and Cryptographic Ciphers

WAMP serves as infrastructure for delivering messages between peers. Regardless of what encryption algorithm and serializer were chosen for Payload Passthru Mode, a *Router* shall not inspect and analyze the ppt_ options and payload of encrypted messages. The application is responsible for choosing serializers and ciphers known to every peer involved in message processing.

6.2. Payload End-to-End Encryption

TBD

7. Advanced Transports and Serializers

The only requirements that WAMP expects from a transport are: the transport must be messagebased, bidirectional, reliable and ordered. This allows WAMP to run over different transports without any impact at the application layer.

Besides the WebSocket transport, the following WAMP transports are currently specified:

- RawSocket Transport
- Batched WebSocket Transport
- LongPoll Transport
- Multiplexed Transport

Other transports such as HTTP 2.0 ("SPDY") or UDP might be defined in the future.

7.1. RawSocket Transport

WAMP-over-RawSocket is an (alternative) transport for WAMP that uses length-prefixed, binary messages - a message framing different from WebSocket.

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Compared to WAMP-over-WebSocket, WAMP-over-RawSocket is simple to implement, since there is no need to implement the WebSocket protocol which has some features that make it non-trivial (like a full HTTP-based opening handshake, message fragmentation, masking and variable length integers).

WAMP-over-RawSocket has even lower overhead than WebSocket, which can be desirable in particular when running on local connections like loopback TCP or Unix domain sockets. It is also expected to allow implementations in microcontrollers in under 2KB RAM.

WAMP-over-RawSocket can run over TCP, TLS, Unix domain sockets or any reliable streaming underlying transport. When run over TLS on the standard port for secure HTTPS (443), it is also able to traverse most locked down networking environments such as enterprise or mobile networks (unless man-in-the-middle TLS intercepting proxies are in use).

However, WAMP-over-RawSocket cannot be used with Web browser clients, since browsers do not allow raw TCP connections. Browser extensions would do, but those need to be installed in a browser. WAMP-over-RawSocket also (currently) does not support transport-level compression as WebSocket does provide (permessage-deflate WebSocket extension).

Endianess

WAMP-over-RawSocket uses *network byte order* ("big-endian"). That means, given a unsigned 32 bit integer

 $0 \times 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4$

the first octet sent out to (or received from) the wire is $0 \times 1 1$ and the last octet sent out (or received) is $0 \times 4 4$.

Here is how you would convert octets received from the wire into an integer in Python:

```
import struct
octets_received = b"\x 1 1 \x 2 2 \x 3 3 \x 4 4 "
i = struct.unpack(">L", octets_received)[ 0 ]
```

The integer received has the value 2 8 7 4 5 4 0 2 0.

And here is how you would send out an integer to the wire in Python:

octets_to_be_send = struct.pack(">L", i)

The octets to be sent are b"\x 1 1 x 2 2 x 3 3 x 4 4".

Handshake: Client-to-Router Request

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WAMP-over-RawSocket starts with a handshake where the client connecting to a router sends 4 octets:

MS	SΒ			LSB				
3	1							0
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	LLLL SSSS RRRR RRRR RRRR RRRR

The *first octet* is a magic octet with value 0×7 F. This value is chosen to avoid any possible collision with the first octet of a valid HTTP request (see here and here). No valid HTTP request can have 0×7 F as its first octet.

By using a magic first octet that cannot appear in a regular HTTP request, WAMP-over-RawSocket can be run e.g. on the same TCP listening port as WAMP-over-WebSocket or WAMP-over-LongPoll.

The *second octet* consists of a 4 bit LENGTH field and a 4 bit SERIALIZER field.

The LENGTH value is used by the *Client* to signal the **maximum message length** of messages it is willing to **receive**. When the handshake completes successfully, a *Router* MUST NOT send messages larger than this size.

The possible values for LENGTH are:

```
0: 2 * * 9 octets
1: 2 * * 1 0 octets
...
1 4: 2 * * 2 3 octets
1 5: 2 * * 2 4 octets
```

This means a *Client* can choose the maximum message length between **512** and **16M** octets.

The SERIALIZER value is used by the *Client* to request a specific serializer to be used. When the handshake completes successfully, the *Client* and *Router* will use the serializer requested by the *Client*.

The possible values for SERIALIZER are:

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```
0 : illegal
1 : JSON
2 : MessagePack
3 : CBOR
4 : UBJSON
5 : FlatBuffers
6 - 1 5 : reserved for future serializers
```

Here is a Python program that prints all (currently) permissible values for the second octet:

```
SERMAP = {
    1 : 'json',
    2 : 'msgpack',
    3 : 'cbor',
    4 : 'ubjson',
    5 : 'flatbuffers',
}

# map serializer / max. msg length to RawSocket handshake
# request or success reply ( 2 nd octet)
for ser in SERMAP:
    for l in range( 1 6 ):
        octet_2 = (l << 4 ) | ser
        print("serializer: {}, maxlen: {} => 0 x{: 0 2 x}".format(SERMAP[ser], 2 * * (l + 9), octet_2 ))
```

The *third and forth octet* are **reserved** and MUST be all zeros for now.

Handshake: Router-to-Client Reply

After a *Client* has connected to a *Router*, the *Router* will first receive the 4 octets handshake request from the *Client*.

If the *first octet* differs from • x 7 F, it is not a WAMP-over-RawSocket request. Unless the *Router* also supports other transports on the connecting port (such as WebSocket or LongPoll), the *Router* MUST **fail the connection**.

Here is an example of how a *Router* could parse the second octet in a *Clients* handshake request:

```
# map RawSocket handshake request ( 2 nd octet) to
# serializer / max. msg length
for i in range( 2 5 6 ):
    ser_id = i & 0 x 0 f
    if ser_id != 0 :
        ser = SERMAP.get(ser_id, 'currently undefined')
        maxlen = 2 * * ((i >> 4 ) + 9 )
        print("{: 0 2 x} => serializer: {}, maxlen: {}".format(i, ser, maxlen))
    else:
        print("fail the connection: illegal serializer value")
```

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When the *Router* is willing to speak the serializer requested by the *Client*, it will answer with a 4 octets response of identical structure as the *Client* request:

 MSB
 LSB

 3
 1
 0

 0
 1
 1
 1
 1
 1
 LSB

Again, the *first octet* MUST be the value **0** × **7** F. The *third and forth octets* are reserved and MUST be all zeros for now.

In the *second octet*, the *Router* MUST echo the serializer value in SERIALIZER as requested by the *Client*.

Similar to the *Client*, the *Router* sets the LENGTH field to request a limit on the length of messages sent by the *Client*.

During the connection, *Router* MUST NOT send messages to the *Client* longer than the LENGTH requested by the *Client*, and the *Client* MUST NOT send messages larger than the maximum requested by the *Router* in its handshake reply.

If a message received during a connection exceeds the limit requested, a *Peer* MUST **fail the connection**.

When the *Router* is unable to speak the serializer requested by the *Client*, or it is denying the *Client* for other reasons, the *Router* replies with an error:

An error reply has 4 octets: the *first octet* is again the magic **0** × **7** F, and the *third and forth octet* are reserved and MUST all be zeros for now.

The *second octet* has its lower 4 bits zero'ed (which distinguishes the reply from an success/ accepting reply) and the upper 4 bits encode the error:

- : illegal (must not be used)
- 1 : serializer unsupported
- 2 : maximum message length unacceptable
- 3 : use of reserved bits (unsupported feature)
- 4 : maximum connection count reached
- 5 1 5 : reserved for future errors

Note that the error code • MUST NOT be used. This is to allow storage of error state in a host language variable, while allowing • to signal the current state "no error"

Here is an example of how a *Router* might create the *second octet* in an error response:

```
ERRMAP = {
    0 : "illegal (must not be used)",
    1 : "serializer unsupported",
    2 : "maximum message length unacceptable",
    3 : "use of reserved bits (unsupported feature)",
    4 : "maximum connection count reached"
}
# map error to RawSocket handshake error reply ( 2 nd octet)
for err in ERRMAP:
    octet_ 2 = err << 4
    print("error: {} => 0 x{: 0 2 x}").format(ERRMAP[err], err)
```

The *Client* - after having sent its handshake request - will wait for the 4 octets from *Router* handshake reply.

Here is an example of how a *Client* might parse the *second octet* in a *Router* handshake reply:

```
# map RawSocket handshake reply ( 2 nd octet)
for i in range( 2 5 6 ):
    ser_id = i & 0 x 0 f
    if ser_id:
        # verify the serializer is the one we requested!
        # if not, fail the connection!
        ser = SERMAP.get(ser_id, 'currently undefined')
        maxlen = 2 * * ((i >> 4 ) + 9 )
        print("{: 0 2 x} => serializer: {}, maxlen: {}".format(i, ser, maxlen))
else:
        err = i >> 4
        print("error: {}".format(ERRMAP.get(err, 'currently undefined'))))
```

Serialization

To send a WAMP message, the message is serialized according to the WAMP serializer agreed in the handshake (e.g. JSON, MessagePack, CBOR, UBJSON or FlatBuffers).

The length of the serialized messages in octets MUST NOT exceed the maximum requested by the *Peer*.

If the serialized length exceed the maximum requested, the WAMP message can not be sent to the *Peer*. Handling situations like the latter is left to the implementation.

E.g. a *Router* that is to forward a WAMP EVENT to a *Client* which exceeds the maximum length requested by the *Client* when serialized might:

- drop the event (not forwarding to that specific client) and track dropped events
- prohibit publishing to the topic already
- remove the event payload, and send an event with extra information (payload_limit_exceeded = true)

Framing

The serialized octets for a message to be sent are prefixed with exactly 4 octets.

MSB LSB 3 1 0 RRRR XTTT LLLL LLLL LLLL LLLL LLLL

The *three least significant octets* constitute an unsigned 24 bit integer that provides the length of transport message payload following, excluding the 4 octets that constitute the prefix.

The most significant octet has the following structure

MSB LSB 7 0 RRRR XTTT

The four bits RRRR are reserved for future use and MUST be all zeros for now.

X is an extra (25th) bit used to encode the message payload length. This bit is only set when the payload length is exactly 16M octets, with the 24 remaining L bits cleared:

When the payload length is 16M-1 octets, for example, the prefix would be:

The three bits TTT encode the type of the transport message:

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0 : regular WAMP message
1 : PING
2 : PONG
3 - 7 : reserved

For a regular WAMP message (TTT == 0), the length is the length of the serialized WAMP message: the number of octets after serialization (excluding the 4 octets of the prefix).

For a PING message (TTT == 1), the length is the length of the arbitrary payload that follows. A *Peer* MUST reply to each PING by sending exactly one PONG immediately, and the PONG MUST echo back the payload of the PING exactly.

For receiving messages with WAMP-over-RawSocket, a *Peer* will usually read exactly 4 octets from the incoming stream, decode the transport level message type and payload length, and then receive as many octets as the length was giving.

When the transport level message type indicates a regular WAMP message, the transport level message payload is unserialized according to the serializer agreed in the handshake and the processed at the WAMP level.

7.2. Message Batching

WAMP-over-Batched-WebSocket is a variant of WAMP-over-WebSocket where multiple WAMP messages are sent in one WebSocket message.

Using WAMP message batching can increase wire level efficiency further. In particular when using TLS and the WebSocket implementation is forcing every WebSocket message into a new TLS segment.

WAMP-over-Batched-WebSocket is negotiated between Peers in the WebSocket opening handshake by agreeing on one of the following WebSocket subprotocols:

- wamp. 2 .json.batched
- wamp. 2 .msgpack.batched
- wamp. 2 .cbor.batched

Batching with JSON works by serializing each WAMP message to JSON as normally, appending the single ASCII control character <u>30</u> (record separator) octet <u>0 × 1 e</u> to *each* serialized messages, and packing a sequence of such serialized messages into a single WebSocket message:

```
Serialized JSON WAMP Msg 1 | 0 x 1 e |
Serialized JSON WAMP Msg 2 | 0 x 1 e | ...
```

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Batching with MessagePack works by serializing each WAMP message to MessagePack as normally, prepending a 32 bit unsigned integer (4 octets in big-endian byte order) with the length of the serialized MessagePack message (excluding the 4 octets for the length prefix), and packing a sequence of such serialized (length-prefixed) messages into a single WebSocket message:

Length of Msg 1 serialization (uint 3 2) | serialized MessagePack WAMP Msg 1 | ...

With batched transport, even if only a single WAMP message is to be sent in a WebSocket message, the (single) WAMP message needs to be framed as described above. In other words, a single WAMP message is sent as a batch of length **1**. Sending a batch of length **0** (no WAMP message) is illegal and a *Peer* MUST fail the transport upon receiving such a transport message.

7.3. HTTP Longpoll Transport

The *Long-Poll Transport* is able to transmit a WAMP session over plain old HTTP 1.0/1.1. This is realized by the Client issuing HTTP/POSTs requests, one for sending, and one for receiving. Those latter requests are kept open at the server when there are no messages currently pending to be received.

Opening a Session

With the Long-Poll Transport, a Client opens a new WAMP session by sending a HTTP/POST request to a well-known URL, e.g.

http://mypp.com/longpoll/open

Here, http://mypp.com/longpoll is the base URL for the Long-Poll Transport and /open is a path dedicated for opening new sessions.

The HTTP/POST request SHOULD have a Content-Type header set to application/json and MUST have a request body with a JSON document that is a dictionary:

```
{
"protocols": ["wamp. 2 .json"]
}
```

The (mandatory) protocols attribute specifies the protocols the client is willing to speak. The server will chose one from this list when establishing the session or fail the request when no protocol overlap was found.

The valid protocols are:

• wamp. 2 .json.batched

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- wamp. 2 .json
- wamp. 2 .msgpack.batched
- wamp. 2 .msgpack
- wamp. 2 .cbor.batched
- wamp. 2 .cbor

The request path with this and subsequently described HTTP/POST requests MAY contain a query parameter x with some random or sequentially incremented value:

http://mypp.com/longpoll/open?x=382913

The value is ignored, but may help in certain situations to prevent intermediaries from caching the request.

Returned is a JSON document containing a transport ID and the protocol to speak:

```
{

"protocol": "wamp. 2 .json",

"transport": "kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr"

}
```

As an implied side-effect, two HTTP endpoints are created

http://mypp.com/longpoll/<transport_id>/receive http://mypp.com/longpoll/<transport_id>/send

where transport_id is the transport ID returned from open, e.g.

http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr/receive http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr/send

Receiving WAMP Messages

The Client will then issue HTTP/POST requests (with empty request body) to

http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr/receive

When there are WAMP messages pending downstream, a request will return with a single WAMP message (unbatched modes) or a batch of serialized WAMP messages (batched mode).

The serialization format used is the one agreed during opening the session.

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The batching uses the same scheme as with wamp. ² .json.batched and wamp. ² .msgpack.batched transport over WebSocket.

Note: In unbatched mode, when there is more than one message pending, there will be at most one message returned for each request. The other pending messages must be retrieved by new requests. With batched mode, all messages pending at request time will be returned in one batch of messages.

Sending WAMP Messages

For sending WAMP messages, the *Client* will issue HTTP/POST requests to

http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr/send

with request body being a single WAMP message (unbatched modes) or a batch of serialized WAMP messages (batched mode).

The serialization format used is the one agreed during opening the session.

The batching uses the same scheme as with wamp. ² .json.batched and wamp. ² .msgpack.batched transport over WebSocket.

Upon success, the request will return with HTTP status code 202 ("no content"). Upon error, the request will return with HTTP status code 400 ("bad request").

Closing a Session

To orderly close a session, a Client will issue a HTTP/POST to

http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd 3 sBLOUnb 3 Fyr/close

with an empty request body. Upon success, the request will return with HTTP status code 202 ("no content").

7.4. Binary support in JSON

Binary data follows a convention for conversion to JSON strings.

A byte array is converted to a JSON string as follows:

- 1. convert the byte array to a Base64 encoded (host language) string
- 2. prepend the string with a $\ 0$ character
- 3. serialize the string to a JSON string

where Base64 encoding follows Section 4 of [RFC4648].

Example

Consider the byte array (hex representation):

1 0 e 3 ff 9 0 5 3 0 7 5 c 5 2 6 f 5 fc 0 6 d 4 fe 3 7 cdb

This will get converted to Base64

EOP/kFMHXFJvX 8 BtT+N 8 2 w==

prepended with \ 0

\x 0 0 EOP/kFMHXFJvX 8 BtT+N 8 2 w==

and serialized to a JSON string

"\\u 0 0 0 EOP/kFMHXFJvX 8 BtT+N 8 2 w=="

A JSON string is unserialized to either a string or a byte array using the following procedure:

- 1. Unserialize a JSON string to a host language (Unicode) string
- 2. If the string starts with a \ character, interpret the rest (after the first character) as Base64 and decode to a byte array
- 3. Otherwise, return the Unicode string

Below are complete Python and JavaScript code examples for conversion between byte arrays and JSON strings.

Python

Here is a complete example in Python showing how byte arrays are converted to and from JSON:

import os, base 6 4, json, sys, binascii data in = os.urandom(1 6)print("In: {}".format(binascii.hexlify(data_in))) # encoding encoded = json.dumps('\ 0 ' + base 6 4 .b 6 4 encode(data_in). decode('ascii')) print("JSON: {}".format(encoded)) # decoding decoded = json.loads(encoded) if type(decoded) == unicode: if decoded[0] == '\ 0 ': data_out = base 6 4 .b 6 4 decode(decoded[1 :]) else: data_out = decoded print("Out: {}".format(binascii.hexlify(data_out))) assert(data_out == data_in)

JavaScript

Here is a complete example in JavaScript showing how byte arrays are converted to and from JSON:

```
var data_in = new Uint 8 Array(new ArrayBuffer( 1 6 ));
// initialize test data
for (var i = 0; i < data_in.length; ++i) {</pre>
 data in[i] = i;
}
console.log(data_in);
// convert byte array to raw string
var raw_out = ";
for (var i = 0; i < data_in.length; ++i) {</pre>
 raw_out += String.fromCharCode(data_in[i]);
}
// base 6 4 encode raw string, prepend with \ 0
// and serialize to JSON
var encoded = ISON.stringify("\ 0 " + window.btoa(raw out));
console.log(encoded); // "\u o o o AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA o ODw=="
// unserialize from JSON
var decoded = [SON.parse(encoded);
var data_out;
if (decoded.charCodeAt( 0 ) === 0 ) {
 // strip first character and decode base 6 4 to raw string
 var raw = window.atob(decoded.substring( 1 ));
 // convert raw string to byte array
 var data out = new Uint 8 Array(new ArrayBuffer(raw.length));
 for (var i = 0; i < raw.length; ++i) {
   data_out[i] = raw.charCodeAt(i);
 }
} else {
 data_out = decoded;
}
console.log(data_out);
```

7.5. Multiplexed Transport

A Transport may support the multiplexing of multiple logical transports over a single "physical" transport.

By using such a Transport, multiple WAMP sessions can be transported over a single underlying transport at the same time.

As an example, the proposed WebSocket extension "permessage-priority" would allow creating multiple logical Transports for WAMP over a single underlying WebSocket connection.

Sessions running over a multiplexed Transport are completely independent: they get assigned different session IDs, may join different realms and each session needs to authenticate itself.

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Because of above, Multiplexed Transports for WAMP are actually not detailed in the WAMP spec, but a feature of the transport being used.

Note: Currently no WAMP transport supports multiplexing. The work on the MUX extension with WebSocket has stalled, and the permessage-priority proposal above is still just a proposal. However, with RawSocket, we should be able to add multiplexing in the the future (with downward compatibility).

8. WAMP Interfaces

WAMP was designed with the goals of being easy to approach and use for application developers. Creating a procedure to expose some custom functionality should be possible in any supported programming language using that language's native elements, with the least amount of additional effort.

Following from that, WAMP uses *dynamic typing* for the application payloads of calls, call results and error, as well as event payloads.

A WAMP router will happily forward *any* application payload on *any* procedure or topic URI as long as the client is *authorized* (has permission) to execute the respective WAMP action (call, register, publish or subscribe) on the given URI.

This approach has served WAMP well, as application developers can get started immediately, and evolve and change payloads as they need without extra steps. These advantages in flexibility of course come at a price, as nothing is free, and knowing that price is important to be aware of the tradeoffs one is accepting when using dynamic typing:

- problematic coordination of *Interfaces* within larger developer teams or between different parties
- no easy way to stabilize, freeze, document or share Interfaces
- no way to programmatically describe *Interfaces* ("interface reflection") at run-time

Problems such above could be avoided when WAMP supported an *option* to formally define WAMP-based *Interfaces*. This needs to answer the following questions:

- 1. How to specify the args|List and kwargs|Dict application payloads that are used in WAMP calls, errors and events?
- 2. How to specify the type and URI (patterns) for WAMP RPCs *Procedures* and WAMP PubSub *Topics* that make up an *Interface*, and how to identify an *Interface* itself as a collection of *Procedures* and *Topics*?
- 3. How to package, publish and share *Catalogs* as a collection of *Interfaces* plus metadata

The following sections will describe the solution to each of above questions using WAMP IDL.

Using WAMP Interfaces finally allows to support the following application developer level features:

- 1. router-based application payload validation and enforcement
- 2. WAMP interface documentation generation and autodocs Web service
- 3. publication and sharing of WAMP Interfaces and Catalogs
- 4. client binding code generation from WAMP Interfaces
- 5. run-time WAMP type reflection as part of the WAMP meta API

8.1. WAMP IDL

8.1.1. Application Payload Typing

To define the application payload Arguments|list and ArgumentsKw|dict, WAMP IDL reuses the FlatBuffers IDL, specifically, we map a pair of Arguments|list and ArgumentsKw|dict to a FlatBuffers Table with WAMP defined FlatBuffers *Attributes*.

User defined WAMP application payloads are transmitted in Arguments|list and ArgumentsKw|dict elements of the following WAMP messages:

- PUBLISH
- EVENT
- CALL
- INVOCATION
- YIELD
- RESULT
- ERROR

A Publisher uses the

• PUBLISH.Arguments|list and PUBLISH.ArgumentsKw|dict

message elements to send the event payload to be published to the *Broker* in PUBLISH messages. When the event is accepted by the *Broker*, it will dispatch an EVENT message with

• EVENT.Arguments|list and EVENT.ArgumentsKw|dict

message elements to all (eligible, and not excluded) *Subscribers*.

A Caller uses the

• CALL.Arguments list and CALL.ArgumentsKw | dict

message elements to send the call arguments to be used to the *Dealer* in CALL messages. When the call is accepted by the *Dealer*, it will forward

• INVOCATION.Arguments|list and INVOCATION.ArgumentsKw|dict

to the (or one of) Callee, and receive YIELD messages with

• YIELD.Arguments|list and YIELD.ArgumentsKw|dict

message elements, which it will return to the original Caller in RESULT messages with

• RESULT.Arguments|list and RESULT.ArgumentsKw|dict

In the error case, a *Callee* MAY return an ERROR message with

• ERROR.Arguments|list and ERROR.ArgumentsKw|dict

message elements, which again is returned to the original *Caller*.

It is important to note that the above messages and message elements are the only ones free for use with application and user defined payloads. In particular, even though the following WAMP messages and message element carry payloads defined by the specific WAMP authentication method used, they do *not* carry arbitrary application payloads: HELLO.Details["authextra"]|dict, WELCOME.Details["authextra"]|dict, CHALLENGE.Extra|dict, AUTHENTICATE.Extra|dict.

For example, the Session Meta API includes a procedure to kill all sessions by authid with:

Positional arguments (args|list)

1. authid|string - The authentication ID identifying sessions to close.

Keyword arguments (kwargs|dict)

- 1. reason|uri reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
- 2. message|string additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details under the key "message".

as arguments. When successful, this procedure will return a call result with:

Positional results (results|list)

1. sessions|list - The list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed.

Keyword results (kwresults|dict)

1. None

To specify the call arguments in FlatBuffers IDL, we can define a FlatBuffers table for both args and kwargs:

```
/// Call args/kwargs for "wamp.session.kill_by_authid"
table SessionKillByAuthid
{
    /// The WAMP authid of the sessions to kill.
    authid: string (wampuri);
    /// A reason URI provided to the killed session(s).
    reason: string (kwarg, wampuri);
    /// A message provided to the killed session(s).
    message: string (kwarg);
}
```

The table contains the list args as table elements (in order), unless the table element has an *Attribute* kwarg, in which case the element one in kwarg.

The attributes wampid and wampuri are special markers that denote values that follow the respective WAMP identifier rules for WAMP IDs and URIs.

When successful, the procedure will return a list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed. Again, we can map this to FlatBuffers IDL:

```
table WampIds
{
   /// List of WAMP IDs.
   value: [uint 6 4 ] (wampid);
}
```

8.1.2. WAMP IDL Attributes

WAMP IDL uses *custom FlatBuffer attributes* to

- mark kwarg fields which map to WAMP keyword argument vs arg (default)
- declare fields of a scalar base type to follow (stricter) WAMP rules (for IDs and URIs)
- specify the WAMP action type, that is *Procedure* vs *Topic*, on service declarations

"Attributes may be attached to a declaration, behind a field, or after the name of a table/ struct/enum/union. These may either have a value or not. Some attributes like deprecated are understood by the compiler; user defined ones need to be declared with the attribute declaration (like priority in the example above), and are available to query if you parse the schema at runtime. This is useful if you write your own code generators/ editors etc., and you wish to add additional information specific to your tool (such as a help text)." (from source).

The *Attributes* used in WAMP IDL are defined in <WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp.fbs, and are described in the following sections:

- arg, kwarg
- wampid
- wampname, wampname_s
- wampuri, wampuri_s, wampuri_p, wampuri_sp, wampuri_pp, wampuri_spp
- uuid
- ethadr
- type

WAMP Positional and Keyword-based Payloads

Positional payloads args|list and keyword-based payloads kwargs|dict are table elements that have one of the following *Attributes*:

- arg (default)
- kwarg

One pair of args and kwarg types is declared by one FlatBuffer table with optional attributes on table fields, and the following rules apply or must be followed:

- 1. If neither arg nor kwarg attribute is provided, arg is assumed.
- 2. Only one of either arg or kwarg MUST be specified.
- 3. When a field has an attribute kwarg, all subsequent fields in the same table MUST also have attribute kwarg.

WAMP IDs and URIs

Integers which contain WAMP IDs use Attribute

1. wampid: WAMP ID, that is an integer [1, 2 ^ 5 3]

Strings which contain WAMP names ("URI components"), for e.g. WAMP roles or authids use *Attributes*

- 2. wampname: WAMP URI component (aka "name"), loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^[^\s\. #]+\$.
- 3. wampname_s: WAMP URI component (aka "name"), strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^[\da-z_]+\$.

Strings which contain WAMP URIs or URI patterns use Attribute

- 4. wampuri: WAMP URI, loose rules, no empty URI components (aka "concrete or fully qualified URI"), must match regular expression ^([^\s\. #]+\.) * ([^\s\. #]+\.) *.
- 5. wampuri_s: WAMP URI, strict rules, no empty URI components, must match regular expression ^([\da-z_]+\.) * ([\da-z_]+)\$.
- 6. wampuri_p: WAMP URI or URI (prefix or wildcard) pattern, loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^(([^\s\. #]+\.)|\.) * ([^\s\. #]+)?\$.
- 7. wampuri_sp: WAMP URI or URI (prefix or wildcard) pattern, strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^(([\da-z_]+\.)|\.) * ([\da-z_]+)?\$.
- 8. wampuri_pp: WAMP URI or URI prefix pattern, loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^([^\s\. #]+\.) * ([^\\s\. #] *)\$.
- 9. wampuri_spp: WAMP URI or URI prefix pattern, strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^([\da-z_]+\.) * ([\da-z_] *)\$.

Type/Object UUIDs

Types and generally any objects can be globally identified using UUIDs [RFC4122]. UUIDs can be used in WAMP IDL using the uuid *Attribute*.

```
/// UUID (canonical textual representation).
my_field 1 : string (uuid);
```

/// UUID (1 2 8 bit binary). my_field 2 : uint 1 2 8 _t (uuid);

The uint 1 2 8 _t is a struct type defined as

```
/// An unsigned integer with 1 2 8 bits.
struct uint 1 2 8_t{
    /// Least significand 3 2 bits.
    w 0 : uint 3 2;
    /// 2 nd significand 3 2 bits.
    w 1 : uint 3 2;
    /// 3 rd significand 3 2 bits.
    w 2 : uint 3 2;
    /// Most significand 3 2 bits.
    w 3 : uint 3 2;
}
```

Ethereum Addresses

Ethereum addresses can be used to globally identify types or generally any object where the global ID also needs to be conflict free, consensually shared and owned by a respective Ethereum network user. Ethereum addresses can be used in WAMP IDL using the ethadr *Attribute*:

```
/// Ethereum address (checksummed HEX encoded address).
my_field 1 : string (ethadr);
/// Ethereum address ( 1 6 0 bit binary).
my_field 2 : uint 1 6 0_t (ethadr);
```

The uint 1 6 0_t is a struct type defined as

```
/// An unsigned integer with 1 6 0 bits.
struct uint 1 6 0_t {
    /// Least significand 3 2 bits.
    w 0 : uint 3 2;
    /// 2 nd significand 3 2 bits.
    w 1 : uint 3 2;
    /// 3 rd significand 3 2 bits.
    w 2 : uint 3 2;
    /// 4 th significand 3 2 bits.
    w 3 : uint 3 2;
    /// Most significand 3 2 bits.
    w 4 : uint 3 2;
}
```

WAMP Actions or Service Elements

The type of WAMP service element **procedure**, **topic** or **interface** is designated using the *Attribute*

1. type: one of "procedure", "topic" or "interface"

The type *Attribute* can be used to denote WAMP service interfaces, e.g. continuing with above WAMP Meta API procedure example, the wamp.session.kill_by_authid procedure can be declared like this:

The value of attribute type specifies a WAMP *Procedure*, and the call arguments and result types of the procedure are given by:

- SessionKillByAuthid: procedure call arguments args (positional argument) and kwargs (keyword arguments) call argument follow this type
- WampIds: procedure call results args (positional results) and kwargs (keyword results)

The procedure will be registered under the WAMP URI wamp.session.kill_by_authid on the respective realm.

8.1.3. WAMP Service Declaration

WAMP services include

- Procedures registered by Callees, available for calling from Callers
- Topics published to by Publishers, available for subscribing by Subscribers

We map the two WAMP service types to FlatBuffers IDL using the *Attribute* type == "procedure" | "topic" as in this example:

When the procedure wamp.session.kill_by_authid is called to kill all sessions with a given authid, the procedure will return a list of WAMP session IDs of the killed sessions via WampIds. Independently, meta events on topic wamp.session.on_leave are published with detailed SessionInfo of the sessions left as event payload. This follows a common "do-something-andnotify-observers" pattern for a pair of a procedure and topic working together.

The *Interface* then collects a number of *Procedures* and *Topics* under one named unit of type == "interface" which includes a UUID in an uuid *Attribute*.

Declaring Services

Declaring services involves three element types:

- Topics
- Procedures
- Interfaces

The general form for declaring *Topics* is:

```
<TOPIC-METHOD> (<TOPIC-PAYLOAD-TABLE>): Void (
type: "topic",
wampuri: <TOPIC-URI>
);
```

The application payload transmitted in EVENTs is typed via <TOPIC-PAYLOAD-TABLE>. The return type MUST always be Void, which is a dummy marker type declared in wamp.fbs.

Note: With *Acknowledge Event Delivery* (future), when a *Subscriber* receives an EVENT, the *Subscriber* will return an *Event-Acknowledgement* including args/ kwargs. Once we do have this feature in WAMP PubSub, the type of the *Event-Acknowledgement* can be specified using a non-Void return type.

The general form for declaring *Procedures* is:

```
<PROCEDURE-METHOD> (<CALL-PAYLOAD-TABLE>): <CALLRESULT-PAYLOAD-TABLE> (
type: "procedure",
wampuri: <PROCEDURE-URI>
);
```

The application payload transmitted in CALLs is typed via <CALL-PAYLOAD-TABLE>. The return type of the CALL is typed via <CALLRESULT-PAYLOAD-TABLE>.

The general form for declaring Interfaces, which collect Procedures and Topics is:

```
rpc_service <INTERFACE> (
   type: "interface",
   uuid: <INTERFACE-UUID>,
   wampuri: <INTERFACE-URI-PREFIX>
) {
   /// Method declarations of WAMP Procedures and Topics
}
```

Note: We are reusing FlatBuffers IDL here, specifically the rpc_service service definitions which were designed for gRPC. We reuse this element to declare both WAMP *Topics* and *Procedures* by using the type Attribute. Do not get confused with "rpc" in rpc_service.

Declaring Progressive Call Results

Write me.

Declaring Call Errors

Write me.

8.2. Interface Catalogs

Collections of types defined in FlatBuffers IDL are bundled in *Interface Catalogs* which are just ZIP files with

- one catalog.yaml file with catalog metadata
- one or more * .bfbs compiled FlatBuffer IDL schemas

and optionally

- schema source files
- image and documentation files

8.2.1. Catalog Archive File

The contents of an example.zip interface catalog:

The bundled Catalog Interfaces in above are FlatBuffers binary schema files which are compiled using flatc

```
flatc -o ./schema --binary --schema --bfbs-comments --bfbs-builtins ./src
```

from FlatBuffers IDL sources, for example:

```
rpc_service IExample 1 (
   type: "interface", uuid: "bf 4 6 9 db 0 -efea- 4 2 5 b- 8 de 4 - 2 4 b 5 7 7 0 e 6 2 4 1 "
) {
   my_procedure 1 (TestRequest 1): TestResponse 1 (
     type: "procedure", wampuri: "com.example.my_procedure 1 "
   );
   on_something 1 (TestEvent 1): Void (
     type: "topic", wampuri: "com.example.on_something 1 "
   );
}
```

8.2.2. Catalog Metadata

The catalog.yaml file contains catalog metadata in YAML Format:

Field	Description
name	Catalog name, which must contain only lower-case letter, numbers, hyphen and underscore so the catalog name can be used in HTTP URLs
version	Catalog version (e.g. semver or calendarver version string)
title	Catalog title for display purposes
description	Catalog description, a short text describing the API catalog
schemas	FlatBuffers schemas compiled into binary schema reflection format
author	Catalog author
publisher	Ethereum Mainnet address of publisher
license	SPDX license identifier (see https://spdx.org/licenses/) for the catalog
keywords	Catalog keywords to hint at the contents, topic, usage or similar of the catalog
homepage	Catalog home page or project page
git	Git source repository location
theme	Catalog visual theme
Table 16	

Here is a complete example:

```
name: example
version: 2 2.6.1
title: WAMP Example API Catalog
description: An example of a WAMP API catalog.
schemas:
- schema/example 1 .bfbs
- schema/example 2 .bfbs
- schema/example 3 .bfbs
- schema/example 4 .bfbs
author: typedef int GmbH
publisher: " 0 x 6 0 CC 4 8 BFC 4 4 b 4 8 A 5 3 e 7 9 3 FE 4 cB 5 0 e 2 d 6 2 5 BABB 2 7 "
license: MIT
keywords:
- wamp
- sample
homepage: https://wamp-proto.org/
git: https://github.com/wamp-proto/wamp-proto.git
theme:
background: " # 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 "
 text: " # e 0 e 0 e 0 "
 highlight: " # 0 0 ccff"
 logo: img/logo.png
```

8.2.3. Catalog Sharing and Publication

Archive File Preparation

The ZIP archive format and tools, by default, include filesystem and other metadata from the host producing the archive. That information usually changes, per-archive run, as e.g. the current datetime is included, which obviously progresses.

When sharing and publishing a WAMP Interface Catalog, it is crucial that the archive only depends on the actual contents of the compressed files.

Removing all unwanted ZIP archive metadata can be achieved using stripzip:

stripzip example.zip

The user build scripts for compiling and bundling an Interface Catalog ZIP file MUST be repeatable, and only depend on the input source files. A build process that fulfills this requirement is called **Reproducible build**.

The easiest way to check if your build scripts producing example.zip is reproducible is repeat the build and check that the file fingerprint of the resulting archive stays the same:

openssl sha 2 5 6 example.zip

Catalog Publication on Ethereum and IPFS

Write me.

8.3. Interface Reflection

Feature status: sketch

Reflection denotes the ability of WAMP peers to examine the procedures, topics and errors provided or used by other peers.

I.e. a WAMP *Caller, Callee, Subscriber* or *Publisher* may be interested in retrieving a machine readable list and description of WAMP procedures and topics it is authorized to access or provide in the context of a WAMP session with a *Dealer* or *Broker*.

Reflection may be useful in the following cases:

- documentation
- discoverability
- generating stubs and proxies

WAMP predefines the following procedures for performing run-time reflection on WAMP peers which act as *Brokers* and/or *Dealers*.

Predefined WAMP reflection procedures to *list* resources by type:

wamp.reflection.topic.list wamp.reflection.procedure.list wamp.reflection.error.list

Predefined WAMP reflection procedures to *describe* resources by type:

wamp.reflection.topic.describe wamp.reflection.procedure.describe wamp.reflection.error.describe

A peer that acts as a Broker SHOULD announce support for the reflection API by sending

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HELLO.Details.roles.broker.reflection|bool := true

A peer that acts as a Dealer SHOULD announce support for the reflection API by sending

HELLO.Details.roles.dealer.reflection|bool := true

Since *Brokers* might provide (broker) procedures and *Dealers* might provide (dealer) topics, both SHOULD implement the complete API above (even if the peer only implements one of *Broker* or *Dealer* roles).

Reflection Events and Procedures

A topic or procedure is defined for reflection:

wamp.reflect.define

A topic or procedure is asked to be described (reflected upon):

wamp.reflect.describe

A topic or procedure has been defined for reflection:

wamp.reflect.on_define

A topic or procedure has been undefined from reflection:

wamp.reflect.on_undefine

9. Router-to-Router Links

Write me.

- 1. Resolve global realm name R_name via ENS to the on-chain address R_adr of the realm.
- 2. Retrieve list of Domains R_DR routing realm R_adr.
- 3. Retrieve the node's N1 own domain D_N1 given the node's address N1_adr.
- 4. Check D_N1 is in R_DR.
- 5. Select a domain D (!=D_N1) from R_DR and get endpoint E for D.
- 6. Connect to D and authenticate via WAMP-Cryptosign.

- 7. Verify connected node N2 by checking against D
- 8. Subscribe to wamp.r 2 r.traffic_payable
- 9. When receiving a traffic payable event, buy the respective key by calling xbr.pool.buy_key, and calling wamp.r 2 r.submit_traffic_payment, which returns a traffic usage report.

Data Spaces are end-to-end encrypted routing realms connecting data driven microservices.

The message routing between the microservice endpoints in

10. Advanced Profile URIs

WAMP pre-defines the following error URIs for the **Advanced Profile**. WAMP peers SHOULD only use the defined error messages.

10.1. Session Close

The *Client* session has been forcefully terminated by the *Router* - used as a GOODBYE (or ABORT) reason.

wamp.close.killed

10.2. Authentication

No authentication method the *Client* offered is accepted.

```
wamp.error.no_matching_auth_method
```

The *Client* attempted to authenticate for a non-existing *Realm* (realm|string).

wamp.error.no_such_realm

The *Client* attempted to authenticate for a non-existing *Role* (authrole|string).

wamp.error.no_such_role

The *Client* authenticated for a non-existing *Principal* (authid|string).

wamp.error.no_such_principal

The authentication as presented by the *Client* is denied (e.g. "wrong password").

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wamp.error.authentication_denied

The *Client* authentication was rejected due to a technical runtime failure ("fail secure" operation).

wamp.error.authentication_failed

The *Client* did not provide the required, non-anonymous, authentication information.

wamp.error.authentication_required

10.3. Authorization

The *Principal* is not authorized to perform such Action.

wamp.error.authorization_denied

Authorization of the *Principal* to perform the given *Action* was rejected due to a technical runtime failure ("fail secure" operation).

wamp.error.authorization_failed

Authorization of the *Principal* is required to perform the given *Action*. This can be used for capability-based access control.

wamp.error.authorization_required

10.4. Remote Procedure Calls

A Dealer or Callee terminated a call that timed out

wamp.error.timeout

A Peer requested an interaction with an option that was disallowed by the Router

wamp.error.option_not_allowed

A Router rejected client request to disclose its identity

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wamp.error.option_disallowed.disclose_me

A Router encountered a network failure

wamp.error.network_failure

A *Callee* is not able to handle an invocation for a *call* and intends for the *Router* to re-route the *call* to another fitting *Callee*. For details, refer to RPC Call Rerouting

wamp.error.unavailable

A *Dealer* could not perform a call, since a procedure with the given URI is registered, but all available registrations have responded with wamp.error.unavailable

wamp.error.no_available_callee

A *Dealer* received a CALL message with advanced features that cannot be processed by the *Callee*

wamp.error.feature_not_supported

10.5. Terminology

This chapter contains a list of technical terms used in this specification, along with their respective meanings.

Implementations SHOULD use terms as defined here in their public interfaces and documentation, and SHOULD NOT reinvent or reinterpret terms. Users SHOULD be able to transfer their WAMP knowledge from one implementation to another. This is to support the overarching goal of WAMP to free application developers from restrictions when building distributed applications, both at the network level, and when choosing (or switching) the WAMP implementations used.

Our goal is to maximize **user choice and experience** when developing WAMP-based applications, both formally (open protocol and open source) as well as practically (switching costs).

10.5.1. Fundamental

Term	Definition
User	A person (or organization) running a WAMP Client or Router

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Term	Definition
Client	A program run by a <i>User</i> , with application code using WAMP for application-level communications
Router	A program run by a <i>User</i> , with middleware code using WAMP to provide application routing services
Peer	A WAMP <i>Client</i> or <i>Router</i> . An implementation might embed, provide or use both roles
Realm	Isolated WAMP URI namespace serving as a routing and administrative domain, optionally protected by AA
Transport	A message-based, reliable, ordered, bidirectional (full-duplex) channel over which <i>Peers</i> communicate
Connection	An underlying entity (if any) carrying the <i>Transport</i> , e.g. a network connection, pipe, queue or such
Session	Transient conversation between a <i>Client</i> and a <i>Router</i> , within a <i>Realm</i> and over a <i>Transport</i>
Message	Indivisible unit of information transmitted between peers
Serializer	Encodes WAMP messages, with application payloads, into byte strings for transport
Table 17	

10.5.2. Authentication and Authorization (AA)

Term	Definition
Authentication	Establishes the identity of a Session within a Realm
Principal	A <i>Principal</i> (authid) is any <i>User</i> that can be authenticated under a <i>Realm</i> (realm) and runs in the security context of a <i>Role</i> (authrole) within that <i>Realm</i> .
Credentials	The authentication information and secrets used during
Authorization	A decision on permitting a <i>Principal</i> to perform a given <i>Action</i> on an <i>URI or URI pattern</i>
Access Control	Policy for selective restriction of <i>Actions</i> on <i>URIs or URI patterns</i> performed by <i>Principals</i>

Term	Definition
Role-based Access Control (RBAC)	An <i>Access Control</i> policy based on <i>Realm</i> (realm), <i>Principal</i> 's <i>Role</i> (authrole), <i>URI or URI pattern</i> , and <i>Action</i>
Discretionary Access Control	An Access Control policy controlled by Users and enforced by Routers
Mandatory Access Control	An <i>Access Control</i> policy controlled by <i>Router Administrators</i> or <i>Realm Owners</i> , and enforced by <i>Routers</i>
Capability-based Access Control	An <i>Access Control</i> policy where <i>Callers, Callees, Publishers, Subscribers</i> directly share capabilities with each other
Subject	The originating Session of an Action in the context of Authorization
Object	A (fully qualified) <i>URI or URI pattern</i> representing the target of an <i>Action</i> in the context of <i>Authorization</i>
Action	One of the four core WAMP operations: register , call , subscribe , and publish

Table 18

10.5.3. Remote Procedure Calls

Term	Definition
Caller	A <i>Caller</i> is a <i>Session</i> that calls , with application payloads, a (fully qualified) <i>Procedure</i> for call routing
Callee	A <i>Callee</i> is a <i>Session</i> that responds to <i>Procedure</i> call invocations by yielding back application result payloads
Procedure	A <i>Procedure</i> is an URI or URI pattern that can be registered for call routing by <i>Callees</i>
Registration	A <i>Router</i> record resulting from a <i>Callee</i> successfully registering a <i>Procedure</i> for call routing
Call	A transient <i>Router</i> record resulting from a <i>Caller</i> successfully calling a <i>Procedure</i> for call routing
Invocation	A call request and payload that are routed to a <i>Callee</i> having a matching <i>Registration</i> for the called <i>Procedure</i>

Table 19

Term	Definition
Publisher	A <i>Publisher</i> is a <i>Session</i> that publishes application payloads to a (fully qualified) <i>Topic</i> for event routing
Subscriber	A <i>Subscriber</i> is a <i>Session</i> that subscribes to a <i>Topic</i> to receive application payloads on matching events
Торіс	A <i>Topic</i> is an URI or URI pattern that can be subscribed to for event routing by <i>Subscribers</i>
Subscription	A <i>Router</i> record resulting from a <i>Subscriber</i> successfully subscribing to a <i>Topic</i> for event routing
Publication	A transient <i>Router</i> record resulting from a <i>Publisher</i> successfully publishing to a <i>Topic</i> for event routing
Event	A publication that is routed to <i>Subscribers</i> having matching <i>Subscriptions</i> to the published <i>Topic</i> .
Table 20	

10.5.4. Publish and Subscribe

11. IANA Considerations

WAMP uses the Subprotocol Identifier wamp registered with the WebSocket Subprotocol Name Registry, operated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).

12. Conformance Requirements

All diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative, as are all sections explicitly marked non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as "strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word ("MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY", etc.) used in introducing the algorithm.

Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps MAY be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is equivalent.

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12.1. Terminology and Other Conventions

Key terms such as named algorithms or definitions are indicated like *this* when they first occur, and are capitalized throughout the text.

13. Contributors

WAMP was developed in an open process from the beginning, and a lot of people have contributed ideas and other feedback. Here we are listing people who have opted in to being mentioned:

- Alexander Goedde
- Amber Brown
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- Zhigang Wang

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- [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.

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Author's Address

Tobias Oberstein typedef int GmbH Email: tobias.oberstein@typedefint.eu